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The last 15 years have seen governments in a number of mature welfare states 
attempting to reintegrate people out of work for reasons of sickness and disability into
employment, principally through changes to the value and conditions of incapacity 
benefits1 and the provision of active labour market programmes.  Whilst the academic 
interest in these changes has been considerable, this thesis begins by arguing that 
these studies hitherto have been satisfied to categorise these emerging regimes 
according to a familiar Work-first v Human Capital Development activation typology 
(for example, Peck & Theodore, 2001), or a variation upon that, according to the 
presence or absence of different activation services.  They largely do not apply the 
insights that the broader activation literature has provided in recent years, particularly
those on the governance of activation.  
Instead, this thesis proposes that it is better to examine recent changes through the 
lens of institutionalisation: how well-embedded employment-related support for sick 
and disabled claimants has become in the structure and functioning of welfare-to-
work regimes for sick and disabled benefit claimants.  Though not a concept much 
used in academic analysis of Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP), a case is made for 
the value of looking at, firstly, how well activating sick and disabled claimants 
becomes a national government labour market policy priority and secondly, how well 
the organisation and governance of active labour market programmes for this group 
support this, in additional to analyses of the services themselves.  Working from what 
is already known about the factors that can influence a workless benefit claimant's 
access to employment support, the contention of such a framework is that the 
successful embedding of an activation strategy for sick and disabled claimants into 
national Labour Market Policy (LMP) is a function of the interaction of a range of 
factors.  Crucial here is the distinction between ALMP for these claimants, and for 
other activation target groups – there is good evidence to believe that the changes 
made to activation governance to promote active work-search for the unemployed 
may, however unintentionally, militate against a comprehensive system of support for 
1 This is a catch-all term used to encompass benefits paid for reasons of sickness, disability or other 
incapacity.
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'non-employed' jobseekers considered to be further from the labour market, claimants 
of incapacity benefits included.
Alongside this framework, a case is made for being much clearer and more precise in 
describing what measures apply to which parts of the incapacity benefit claimant pool.
In most countries, this is a very diverse population with several distinct sub-sets with 
different levels of distance from the labour market, ranging from those with very 
severe disabilities or health conditions; others with multiple employment barriers not 
all stemming directly from their condition (outdated skills, for example), and those 
whose employability is high, their disability or health condition notwithstanding.  As 
a small number of studies have pointed out (Evans, 2001, for example), activation 
regimes – defined in this study as the set of services that are provided to help non-
employed sick and disabled benefit claimants back to work; and how these are 
organised; delivered; targeted and financed – 'sort and select' claimants, applying 
different types or more or less intensive support for different categorisations of 
claimants.  An activation regime for the claimant group can thus be very inclusive or 
rather narrow, depending on the extent to which these sub-pools are catered for.
To demonstrate the value of this framework in reaching a more accurate 
understanding of the nature of these emerging regimes relative to extant approaches, 
a cross-national comparison of activation of sick and disabled claimants in Denmark 
and the United Kingdom is offered.  Whilst they are considered to be very nearly 
diametrically opposed in a number of key ways – their approaches to activation; 
benefit generosity and broader welfare regime contexts – when looked at using the 
institutionalisation framework, they emerge as more similar than expected.  
Regardless of their quite different starting points, they experience many of the same 
challenges in creating a system in which the employment activation of the full extent 
of the claimant group is a priority and where a sick or disabled benefit claimant's right
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Notes on layout; presentation of data; referencing; style 
and usage 
Layout
The thesis is split into 10 individual chapters. These are divided into sub-sections and 
these sub-sections may sometimes have separate sections of their own.  Font size and 
numbering have been used to help the reader navigate the sections. An example of 
how the thesis is laid out is below:
Chapter 7: Denmark
7.1 Political commitment to the active work principle for sick and
disabled claimants
7.1.2 Building an institutional framework
Launching new programmes
Paragraphing
Where an overly-long paragraph needs breaking up or where the subject is distinct, 
but subsidiary, 
an indentation is made.
When the point to be made is a substantively new one, this indicated by a line space 
and a new paragraph.
Abbreviations
The long form term followed by the abbreviation is used in the first instance, and 
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usually the abbreviation only thereafter. However, to avoid sentences with too many 
abbreviations, which are stylistically undesirable, a long form term might be used.
Where a Danish abbreviation is in common usage, this is used.  If no abbreviation in 
Danish exists but one is stylistically required, I have developed one from the English 
translation. This applies mainly to Danish benefits, which are, in contrast to UK 
benefits, referred to in long form in Danish publications.
Danish translations
Most Danish terms have a commonly-used English translation, and these are used, 
with the Danish form italicised and in brackets in the first instance of usage, for the 
benefit of the reader should they wish to cross-reference with a Danish source. If no 
translation exists and one is required, I have developed one and this is indicated in a 
footnote at the first instance of usage. In some cases the term used in Denmark is 
English, and thus do not require translation.
Unless otherwise indicated, Danish translations are my own, using my own 
knowledge of Danish; dictionaries and automatic translation.
Danish language entries in the Bibliography have an English translation of the title, 
for the reader's benefit.
Gender neutral language
An effort has been made to use only gender neutral language. In most cases, this 
means referring to a non-specific individual using 'they' or ''their', rather than 'he' or 
'his'.
Presentation of data
Numerical data is presented in the form of line bar graphs; pie charts and tables. These
are captioned accordingly, along with a descriptive title. The source of the data is 
given beneath.  Where the source of data is a database that has required some input to
generate the data, the title of the database and a description of the options entered is 
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added to the source details. In most cases, this is the Danish Labour Market 
Authority's Jobindsats database at http://www.jobindsats.dk or the Department for 
Work and Pensions Tabulation Tool https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/dwp-
statistics-tabulation-tool. Any calculations applied to the data are also provided.
Referencing
Referencing and citation styles
Referencing is in American Psychological Association (APA) style, a common form of 
the Harvard author-date referencing system. The author name and year of publication 
are cited in brackets and then a full reference provided in a list of references.  Page 
numbers are also cited if a source is quoted.
Where a publication is referred to as matter of interest – as distinct from being cited 
as evidence – it is cited in the same manner and prefaced with  “see, for example”, or 
similar, enabling the reader to look it up should they wish to.
Web sources
The majority of sources have been accessed via the internet. A URL is provided, along 
with the date on which the source was last accessed.  Over the time of research and 
writing, the websites of both the Danish and UK authorities have undergone 
redevelopment, and the cited sources may have been moved or deleted.  Where this is 
the case and has come to the author's attention, an effort has been made to provide an 
alternative link, and [Source deleted] added if this has not been possible. Links to 
moved UK government URLs generally redirect to an archived version hosted by the 
National Archives, but this facility is not offered by Danish government websites.  If 
the page is no longer online and the reader still wishes to be able to access it, an 
archived version (not necessarily corresponding to the page at the time it was read by 
me) may be available on Waybackmachine at http://archive.org/web/.
Referencing errors
I have experienced some difficulties with the citation software I used to insert citations
and compile the bibliography, described by the software's developers as the worst they
had ever seen.  About 50% of the citations were randomly re-organised and some 
deleted entirely. I have made efforts to correct this when I have noticed a mistake (the 
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most notable are when there is a Danish citation when there should be a UK one, or if 
the year is obviously wrong), but it is inevitable that some will remain and I ask for 




The British social security system has been accused of failing, and every adult claimant under 
60 is the subject of a silent accusation:  'Could you be working instead of claiming benefits?' 
But this implies an equally silent rejoinder on government: 'What are you doing to assist in 
expanding my opportunities to work?' Finding out the fair and rational answers to such 
questions takes time, is difficult and expensive to do, and contingent on the state of the 
general economy. 
Evans (2001) p.60
Around 25 years after the question of how workless benefit recipients can be moved 
into employment started to become one of the major preoccupations of the 
contemporary welfare state, the contours of the political and academic debates are 
now clear and well-established.  The political case rests on a number of familiar 
arguments clustered around several core areas: debates about the labour market and 
paid work – often the need for labour market flexibility and work as a route out of 
poverty; the benefits system – that cash benefits can act as an incentive not to work 
and that governments need to engineer claimant incentives accordingly; the 
individual – that they need to change their patterns of behaviour in order to gain 
employment; and around different ways of organising back-to-work support – that 
competition between rival service providers will drive up results and encourage 
innovation.  The evidence bases of these claims are all contested to some extent by the
greater part of mainstream academic work (Newman, 2011) but perhaps the point of 
greatest contention – both in terms of the intensity and quantity of the criticism – has
been over the distribution of responsibility for non-employment and thus efforts to 
move towards employment between the state and the individual, whereby an undue 
share of the blame for the claimant's worklessness is sited with the claimant 
themselves.  This can take a variety of forms: the claimant not having the skills and 
experience employers demand; ineffective or insufficient jobsearch activity, or 
supposed 'poor attitudes' to seeking, taking and retaining employment. This critique of
17
UK employment programmes from Patrick (2012) is fairly representative of this line of
argument:
Employability programmes such as New Labour’s New Deals and the Coalition’s Work 
Programme place emphasis on the individual barriers facing those out of work, focusing on 
the supply-side of the labour market, and seeming to implicitly suggest that those out of work
are ultimately responsible for their own unemployment […] Policy energies and rhetorical 
discourses are centred on how best to activate the economically inactive, with the corrective 
lens firmly focused on the steps individuals must take to make themselves more employable. 
Patrick (2012), p.8
Given that challenging the notion that claimants' work-search efforts can vary, be 
inadequate and need to be strictly monitored has been such a focus for academic 
analysis in recent years, it is perhaps surprising that such work does not take the 
natural step, and turn these questions back on governments, as Evans does in the 
passage quoted at the start of this chapter. National governments' activation 
programmes have of course attracted considerable scrutiny – particularly around 
whether or not they are successful and whether they are appropriate given what are 
argued to be the complex and interacting causes of non-employment – but these 
critiques assume a permanence and a level of political and institutional embeddedness 
of these activation regimes (defined in this study as the set of services that are 
provided to help non-employed sick and disabled benefit claimants back to work; and 
how these are organised; delivered; targeted and financed) that may not exist, or at 
least may more variable than has been appreciated hitherto.  In the quoted passage, 
Evans intimates that activation as a policy strategy may be less firmly rooted and 
more in flux than has been usually understood.  The thesis takes this as a starting 
point and makes a case for the value of looking at activation in this way: as a policy 
approach that can be institutionalised and deinstitutionalised – more or less secure 
and embedded – according to the operation of a variety of factors, and for developing 
a framework to allow these variations to be identified.
The value of the concept of institutionalisation of activation and the associated 
framework that is offered are demonstrated through a cross-nationally comparative 
analysis of developments in the activation of claimants of sickness and disability non-
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employment benefits2 in the United Kingdom3 and Denmark over a period of interest 
running from 2007 to 2014.   Concepts are inherently comparative, and so they must 
be seen to be valuable in analysing two or more cases – here, countries – for them to 
have any reason to exist at all, and this is what the two national case chapters do.  
The reason for doing a cross-national comparison goes further than this, 
however.  As a relatively new area policy and given that comparative work takes some
time to catch up with policy development, comparative analysis of activation for 
incapacitated benefit claimants is still in relative infancy.  Even so, the analyses that 
are coming through presently don't appear to be using the insights that the past 15 
years of activation research have bequeathed us since the last bout of cross-national 
analyses of welfare. Thus, studies like that of Etherington and Ingold (2012) take the 
cross-national analysis of this new and potentially exciting area study down a familiar
road where the mode of analysis is that of formal programme content and in which 
countries are distinguished from one another according to the Work-first v Human 
Capital Development dichotomy –  however much some studies strive to repackage it 
– and so, at best, the state-claimant responsibility debate outlined above is taken 
beyond one country.  Insights from the policy implementation and governance of 
activation fields of research that have been so fruitful in studies of activation of other 
groups have not been brought to bear on studies of sick and disabled claimants in a 
cross-nationally comparative way.  There are plenty of existing national studies 
around how various governance arrangements impact upon the ability of sick and 
disabled claimants to access support, but these insights are rarely put to wider use – 
either comparatively, looking at whether other countries experience the same 
problems and why they do, or do not – or explored for what they tell us about the 
nature of activation regimes for this group of claimants.
This is what this study tries to do. It seeks to tell a broader and more dynamic story 
about activation regimes for sick and disabled claimants – how they function (or 
indeed, malfunction) as the interaction of a variety of factors; to do this in a cross-
nationally comparative way and by bringing together a range of different insights 
2 For stylistic reasons, several variations on this are used, but this is the definitive phrase. 
Importantly, 'Claimants of sickness and disability non-employment benefits' is distinct from 
claimants of mainstream non-employment benefits who have a health condition or disability. The 
former is the focus here.
3 Excepting Northern Ireland, where social security and welfare-to-work is devolved.
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from the fullest range of activation literature: orthodox policy content analysis; 
activation governance; the politics of activation, and policy implementation work.  All
these three tasks are accomplished through the construction and use of the concept of 
institutionalisation. By pulling together a number of different insights and ideas, it 
offers a richer and more finely-grained way of looking at activation regimes for sick 
and disabled benefit claimants but also one that is readily cross-nationally 
comparative. It also offers scope for uncovering the similarities in the way different 
countries have experienced this policy challenge.
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Chapter 2 Review of literature
2.1 Role and scope of the review of literature
The drive to integrate sick and disabled benefit claimants into the labour market over 
the past two decades has generated a sizeable but what is argued here to be a 
narrowly-focused academic literature on incapacity benefits and the measures used by
governments to help claimants to move into work.  Most academic analyses are either 
observations of reform efforts; evaluations of effectiveness – and usually only of single
scheme or one country – or normative discussions of the rights and wrongs sickness 
and disability-related social security reform. That the literature should be skewed in 
this manner is understandable given, respectively, the relatively recent nature of the 
reforms; the emphasis governments put on the question of 'what works, for whom and
when' (Waddell, Burton, & Kendall, 2010) and the ease with which social security 
reform for people with illnesses or disabilities becomes politicised. But nonetheless, 
this review has confirmed my original working assumption that over and above 
whether particular approaches or programmes are successful in helping sick and 
disabled claimants find work and whether making incapacity benefits contingent on 
seeking work is politically or ethically acceptable, there are a series of compelling yet 
largely unasked questions about the nature and functioning of activation regimes for 
this group of claimants: how comprehensive are they? To what extent is the support 
offered to all claimants who need it? Is it inclusive, or only some sections of the 
claimant pool offered support? Is there a right to activation, or is it discretionary? All 
these, it is suggested, can be usefully asked and answered through the lens of 
institutionalisation. 
The first section of this chapter works through the broader existing academic 
literature on activation to see what factors need to be considered if a concept of 
instiutionalisation is to readily capture the functioning of activation regimes for sick 
and disabled claimants and show how those regimes can be embedded and 
disembedded.  The next section looks at the few existing attempts there have been to 
understand the activation of sick and disabled working-age benefit claimants cross-
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nationally and, in the light of the research reviewed in the first section, argues that 
their design and conceptualisation leads them to present stories about of activation 
regimes that ignore some key issues and thus become too wedded to orthodox welfare
regime models. 
2.2 Constructing the concept of institutionalisation: what does the 
activation literature offer?
Institutionalisation is not a concept used in studies of activation, and so there is no 
pre-existing framework that can be adapted to study the institutionalisation of 
activation for the claimant group of interest.  However, whilst the provision of 
employment support is generally assumed to be entrenched, a large number of studies
do in fact show that employment support to marginalised groups is contingent on, 
amongst other things, political will; the state of the economy; funding structures and 
the management of providers.  Whilst these studies generally do not conclude that 
activation for a particular target group can be a more or less strongly rooted, this is a 
logical conclusion of these studies.  By bringing these insights, together, therefore, it 
should be possible to develop a framework for measuring and understanding the 
institutionalisation of activation for sick and disabled benefit claimants of working 
age.
2.2.1 Policymakers and political commitment to the activation 
agenda for sick and disabled claimants
One of the challenges to the institutionalisation of activation is that, unlike other 
social policies, activation is largely discretionary.  Whilst claimants of, for example, 
state pensions accrue rights to their benefits through the payment of insurance 
contributions and most public healthcare systems provide treatment on the basis of a 
right derived from citizenship, employment support is rarely provided on a 
contributory or rights basis.  Two aspects of this discretionary nature are important 
here.  Activation has long been recognised as an inherently discretionary social policy
at the frontline service level (Jewell, 2007) – and the question of what impact this has 
on institutionalisation is looked at in this study – but activation can also be 
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discretionary at the policymaker level.  There are many studies that show that 
policymakers can and do expand and reduce the support used to activating marginal 
groups in response to a variety of pressures.  For example, like many other countries, 
Ireland became in the last decade interested integrating disabled people into its 
national activation strategy, but the pressure to focus on newly unemployed claimants
due to the economic downturn led to this falling away as a policy priority:
Planned extension of the NEAP [National Employment Action Plan] to lone parents and 
people with disabilities has now been quietly put away. A political concern with the rising live
register, while understandable, back tracks on commitments to extend activation policy to 
groups traditionally seen as outside the scope of employment policy. The employment needs 
of lone parents […] people with disabilities and carers could fall off the political and policy 
agenda. This sharp u-turn on the slow road to equality or active inclusion and the underlying 
agenda of focusing on managing predominantly male live register unemployment may be 
difficult to reverse.
Murphy (2010) p.1
Writing at a similar time, Sissons observes a similar process in the UK:
Recession does raise an important question about how those with health limitations…can now
compete for jobs with newly unemployed groups…it is probable that the employment needs of
the claimant unemployed, who will receive more intensive forms of support under the new 
Flexible New Deal programme, and who represent a more politically sensitive measure of labour 
market disadvantage, will be prioritised over those on inactive benefits.
Sissons (2009) p.179, emphasis added
Rising costs of providing employment support and the concerns over poor programme
performance or poor value for money might also dent political commitment because, 
as Jewell (2007) notes, such programmes “are expensive to develop, yet they may not 
improve participants’ prospects of finding employment” (p.27-28).
These experiences accord with the 'reserve army' theory of disabled people's 
relationship with the labour market.  Since at least the 1970s the idea that disabled 
people constitute part of the reserve army of labour – to be utilised when in periods of
labour shortage and easily disposed when demand falls – has been influential in the 
disabled people's movement and disability studies as a way of explaining disabled 
people's labour market disadvantage (Stone, 1984). Later analysts have adapted the 
'reserve army' thesis to explain more recent efforts to activate sick and disabled benefit
claimants into work. Making employment-ready sick and disabled benefit claimants 
deemed to be non-work ready moves them from what Marx called the 'pauper' or 
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'stagnant' element of the reserve army – members of which cannot be drawn upon 
immediately by capital and also who do not exert an effect on wage inflation because 
of this – to the 'latent' and 'floating'; elements  (Harvey, 2010), expanding the pool of 
labour capital can call on to fulfil often low-waged and low-status work (Hyde, 2000), 
particularly in times of labour market tightness: "Policy changes have been aimed at 
reconstructing the non-employed disabled people as an important part of the reserve 
army in a period when labour markets are tighter" (Grover & Piggott, 2005, p.705, 
emphasis in original). These theoretical perspectives – as well as Sissons's and 
Murphy's empirical observations – suggest that providing employment support for 
non-employed sick and disabled claimants is an economically contingent policy aim 
that makes sense in some economic conditions and not in others.  While investigating 
this specific hypothesis is not the aim of this thesis, it is another good reason to 
believe that institutionalisation of employment services for sick and disabled 
claimants is variable.
This is not necessarily an inevitable process Conceivably, activation for sick 
and disabled claimants could be conceptualised by policymakers as a core and not 
additional labour market policy and thus it could be insulated from deprioritisation 
described here. However, the evidence of the experiences presented here do at least 
show that the nature and strength of the political commitment to activation can vary, 
and that this should be part of a framework looking at the institutionalisation of 
activation for this group.
2.2.2 Sorting and selecting claimants for activation
One of the major weaknesses of current approaches to analysing the activation of sick 
and disabled claimants is that they tend not to discuss – or discuss in insufficiently 
precise terms – how wide the commitment to activation is.  Incapacity benefit 
claimant pools are large and diverse, and a stated commitment to offer more 
employment support may or may not apply to this full diversity of claimants.  
A number of authors (Evans, 2001; Mabbett, 2003) have described how the 
categorisation of claimants structure access to back-to-work programmes, with the 
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highest priority and best-funded programmes being easily accessed by claimants of 
unemployment insurance benefits, with those on incapacity payments and on social 
assistance being sidelined.  The point was articulated most clearly by Evans (2001), in 
his cross-nationally comparative study of activation in five countries (the UK, France, 
the Netherlands, Germany and the United States). He argues that benefits systems 
'sort and select' – some more strongly and rigidly than others – claimants into distinct
claimant ‘reservoirs’ that accordingly differ in terms of the demands made upon their 
claimants and the support offered. Across all five countries, sick and disabled 
claimants’ access to support tended to differ in a number of important ways to that 
offered to claimants of unemployment benefits: it was not generally offered at an early
point in the claimant’s relationship with welfare authorities, tended to be mainly 
specialist and not strongly related to employment, and funding was often poor. Evans 
describes the way different claimants are channelled towards different types and levels
of support as ‘the organisation of opportunity’, a useful collective metaphor for many 
of the individual processes this research project is examining:
How policy actors define you influences the reality of each part of the phrase welfare to work.
It defines you as a being in a target programme or as part of a target population – that is, in 
the welfare part of the phrase – and also often determines what you get and from whom in 
order to work. It is these differences that I call the ‘the organisation of opportunity’.
Evans (2001), p.1, emphasis added
Without major change in the organisation of activation for historically excluded 
groups, he argues helping them into work will continue to be an essentially peripheral
priority whereby their activation continues to lag behind that of the frictionally 
unemployed:
It is difficult to see how the distribution of resources, so prominently skewed to the easiest to 
serve at present, can be reallocated other than by a ‘wait and see’ policy (this means that, as 
unemployment levels fall, the harder to serve will eventually get nearer to the front of the 
queue, but presumably still some way behind the continued demands of the frictionally 
unemployed). While this approach may make sense in economic terms as an efficient 
rationing of current resources, it cannot also carry the label of equal opportunity.
Evans (2001), p.39
Whilst Evans' work concerns the benefits and welfare to work systems and their 
various individual groups as a whole, the processes he describes could now apply to 
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sick and disabled claimants specifically – i.e. that policy sorts and selects different 
elements of the incapacity benefit pool and applies different levels of support.  Indeed, 
though with more of a focus on social security and using rather different concepts, 
Grover & Piggott (2010) describe the same processes as happening within Employment
and Support Allowance (ESA) in the UK:
The purpose [of ESA] is not to get all people who are sick and/or who have impairments into 
paid work, but through interpreting data collected about their health conditions to determine 
whether they should be expected to work and when. In this sense, the newly established 
processes that are central to the operation of the ESA have a familiar role in surveillance; to 
classify people so that they can be treated differently from one another. 
Grover & Piggott (2010), p.268
Described here is what is lacking in some of the studies examined later on in this 
chapter. They only describe the services offered, and not how different pools of 
claimants are channelled to them4.  How strongly institutionalised an active work-
focus is for sick and disabled claimants depends on many of the processes that Evans 
and Grover & Piggott describe.
The claimant pools in both countries range from people with lifelong severe 
impairments needing extensive support, through long-term unemployed claimants 
who may have a variety of social and education-related employment barriers in 
addition to their health condition or disability, to claimants with issues that can be 
managed through routine support – and different groups of incapacitated claimants 
will require access to different kinds of services, from specialist to general support. 
How well labour market authorities connect these different pools of claimants to the 
appropriate support is therefore central to the institutionalisation of activation for 
them. Most studies, however, tend to gloss over these distinctions, despite the debate 
over the appropriateness of specialist versus general employment services for 
incapacitated claimants being prominent and extensive over the past ten to 15 years. 
The issue of how different types of claimants are connected to different types 
of support is crystalised particularly clearly in the debate around specialist and 
mainstreamed support that goes on in disability studies analyses of many different 
types of public services (see, for example, Shah (2007) in relation to education), 
4 Or indeed, as it seems in some cases, not channeled anywhere at all.
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including employment services. The following extract from a report by the DWP 
Advisory Committee for Disabled People in Employment and Training sums up this 
issue well:
At present it can be seen as 'the easy option' to direct disabled people to specialist services – 
easier for the disabled person as well as those assisting them. However, even that option is 
complex – as well as having the outcome of segregating, rather than including disabled 
people. It can also highlight, in the mind of an employer, that this is someone who is 'different'
and needs 'special' handling, rather than a potential employee who may be the best person for 
their job.
Advisory Committee for Disabled People in Employment and Training (2001,p.2)
Opening up mainstream employment support potentially does institutionalise 
activation for these groups more strongly, by allowing them access to a wider range of
services. On the contrary, however, as  (Mabbett, 2005) describes, it may instead 
expose them to competition for support from less disadvantaged groups and, as Evans 
(2001), argues, subject them to an inappropriate regime: “The balance between a single
gateway that can give access to service-rich programmes for a wider selection of 
claimants and a work-focused entry point that can emphasise diversion must be 
carefully thought through” (p.31).  As the next section shows, which of these is the 
case in each of the countries is likely to depend on political and administrative choices
around funding mechanisms, regulatory regimes and organisation of programmes and 
services.
2.2.3 Governing activation regimes for incapacitated benefit 
claimants
One of the central issues the literature on the activation of sick and disabled benefit 
claimants and other marginal groups focuses on is that of the barriers such groups 
face in getting access to employment support.  A prominent form of this is 'creaming 
and parking', whereby claimants considered too distant from the labour market given 
the instruments and funding available are ‘parked’ and given minimum support, 
whereas the most job-ready are ‘creamed’ from the top and have the bulk of resources 
focused on them.  Given the perception (on the part of service providers) of disabled 
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people's lower chances of gaining employment and the more multiple and complex 
nature of their employment barriers, sick and disabled claimants are likely to suffer 
from this.  Indeed, this has been observed on a number of programmes in a variety of 
countries, including the UK (Rees, Whitworth, & Carter, 2014; Hudson et al 2010) and 
Australia (Byrnes & Lawn, 2013), as well as with recently-arrived immigrants (Shutes, 
2010), lone parents, members of ethnic minority communities (Dockery & Stromback, 
2001) and the long-term unemployed more generally (van Berkel, 2005; Winter & 
Haar, 1996)
For example, Hudson et al (2010) found that in the UK's Provider-led Pathways to 
Work programme:
In all areas there was adviser frustration that management pressure to focus on job ready 
clients was leading to less time being spent with clients who are further away from work. A 
strong sense of what needed to be done for business survival and job security saw creaming 
(working intensively with some clients) viewed as appropriate behaviour in a target-setting 
environment. Parking (giving other clients a bare minimum of service) was seen as 
appropriate practice.
Hudson et al (2010), p.4
A number of factors appear to encourage creaming and parking.  Programmes that are
strongly outcome-based – whereby the provider is paid when the claimant enters 
employment, rather than paying mainly or wholly for a service provided – seem to 
suffer from this problem most acutely (Davies, 2008)  Activating disadvantaged and 
less disadvantaged claimants together increases the pressure and ability to cream and 
park (Mabbett, 2005) – a particularly crucial point given that this appears to be a trend
of recent policy.  Limited capacity to help claimants with specialist needs also appears 
to lead to parking (Rauch & Dornette, 2009) as do programmes being underfunded 
(Corden & Thornton, 2003). Conceivably, also, such behaviour might be curtailed if 
there exists a claimant right to employment support and if this is enshrined and 
protected (van Aerschot, 2013; Benish, 2014) Corden & Thornton (2003) recommend 
providing higher rate compensation for providing services to client groups or 
individuals with greater needs; setting different benchmarks for payment purposes for
client groups or individuals with greater needs; providing additional fee-for-service 
funding to meet needs of individuals and requiring a quota of people with greater 
needs amongst a provider’s successful outcomes.   Personal budgets assigned to each 
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claimants, as used in the Netherlands (OECD, 2008) would likely also circumvent 
attempts to divert resources from more to less disadvantaged claimants.
The implications of creaming and parking for institutionalisation should be obvious.  
If sick and disabled claimants are routinely unable to access employment support, 
then activation for them is weakly institutionalised – even if it is a prominent policy 
aim, it will not be guaranteed experience for claimants in the everyday operation of 
the activation regime.  However, in the light of the previous discussion, creaming and 
parking of vulnerable claimants, important though it is the literature on the activation
of incapacity benefits claimants, should be seen as really only the service-level 
expression of the system-wide process of sorting and selecting claimants. It crystalises 
what is a much larger and broader range of governance tasks central government has 
to get right in order for services to be available, accessible and properly functioning. 
The broader literature on activation tells us that governments have to deal with 
finding and/or developing the right kind of services and service providers; manage 
decentralisation; reconcile the need for central political management with trends 
towards personalisation of activation, and foster inter-agency co-operation across 
traditionally separate divisions of government responsibility, amongst other tasks 
(Van Berkel & Borghi, 2008).
2.2.4 Conceptualising activation regimes
Activation regimes tend to be understood as exhibiting characteristics of either Work-
First or Human Capital Development (HCD) models.  A short-term focus on re-entry 
into employment, with the suitability of employment for the individual not a major 
concern, is the central principle of Work-First regime. This usually goes along with 
low-cost employment support such as work-search and CV writing. Peck & Theodore 
(2000), in one of the first major attempts to map out the features of work-first policy, 
describe it as a labour market regulatory strategy designed to “compensate for the 
weakened 'demand pull' of contingent labour markers, the capillary action of which 
has been ruptured by job instability and low pay” (p.134).  This compensation comes, 
they argue, largely in the form of benefit sanctions, the threat of which 'pushes' 
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claimants into low wage work.  The HCD model is the antithesis of work first, with 
long-term employability – rather than short term employment – being the focus. This 
entails high investment in the employability of the claimant much more broadly 
defined than in work-first regimes; in education; skills and health-related services, for 
example (Lindsay et al., 2007). HCD approaches also tend to have more of a focus on 
employment sustainability and progression (ibid).
The review thus far has shown that there are several good reasons to believe that the 
delivery of employment support may much more variable in practice that such models
would suggest. Largely, however, this variability is not something that is addressed 
directly – and perhaps cannot be – by extant activation regime models or even by the 
use of such models in understanding particular programmes and countries (see, for 
example, the critique of Etherington and Ingold, 2012, below). Embedding support 
would appear to be a challenge in both cases. As Peck & Theodore do argue (2000), the
political success of work-first approaches (and therefore, by extension, support for 
investment in services for claimants, especially those considered further from the 
labour market) is likely to be contingent on good economic conditions. HCD 
approaches are less at risk given the more numerous and broader justifications for 
such support beyond simply entry into work, but other challenges present themselves.
From decades of public administration research, well known, for example, are the 
difficulties facing policymakers in integrating services from diverse policy areas in the
service of a policy goal like the integration of employment; health; care and education 
policy in the service of employability. 
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Table 2/1: Work-first and Human Capital Development ideal types
Work-first Human Capital 
Development




Targets Job-entry. Benefit cost 
reduction.
Sustainable transitions to 
work and in-work 
progression
Intervention model Job-search and short-term 
training, especially for closest
to labour market. Other 
work-focused activities for 
non work-ready groups.
Long-term training integrated
with care; education and 
skills. Holistic, professional 
case-management.
Programme dynamics Processing-based, highly 
exposed to labour market
Course-based, insulated from 
labour market
Relationship to labour 
market
Demand-responsive: inserts 
jobseekers into available 
opportunities 
Improves quality of labour 




'Hard' job entry target-based. 
PES-led, outcome-based 
contracting to third party 
providers.
Integration of an array of 
services. 'Soft' progression-
based targets
Sources: Lindsay et al., (2007; Peck & Theodore, 2000)
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The problem is not even that dominant Work-first and HCD conceptualisations do not 
recognise these issues, though sometimes they do so only implicitly. The model of 
governance and the basis on which employability services are provided – two factors 
which this review suggests may be important for the institutionalisation of activation 
support – are sometimes contained in schematics of Work-first and HCD regimes (see 
Table 2/1, above). Crucially, however, they are rarely acknowledged to be interactive 
with the other features of the regime and therefore partly constitutive of its overall 
character. Instead, one or two characteristics of each tend to dominate and be taken to 
represent the whole.
This critique would appear to present more of a challenge to extant conceptualisations
of HCD regimes than of Work-first. Given that the stakes are so low, the dominant 
view of the UK as a work-first regime would not significantly be changed by a 
research finding that what little support that is claimed to be offered is more 
contingent and variable.  The same is not true of HCD. Indeed, comprehensiveness and
the depth of coverage is often claimed to be a defining feature of the model, and so 
research findings that show this is less the case than is assumed will be significant.  
Such findings would go alongside those of a number of other studies that are 
questioning the purity of the HCD model as it is claimed to operate in countries such 
as Denmark and Sweden (in relation to Denmark, see, for example, Abrahamson, 2010;
Larsen & Mailand, 2007).
The argument presented here is very much of the broad tendencies of the way Work-
first and HCD models have been constructed used, and it was not the intention to 
present it as entirely original. There are many studies that show that intentions of 
activation policy can be reconfigured either deliberately or unintentionally in the 
course of its implementation. Sirovátka, Horák, & Horáková (2007), for example, show
how national activation strategy in the Czech Republic has been reconfigured at the 
local level, both in terms of content and purpose. However, I suggest that even these 
studies tend to underestimate the interactional nature of features of activation policy 
identified in this and the next chapter and how these can produce highly and quickly 
changeable regimes. Thus, I contend, activation policy may not only be reconfigured 
in the process of implementation and governance, but be in a potentially constant and 
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quickly changing state of embedding, disembedding and re-embedding in different 
forms, according to the operation of a range of factors.
2.3 Activating sick and disabled claimants in cross-national 
perspective
Given that the reforms in question are relatively recent, it is perhaps not surprising 
that comparative literature on activation of sick and disabled people is still fairly 
limited. This section5 offers a critique of large-n comparative treatments which tend 
toward initially useful but analytically blunt attempts to catalogue policy changes and 
small-n studies, which whilst offering more analytical purchase, tend to be skewed 
either towards rather narrowly-focused evaluative comparisons or attempts to 
produce categorisations of national policy regimes that focus too much on formal 
policy content. These end up being too static to provide us with a satisfactory 
understanding of the processes that this thesis is arguing should be looked at.
Large n studies
A good starting point in looking at comparative treatments is the OECD’s Sickness, 
disability and work: breaking the barriers project (OECD, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010), the 
most notable multi-national survey of social security and activation measures for sick 
and disabled people. It is a comprehensive project, both in its the breadth – 28 member
states and 11 in detail – and depth, looking at both social security, activation and 
related organisational and institutional reforms, and at the legislative and front-line 
levels.  It draws out from the survey a large number of issues deemed to be important 
regardless of nation and specific national set-ups, and many of these are useful in 
generating the kind of framework needed for this research. In terms of activation, it, 
for example, looks at the prevalence, comprehensiveness and funding of different 
kinds of of employment services – supported, subsidised, sheltered employment – as 
well as vocational rehabilitation and more general services – and the timing of such 
support (whether soon after the initial claim or not until a given time has passed). 
Change in benefits regimes are examined through replacement rates; how long 
5 Chapter 4 on research methods will deal with the merits of single, small-n comparative and large-n 
comparative strategies relative to the aims of the thesis.
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benefits can be claimed for and the strictness of assessment criteria, and related 
aspects of incapacity benefits claims. Given the importance of looking at the 
governance of activation as established by the work reviewed in the previous section, 
it rightly points out the importance of cross-sectoral and inter-agency co-operation; 
reformed gateways to benefits and activation, and the correct engineering of 
incentives for benefit authorities, service providers and employers. It will likely prove 
influential on future studies as the area attracts more academic interest, as indeed it 
has on this one.
However, unfortunately, and perhaps inevitably given the common problems 
in forming concepts that need to apply to a large, heterogeneous group (Sartori, 1970),
the OECD project aggregates this large number of interesting, fine-grained 
observations into rather blunt indicators of policy change. Scored observations were 
made on twenty policy elements and then combined these into two indicators 
showing how 'integrationist' and 'compensatory' different nations are. These produce 
intuitively sensible findings given what we know about cross-national variation of 
welfare states and welfare reform over time, with the countries falling into broadly 
familiar social democratic; liberal and corporatist groups and most becoming less 
compensatory and more integrationist over time.  Epistemological concerns with 
reducing complex social and political phenomena to abstract indicators aside, the 
OECD indicators are in themselves of some merit. They are a reasonable first attempt 
at gaining a sense of the type and extent of policy variation in the countries studied 
and are thus a useful point of departure for smaller-n studies.  However, the OECD 
study fails to tap what I am arguing to be a number of important issues that must be 
understood to reach a richer understanding of an ALMP regime for sick and disabled 
benefit claimants in a given country.  This is partly due to design flaws, and partly due
to the inherent limitations of a large-n approach.  Firstly, whilst the report does cover 
governance issues in some detail, they are not – for reasons unknown – included in 
the two overall measures.  This approach assumes, for example, that the existence of a 
given programme means that claimants are able to access services, despite evidence 
that claimants may be excluded for a variety of reasons, or that the services may not 
exist due to difference between localities and/or service providers. Secondly, and 
perhaps more fundamentally, in separating benefit and activation reform into two 
unlinked measures, the OECD studied underplays the relationship between them.  As 
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the first section of this chapter showed, however, benefits systems can strongly 
influence access to employment support and reforms of incapacity benefits can have 
significant impacts on the provision of activation services – making receipt 
conditional on taking part in activation, for example, puts significant new pressures 
on activation providers unused to large numbers of new claimants with complex and 
multiple employment barriers – see, for example, Rauch and Dornette (2009).
In working up from the 20 observations to produce the two overall measures, 
the study inevitably ends up conceiving of the nature of the policy systems in each 
country as being the aggregate of all these, failing to understand the interactional 
nature of the policies involved.  As the previous section showed, however, the various 
legislative; institutional and organisational policy settings can be at tension with one 
another, some promoting and some undermining the goal of a secured, comprehensive
approach to helping incapacity benefit claimants into employment.  As a consequence,
the OECD study's approach ossifies what I argue to be inherently dynamic and 
changeable policy regimes. Though the study does plot changes on the two indices 
over time, this is still very much only a reflection of progress or otherwise in 
introducing changes on the measures identified, and it does not recognise that these 
regimes are highly changeable according to variation of a number of factors discussed 
above.
Given the relatively small number of large-n comparative studies, it is admittedly 
somewhat of a moot point whether these faults arise from the design of the OECD 
study itself or whether they are inherent in large-n comparative approaches. 
Certainly, other large-n studies, whilst having strengths the OECD study lacks, suffer 
from some of the same drawbacks.  The Academic Network of European Disability 
Experts (ANED) permanently monitors changes in policies affecting disabled people in
34 European countries and produces yearly reports. The ANED reports (see, for 
example Greve, 2009) accept (albeit implicitly) and observe much more finely-grained 
change in policy and show that the movement towards more inclusive policy 
arrangements can be halted or reversed by various political, economic and 
institutional factors –  a finding shared with a smaller cross-national project on the 
impact of European governments’ austerity plans on the rights of people with 
disabilities (European Foundation Centre, 2012).  Again, though, the ANED reports are
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hindered by the size of their sample to making relatively general conclusions which 
though useful and which provide a good jumping-off point for more detailed analyses,
put an upper limit on the sophistication of the national accounts they are able to 
produce.
Small n studies
A smaller cross-national study of activation for sick and disabled claimants and of 
other groups appears to offer a means to study the issues identified, though existing 
ones suffer from some important drawbacks.  Worth pointing out here is that despite 
the considerable number of differences in the nature of the two welfare states that are 
the focus of this research and the consequent apparent difficulty in comparing them, 
Etherington & Ingold (2012); Ingold & Etherington (2013); Lindsay & Mailand (2004) 
have produced cross-national comparisons of the activation of marginalised labour 
market groups in the UK and Denmark. 
Etherington & Ingold (2012) is, to date, the only cross-nationally comparative 
analysis of activation and benefits policy towards sick and disabled people in 
Denmark and the UK6, and so it is worth looking at in detail.  Using primarily 
interview data they argue that though there has been a notable shift towards workfare
in both countries, the idea of an inclusive labour market for sick and disabled people 
and support to help them access it has become increasingly the reality in Denmark 
whilst it still remains relatively marginal in the UK.  Their concept of an inclusive 
LMP has four parts, combining access to activation services; income security and 
financial incentives; welfare support and services that address health and childcare 
needs, and “governance and social partners that empower sick or disabled benefit 
recipients to negotiate the welfare to work system and how they represent recipients’ 
voices and needs within different policy and governance structures” (ibid, p34).  
Whilst the study rightly links formal policy7 and governance arrangements in order to
6 Although an overview of the two is given in Lindsay et al (2015).
7 The policy comparison between the Flexjobs scheme and Pathways to Work' Return to Work credit 
is also questionable in how it has been designed. Flexjobs is argued to be 70% of Danish activation 
programmes for disabled people, but the other schemes that go together with Flexjobs to form the 
total does not include Rehabilitation, even though it is mentioned elsewhere in the text. Further, 
Unemployment Allowance is counted as an activation programme. This is contrasted to the number
of claimants claiming Return to Work Credit (RTWC) as a percentage of total Pathways to Work 
claimants, but it is misleading to present Pathways as the only activation programme for disabled 
people, as several others operated at that time. They appear to be comparing the take-up of one 
component of one scheme (UK) with the number of places on one scheme as a total of all schemes 
(Denmark), which is not comparing like with like. 
36
produce an overall impression of the two welfare states' treatment of workless sick 
and disabled individuals, this is not clearly conceptualised or operationalised.  Though 
it makes a number of brief observations about changes in the governance of Danish 
LMP and the impact these might have on the inclusiveness of LMP for these groups – 
such as the centralisation of activation when it has previously been at the discretion of
local authorities, and increased focus on outcomes  – these are not considered 
systemically and do not enter into the overall framework. This part of the study 
focuses mainly on the representation of sick and disabled people or their 
representatives in the policymaking process. Whilst this is important, it is not 
considered in the context of these other relevant governance-related issues.  
Essentially, the representation of claimants in and of itself is taken as denoting greater
inclusiveness, regardless of the operation of other factors that might serve to 
undermine the impact of the inclusion of sick and disabled people's representatives in 
the policymaking process. They conclude that good representative structures have 
limited the impact of work-first on sick and disabled claimants in Denmark without 
having properly considered the mechanisms – outcome targets, single gateways to 
employment services, and so on –  the activation literature tells us are commonly used
to reorient LMP to work-first, and how they interact with the representative 
structures they describe.  
Without systematic consideration of the factors that this review has 
highlighted, the distinction that Etherington and Ingold establish between the two 
countries is in fact not much different from those that distinguish approaches that 
emphasise the quickest route to any employment from those that develop the 
claimant's employability in a more gradual and holistic way. In various different forms
(Barbier, 2004; Peck & Theodore, 1998) these two opposing models have been part of 
the activation literature for some considerable time.  Though analysing in this way the
two countries' approach to activating sick and disabled benefit claimants is by no 
means a valueless exercise, the contention here is that seeking to produce two broad 
descriptions on the basis of a relatively narrow set of observations gives us an 
understanding that is inevitably partial; static and misses some key challenges that 
both national governments are struggling with
Etherington and Ingold (2012)  is thus fairly typical of UK-Scandinavian 
comparisons in welfare-to-work, which over-focus on the admittedly usually stark 
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formal policy differences without considering that they may have similar impacts due 
to the operation of other factors.  They inevitably fall back on familiar welfare regime 
typologies.  Lindsay and Mailand (2004) make this point in their discussion of welfare-
to-work for young people in the same two countries, which they hold to be 
surprisingly convergent despite their quite different starting points and apparently 
divergent approaches:
Activation remains a relatively new area of policy development and analysis. It is therefore 
important that critical analyses and attempts to explain recent developments focus upon the 
detail of policy. The above analysis suggests that attempts to explain activation policies with 
reference to welfare regime theory alone risk neglecting inconvenient, but crucial, features 
that may indicate a process of policy convergence at odds with expected patterns of development. 
In more general terms, our analysis adds to existing evidence suggesting that policy-specific 
comparisons may be rather more helpful in explaining recent trends in activation reform than 
traditional interpretations based upon the orthodoxies of welfare regime theory (Kasza, 2002). 
The welfare regime concept is a necessary, but not sufficient, element informing attempts to 
analyse and compare the development of activation policies for young people and other 
groups.
Lindsay and Mailand (2004), p.205, emphasis added
Other small-n comparative studies might point the way to a more comprehensive and 
dynamic way of understanding this process.  A four-country comparison of the UK, 
Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany (Van Berkel, 2009) and a similar British-
Dutch-Swedish study by Minas, Wright, & Van Berkel (2012) emphasise the 
importance of looking at organisational reforms in concert with changes to the formal
content of policy in understanding the development of activation in these countries. 
They are good examples of the power of small-n studies that connect up formal policy 
changes with organisational reform to understand the nature of the activation regimes
and detect similar underlying changes in countries which at first sight seem very 
different.  Crucially for this research project, Minas; Wright and van Berkel found 
found that; 
From different starting points and through different reform paths (of both policy content and 
administrative structures and practices), all three countries moved towards a “work first” and 
“work for all” position over the past ten to 15 years. This change in policy content has been 
connected with stricter control taken by the centre and more directive forms of performance 
measurement. A range of changes in the governance of activation appear to have supported 
and enhanced the broader shift towards activating social assistance recipients in ways that are
more closely interlinked with activation of the insured unemployed.
Minas, Wright and van Berkel (2012), p.296
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2.4 Summary
This review of literature was conducted for two purposes. Firstly, to see identify what 
ideas and perspectives relevant to viewing activation through the lens of 
institutionalisation are available, and secondly, to critique existing cross-national 
analyses of activation of sick and disabled benefit claimants.
The first section highlighted work that either explicitly or implicitly shows that
activation generally and of marginalised groups in particular can be a highly 
contingent process, depending on variable political will and various administrative 
and organisational decisions which, though they may seem innocuous, can be crucial 
to the institutional security of the agenda.  Several perspectives, like those of Evans 
(2001) and Grover & Piggott (2010) point towards the need to examine whether or not 
these regimes are comprehensive, or whether they 'sort and select' from a diverse 
group of claimants.  Working from an examination of the much-analysed issue of 
creaming and parking of marginalised claimants by activation providers, it argued that
dealing with this is merely an example of a wider set of governance tasks that central 
government must carry out if activation for sick and disabled claimants is to be 
properly embedded.
The review then moved on to look at existing cross-national studies and the 
extent to which they incorporate these perspectives. It found that they tend to 
significantly underestimate the dynamic and interactional nature of the process of 
providing employment support for sick and disabled non-employed benefit claimants, 
significantly but not entirely the result of the failure to integrate policy and 
governance analyses. Existing studies do not address the heterogeneity of the claimant
group in question or these sorting and selecting processes, and therefore do not show 
the extent to which the activation regime they present is comprehensive. Thirdly, they 
also do not often clearly connect the political and service levels, with most looking at 
one or the other.  
The contention on which the thesis proceeds, then, is that the nature of the 
activation regime emerges from both how it is constructed as a policy priority by 
policymakers and from how it is constructed and operated at the service level.  These 
two may be in harmony, or in opposition, and how they interact will impact upon how
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fully and securely activation is institutionalised.  The next chapter uses the insights of 
this one to build a concept of the institutionalisation of activation and offers a 
framework for its use. 
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Chapter 3 The institutionalisation of activation for sick 
and disabled claimants in a cross-nationally 
comparative perspective: a conceptual and analytical 
framework 
3.1 Conceptualising activation regimes for sick and disabled 
claimants through institutionalisation
3.1.1 Extant uses of the concept
Whilst existing studies of institutionalisation were not influential in building the 
framework presented in this chapter, it is worth, firstly, looking briefly at how the 
term is used in other studies to see how it compares, and secondly, looking at two 
studies that confirmed my confidence in the concept once I had identified it.
Institutionalisation is an idea that is much used in a range of fields – though not in 
welfare-to-work – but often not in a clearly operationalised way. The following list 
identifies three distinct uses in social science:
 It sometimes is used to describe the process by which an idea becomes a 
default consideration; perspective; practice or principle of an institution. 
 It may be used to describe the process of the creation of social institutions – i.e.
how something becomes a central part of society.
 The term may also be used in a political sense to apply to the creation or 
organisation of governmental institutions or particular bodies responsible for 
overseeing or implementing policy.
The way I use the term is closest to the first use, though perhaps has elements of the 
other two; particularly the last one given the importance the framework places on the 
role of welfare institutions for enforcing a focus on sick and disabled claimants. The 
Online Dictionary of Social Science defines it as “Where social interaction is 
predictably patterned within relatively stable social structures regulated by norms.” 
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(Online Dictionary of the Social Sciences, n.d.) and my usage is consistent with this 
broader definition.
Two studies confirmed my confidence in the concept once it had been adopted, each 
for different reasons. Firstly, Levy (1996) posits the idea of a 'web of 
institutionalisation' for understanding the integration of gender perspectives within 
Development policy and projects. Levy argues that thirteen factors need to be 
examined to determine whether gender has been institutionalised within development
policy.  The fact that a number of these – notably political commitment; resource 
commitment; representative structures; research; staff development and regulatory 
mechanisms –  are the same or similar to parts of my framework was encouraging. 
Secondly, Levy argues that all these factors are inter-dependent and the non-existence 
of one factor can undermine the others. The visual presentation of the framework 
presented (1996, p.10) bears a resemblance to that of this research, presented later in 
this chapter. Thirdly, in a similar way to this study arguing that institutionalisation 
will ultimately find expression in the quantity; appropriateness and accessibility of 
employment-related support for the target group, Levy argues that it is the “actual 
delivery of programmes and projects which meet the needs of women and men” that 
is crucial and without these “all development interventions are unsuccessful and 
certainly the institutionalisation of a gender perspective has also failed” (1996, p.11). 
The similarity of how Levy constructs and uses her framework in gender studies 
further encouraged my use of the concept in analysis of welfare-to-work because it 
showed that although its constituent parts were drawn narrowly from ALMP 
literature, this did not result in a concept that had been overdetermined (and therefore
limited to) by one field of study and thus my study and its concept would be 
understandable beyond ALMP.
The second study that confirmed me in my confidence in the concept was the only 
social policy study that I came across that uses the same concept in a similar way. It is 
also notable as an example of the use of institutionalisation in the study of a social 
policy using it to look at the embedding and disembedding of a service cross-
nationally and for the similarity between the operationalisation of the concept and the
key issues I have drawn out of the existing activation literature in the previous 
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chapter. Bahle (2003) uses the concept to compare the institutionalisation of social 
services in France, Germany and the UK.  As with my characterisation of activation, 
Bahle argues that social services have not been “part of the historical core of the 
welfare state” (p.6) that are assumed by path-dependency theory to be strongly 
institutionalised and are thus an important case to study institutionalisation. 
Following Lepsius (1990), he specifies five conditions for the institutionalisation of 
social services. Firstly, the definition of a problem as a socially relevant one. Secondly, 
the integration of actors into the system and the definition of their roles and 
relationships to each other, which he identifies as having expression in the public-
private mix and the relationship between different types of providers. Thirdly, the 
allocation of resources, which in his exposition focuses on financing mechanisms and 
new sources of finance, such as through contracting-out. Fourthly, the legal and 
administrative regulation of social service systems, and fifthly, the establishment of 
legitimacy, which is not clearly dealt with in the three country examples.  Patently, 
there are similarities with some of the factors identified as being important in the 
previous chapter and, consequently, some of elements of my framework as laid out in 
the subsequent sections of this chapter. There is a focus in both on the political 
importance accorded to the issue, and on regulatory systems; financial systems and 
relations between different actors. However, Bahle's concept appears to be 
substantially divorced from any proper consideration of how the social service user's 
experience is influenced by the changing levels of institutionalisation. There is a very 
brief assertion that increased institutionalisation may produce standardisation of 
services, but, otherwise the impact of institutionalisation goes largely unexplored. 
Without this, it is difficult to see his concept of institutionalisation as especially useful.
The institutional security or otherwise of a set of services does not really have much 
meaning unless a knowledge of that level of security sheds light on the impact on the 
users of those services, as it is upon them that the impact will inevitably be expressed.
3.1.2 The origin of this study's concept of institutionalisation
Using institutionalisation as the study's central concept was an idea that developed 
over time and in response to a number of issues that emerged as important from the 
initial review of literature. To an extent, it was a catch-all term that seemed able to 
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gather together in a coherent way a number of these issues.
One of the first things I did when starting on the study was to consider the 
nature of ALMP in comparison with other social policies. One of the major issues the 
comes out of that was the nature of activation as a seemingly discretionary social 
policy, in comparison to other social policies where there is a process of accrual of 
rights on the basis of contributions or citizenship and so these rights put a lower limit 
on the extent to which reductions can be made. Rather, ALMP in contrast appears to 
be a set of tools governments use to meet prevailing policy goals which might change, 
and so the activation commitment might change with it. 
At the same time, the literature review produced work on ‘creaming and 
parking’ – providing more support to some select group of claimants and less to 
others – which seemed to be a particularly pressing issue with sick and disabled 
claimants, and especially when services were not delivered by central government 
agencies.
Similarly, at around this time (2010) also, welfare states were responding to the 
increase in unemployment due to the financial crisis, and this raised the issue of 
whether that would impact on the extent to which activation was provided (or at least 
still considered to be priority) given that (at least in the UK) it had been predicated in 
part on low general unemployment earlier in the decade.
These three considerations all raised the possibility of the level of support for 
sick and disabled non-employed claimants being variable. This very much accorded 
with the long-standing perception that such claimants found it difficult to access 
support because of their benefit status according them a low priority due to 
perceptions of the value of sick and disabled workers. This has oft been cited by 
policymakers as a reason for requiring such claimants to access support but has also 
featured in academic literature, with Evans (2001) arguing that the institutional set-up 
of benefits systems channelled certain benefit groups towards certain types and 
amounts of support depending on their benefit status. 
In their own way, all of these issues pointed to the level of support being 
variable and this variance being attributed to a range of factors, possibly including 
economic, political and institutional ones. Thus, what was called for was a concept 
that would enable me to establish how well the practice of activating this group – 
previously a peripheral one – has become embedded in the everyday operation of the 
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activation regimes of the two countries. Institutionalisation – a concept which often 
(though not exclusively, as noted in 3.1.1, above) is used to refer to how far a practice 
has become secured, was a natural choice. The second major reason for choosing it – 
again driven by a conviction stemming from a review of activation literature – as it 
intuitively suggests that it is a series of institutional processes than can take us some 
of the way to understanding the nature and functioning of activation regimes for this 
group. In this way, the study is an example of the “`institutionalist' school in 
comparative social policy”, central to which is “the analysis of the role of political 
decision-making structures, government systems and bureaucracies” (Mabbett & 
Bolderson, 1999b)
3.2 Criteria for and outline of the analytical framework
This piece of research has made three principal contentions regarding the 
institutionalisation of ALMP regimes for sick and disabled benefit claimants. Firstly, 
that analyses need to move beyond merely classifying national policy regimes 
according to whether they fit ideal types based on the types of services provided – 
commonly Work-first and Human Capital Development.  An understanding of the 
types of services offered is important, but they exist in the context of a number of 
other factors that interact to produce more or less well-institutionalised activation 
regimes. The factors that have identified to be at work appear to fall into two sets of 
categories.  Some are specific policy decisions by policy actors (either at the national 
or local levels) and others are pre-existing features of the ALMP landscape (funding 
systems, governance arrangements) which filter the impact of these decisions.  The 
second main contention is that ALMP arrangements for this group are significantly 
more changeable than previous analyses have assumed given the interaction of these 
factors.  Thirdly, as the last chapter argued, previous studies have not been sufficiently 
clear in establishing the scope of policy – whether or not it serves the full range of 
incapacitated claimants.  This is where the types of services offered is important: given
that the target group is very diverse in both countries, a broader range and availability
of services is likely to mean that a greater proportion of the target group will get 
access to appropriate support, and therefore activation can be said to be well-
institutionalised.
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It is therefore possible to establish the following criteria for the analytical framework. 
The framework should:
• Identify functionally equivalent features of ALMP and its governance in the 
two countries in order to allow for a cross-national comparison between two 
distinct welfare systems.
• Establish the policy mix in the two countries: what services are offered and to 
which claimants.
• Distinguish between the two broad sets of factors that research argues are 
important in shaping the institutionalisation of these policy mixes – specific 
policy decisions and the organisational landscape – but also articulate how the 
two are connected, showing how factors at both levels interaction to produce 
strongly or weakly institutionalised ALMP regimes for sick and disabled 
claimants.
• Be capable of showing how institutionalisation can strengthen or weaken over 
time according to the interaction of these factors.
• Outline in an ideal-typical manner what a strongly and weakly 
institutionalised regime might look like.
Accordingly, this framework establishes four separate, but interlinked loci of analysis. 
Given there is no existing framework for the institutionalisation of activation, these 
are derived in a grounded and iterative way from the activation literature. The 
appropriate part of the literature is indicated and the relevance explained here, but the
reader should refer back to Chapter 2.3 for a fuller treatment of the literature.
The first part seeks to establish the level of and over-time variations in the 
political commitment to the activation agenda for sick and disabled claimants.  Most 
other analyses take this as a given, without recognising that it may in fact vary 
between lip-service to a genuine and concerted effort to construct an active regime 
and indeed may move between these extremes over time.  Which of these is the reality
in the two countries is essential to establish before anything else as it will inevitably 
have an impact how well ALMP for sick and disabled claimants becomes 
institutionalised. A lip-service commitment poorly backed by budgetary support is 
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unlikely to lead to a well-institiutionalised regime, no matter how benign other factors
– organisational structures, provider incentives etc – are.
A discussion of the nature of the central political commitment to activation 
leads naturally onto a discussion of the scope of activation for sick and disabled 
people, based on a broad overview of the types and aims of activation. In particular, it 
looks at how well this matches up to the groups that have been identified by 
policymakers as targets for activation. 
 Following Evans (2001) and Grover & Piggott (2010) the next part of the 
framework draws on the argument that, partly by political determination and partly 
through the types of services and the rules governing access to them, sick and disabled
non-employed are 'sorted and selected' for activation, and this process can channel a 
greater or lesser proportion of the claimant group to active services.
 Whatever the strength of political commitment and scope of activation, 
however, the resulting strength of institutionalisation will be an outcome of the 
operation of a number of key features of the ALMP landscape  – the system of 
funding; the monitoring and regulation of activation providers; the setting of targets, 
and the operation of incentives for providers to help those claimants with multiple 
and complex employment barriers. These will impact upon the extent to the support 
that exists actually does reach the full diversity of the targeted population.
Identifying these four loci is distinctly is necessary because it is possible that 
activation could be well-institutionalised at one level and not the others.  Political 
support for a broad activation policy for a wide-range of claimants may be strong, for 
example, but central government may lack the tools to steer sub-national units to 
implement it, and it may not have a strong basis in the way the provision of activation
is governed at the front-line.
Two further points that will aid the reader in the navigation of the framework are 
worth making here.  Firstly, there is apparent overlap between the several different 
parts of the framework in terms of the factors that feature, though some considerable 
effort has been made how they are functionally different as far as the analysis is 
concerned. For example, that governments express a desire to steer sub-national 
ALMP policy towards providing more and better support can be taken as a sign of 
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commitment regardless of how they seek to do so. How they do this – what outcomes 
the provision of services are oriented towards, for example – comes in the second 
section on the nature and scope of the activation. How this actually plays out with 
other factors to produce strongly or weakly institutionalised services is looked at in 
the third section.  This does inevitably involve some repetition – as the relevance of a 
particular factor to the three levels of the analysis is elucidated each time – but it is 
necessary to lay out the multifaceted and interlinked nature of the impact of each of 
the key features of the ALMP regimes.
Secondly, before moving on, this is perhaps the place to say that whilst the 
analyses of the UK and Denmark provided in Chapters 7, 8 and 9 follow the 
framework laid out here, the framework's primary purpose is to guide the fieldwork 
and analysis, rather than rigidly structure the writing of those chapters. Their 
structure and flow, therefore, may deviate somewhat from the structure of framework 
laid out here. For example, whilst answers to the sets of research questions and sub-
questions below feature in the two national chapters, they may not all have a 
corresponding section or sub-section. This is a natural outcome of the process of 
writing-up and I have been conscious of the (in my opinion, problematic) temptation 
to go back and re-engineer the framework to ensure a neat fit between framework and
the results of the research and writing process.  
3.3 Central political commitment to the activation agenda
3.2.1 Extant conceptualisations and measurements of political commitment
Establishing the nature and strength of central government commitment is the logical 
first stage of the analysis as, regardless of the intervening factors, the strength of the 
institutionalisation of the activation agenda will inevitably be to some extent a 
function of the central government’s political commitment to it initially.  National 
government in both countries remains the initiator, regulator and funder of ALMP, 
and so looking at national political commitment makes sense, even though there is 
some element of sub-national responsibility for ALMP for both countries, and a 
significant element in Denmark especially.
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Hammergren (1998) describes political commitment as the “slipperiest concept in the 
political lexicon” (p.12) and pinning it down such that it becomes usable in this 
analysis is made more difficult by the fact that it has not been a widely used concept 
in ALMP studies. Establishing the level of and changes in political commitment to a 
given policy has, however, been attempted by scholars in a number of areas of public 
policy, most notably in public health and international development, and in a number 
of forms ranging from typologies to mathematical indexes of commitment.  It is 
possible, it is argued here, to adapt these so they can be used to analyse ALMP.  
Different conceptualisations use a number of different measures of commitment, some
specific to a particular policy, and some more general.  Two examples are given here.  
In relation to HIV/AIDs prevention in developing countries, a policy area in which 
there has been a noticeable effort to measure political commitment, Fox et al (2011) 
distinguish between expressed (how early and how often top-level leaders draw 
attention to a policy problem and the need to address it); institutional (whether or not 
governments establish the institutions and infrastructure needed to develop a 
response) and budgetary (whether sufficient resources are provided to back up the first
two) commitment.  Brinkerhoff's  (2000) study of government commitment to anti-
corruption efforts uses similar categories but additionally includes the degree of 
analytical rigour applied to understanding the problem and potential solutions; the 
extent to which support from relevant stakeholders is sought, whether credible 
sanctions of corrupt behaviour are established, and the extent to which the outcomes of
these efforts are monitored and sought to be improved upon.
3.3.2 Conceptualising political commitment to activation for sick and disabled
claimants
Taking these examples as a lead, this section now proceeds to outline what measures 
would be needed to establish the level of and changes in commitment to an activation 
agenda for sick and disabled claimants.
Fox et al’s expressed commitment was established by scanning speeches and 
policy documents for mentions of the issue. This is a very time consuming approach 
that would give us a more fine-grained measure than is actually necessary. Given the 
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ease with which a speech can be made or policy brief written – in comparison to 
setting up institutions, new programmes and finding sufficient expenditure – it is not 
clear that counting mentions of an issue in official pronouncements actually tells us 
very much about the strength of commitment.  Especially given that this discussion 
will come at the very start of the two empirical chapters looking at the UK and 
Denmark, what is more important here is to establish what governments have said 
about their ambitions regarding the activation of sick and disabled claimants – their 
stated aims; the scope of policy as articulated – rather than how much they have 
talked about it. This will serve a vital introductory and contexualising role for the rest 
of the two chapters.
Fox et al’s focus on governments building an institutional infrastructure to tackle the 
policy issue and Brinkherhoff’s credible sanctions do appear to be highly relevant for 
our analysis. Setting up new employment programmes and supporting institutions can
be a complicated, politically risky (in the event of failure) and expensive process and 
so undertaking these tasks should be seen as strong indicator of commitment.  
Brinkerhoff’s notion of credible sanctions points to a need to build into the measure 
the extent to which the two governments have been concerned to steer the 
implementation of an active agenda through incentives for providers. Given how 
frequently the issue of creating the right incentive structures emerged in the course of
the fieldwork, the extent to which governments put effort into designing; setting-up 
and monitoring the effect of such incentives should be part of any measure of 
commitment, as distinct from the effectiveness of such efforts, which is the concern of 
later parts of the framework.
Activation of such claimants was for much of the period under study a relatively new 
field in which policymakers were unsure how best to help sick and disabled people 
into work, and it was a theme that came through strongly during the review of 
literature and fieldwork. Accordingly, a measure similar to Brinkherhoff’s degree of 
analytical rigour and outcome monitoring would be an effective measure: in this case, 
the extent to which the two governments have done research into the needs of the 
target population, trialled activation measures for sick and disabled claimants, sought 
to develop and spread best practice and monitored the effectiveness of these measures.
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The quality and availability of expenditure data has proved to be far better than 
expected, and so the framework and subsequent analyses for the two countries pay a 
significant amount of attention to how much is spent on activation for sick and 
disabled claimants.  Expressing active expenditure as a percentage of benefits 
spending is a common way of examining the extent of activation, and this is used 
here. Spending on activation targeted at sick and disabled claimants as a percentage of
overall ALMP spending does not appear to have been used widely, but it is possible to 
calculate given the quality and detail of the spending data that I have been able to 
access. It will show very clearly how large activation for sick and disabled benefit 
claimants looms in the overall ALMP budget, and an increasing share over time would
be expected if political commitment is increasing. A concern here is that the measure 
will be skewed by steep increases in general ALMP spending due to, for example, 
increased unemployment and therefore spending on activation for general 
unemployment benefit recipients, and indeed, the period studied does involve 
economic downturns in both countries. However, there is a case to be made that as 
sick and disabled workless benefit claimants are facing the same tougher labour 
market conditions as newly unemployment claimants, and so spending on the former 
should increase in line with increases in spending on the latter.  
A criticism to be made of both these broad aggregate measures is that they do 
not consider the size of the participant population. In both countries but especially the
UK there has been a significant increase in the number of claimants required to seek 
work, and so aggregate expenditure figures could well be misleading if spending is 
spread amongst an increasingly large population to be activated.  Where possible 
therefore, per-head spending should be calculated and plotted over time,  and 
spending which is adjusted upwards with increasing participant numbers should be 
taken to be a sign of strong commitment.
In judging the two central governments according to these criteria, this part of the 
conceptual and analytical framework allows us to draw several important conclusions 
about the political commitment to ALMP for sick and disabled claimants that are 
important to establish at this stage. It tells us about the broad contours of the 
commitment; how much a stated commitment becomes a clear strategy through the 
trialling and testing of interventions and the establishment of an institutional 
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infrastructure and, if these are in place, how much governments are committed to 
using them to steer a national agenda backed by sufficient funding. All these can be 
regarded as an inputs into the policy process, inputs which are then shaped by the key
features of the ALMP landscape that are discussed in the later sections of this 
framework.
The last part of this section operationalises these issues into several research questions
and offers a range of indicators that would provide answers. The other two sections 
also have their own list of questions and indicators
A. The nature and scope of the activation agenda
A.1 What are the stated aims of central government policy regarding activation for sick 
and disabled claimants?
• Policy statements are likely to include references to one or more of; improving 
employment-focused support for groups marginalised from labour market; 
reducing the cost to the state and personal cost to claimants of dependence on 
benefits; improving quality of claimants' lives; increasing employment rate of 
disadvantaged groups; increasing quality and size of labour supply.
• May include specific targets: e.g; reduction of certain number of incapacity 
benefit claims;  increasing of employment rate of vulnerable groups to a certain
percentage. 
A.2 What is the scope of central government policy regarding activation for sick and 
disabled claimants?
• Policy statements will have some indication of the number and range of 
claimants policy is seeking to support
• Policy statements may make reference to improving quality and quantity of 
specific types of support (sheltered employment support; supported 




B.1 Have governments launched national ALMP programmes for sick and disabled 
claimants?
• Launching of national programmes or initiatives targeted at sick and disabled 
claimants during the period of interest. 
• Closure or merging of national programmes or initiatives targeted at sick and 
disabled claimants during the period of interest. 
B.2 What other institutions have been established to support the agenda?
• Existence of institutions or initiatives established and/or funded by 
government with some role in supporting the activation of sick and disabled 
people, for example, research institutions; discussion forums; representative 
organisations; centres of excellence.
B.3 Has there been a strategy to build institutional capacity?
• Training and recruitment of specialist PES staff. 
• Measures to increase specialist knowledge amongst non-specialist staff. 
• Contracting-out to disability/health specialist employment service providers.
C. Steering, target-setting and monitoring
C.1 To what extent have the national governments shown a desire to steer service 
providers to provide adequate activation services? 
• The extent to which targets for the activation of claimants are set. This may 
include targets for;
◦ The overall claimant population, both process targets (a given percentage 
provided with services, for example) and outcome targets (such as outflows
from benefits to employment).
◦ Individuals – most likely, interventions delivered within and for a given 
amount of time.
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• Central government monitoring of service providers for their level and quality 
of support offered, and to ensure targets are met.
D. Trialling, research and evaluation
D.1 How much research is done into the nature of the incapacity benefits caseload?
• Existence of government-led or sponsored research on the claimant population
– characteristics and needs; surveys of claimant population. 
D.2 Has central government sought to extensively research, trial and evaluate new 
approaches to the labour market integration of sick and disabled claimants?
• Use of pilot programmes testing new approaches – particularly health support 
– or use of existing approaches for new sick/disabled target groups.
• Number, extent and scope of evaluations of existing programmes.
E. Resource commitment
E.1 Over the period of interest, has central government expanded the amount of central 
funding going to activation for sick and disabled claimants?
• Change in the ratio of active spending:benefits spending and specialist ALMP 
spending as a proportion of total ALMP expenditure.
E.2 How has central government spending on activation for sick and disabled claimants 
changed with changes to the number and/or array of claimants being targeted?
• Maintained or increased per-head spending on specialist ALMP programmes 
with increased caseloads.
• Programmes targeted at hardest-to-help are funded appropriately 
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3.3 The scope and nature of the activation offer
3.3.1 Conceptually linking the scope of the activation offer and 
institutionalisation
According to the criteria established at the beginning of this chapter, the framework 
should somewhere establish the policy mix in the two countries – what services are 
offered and for how large a group of claimants, and so by including a description of 
the scope of policy, this part of the framework can be made to serve these two 
purposes.  The claimant pool is large and diverse in both countries, and the framework
should distinguish here between a relatively limited commitment – characterised by 
short-term efforts for new claimants – and a more extensive one that seeks to reach 
much further in the pool of claimants who tend to have multiple complex barriers to 
work and longer histories of non-employment.
The relationship between the scope of activation and institutionalisation is not 
self-evident, and does require some explanation and justification.  Whilst a limited 
regime – one that provided assistance only to claimants with limited sickness and 
disability-related needs – could be said to be well-institutionalised on its own terms – 
services for those claimants might be easily accessible, appropriately funded and 
backed by strong political commitment – the argument here is that this would still be 
a poorly institutionalised regime if the sickness and disability claimant pool is larger 
than this and especially so if benefit conditionality is applied widely – as indeed is the 
case in the UK and, increasingly, Denmark.
3.3.2 Conceptualising and operationalising the scope and nature of the 
activation offer
Categorisations of incapacity benefit claimant populations do not exist, but based on 
the caseload profiles in Chapter 6 and the review of literature, it is suggested that data 
should be collected on the extent to which services are offered for:
• Claimants with severe, life-long disabilities, typically requiring extensive 
support through sheltered or supported employment, the aim of which is not 
usually employment in the open labour market;
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• Claimants whose incapacity and subsequent non-employment stems from a 
specific illness  (increasingly likely to be mental health-related), or disability 
but who may also require additional education/training and social support 
stemming from long periods out of work.
• Claimants with only health or disability-related employment barriers.  
The range of accepted outcomes towards which the services are provided is another 
key feature of the nature of activation but is also crucial for the next part of the 
framework: where a wide range of outcomes are accepted and thus paid for and part 
of the provider incentive structure, it will likely be easier for government to steer 
providers into assisting the full range of claimants, as opposed to focusing resources 
on the most job ready. There is a very extensive literature (Shutes 2011; Larsen & 
Bredgaard, 2008) that shows that parking of more vulnerable claimants is worsened 
when the main aim of ALMP is to get claimants into work in the shortest time 
possible.
A discussion of the basis on which services are provided fits most naturally at this 
point in the framework. As well as the types of services provided, the nature of the 
activation offer also stems from whether those services are provided in a discretionary
manner, or by right.  As the next section discusses how secure the activation offer is 
and how access can be easy or difficult, a discussion of whether a right to activation 
exists is a natural jumping-off point.  As a relatively new area of policy, a de jure right 
to employment support is unlikely to exist in either country, but the regulations 
governing access to activation specifying the amount of support due to which 
claimants may amount to a de facto one.
A. Breadth of services offered
A.1 What range of employment barriers are within the scope of policy and what services 
are accordingly offered? Are the notable changes in these over time?
• Existence of strategies for:
*Non-mainstream support: sheltered and supported employment
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*Mixed-service approaches, combining health, education/training, social and 
general employment-related support.
*Health/disability-related components to mainstream employment 
programmes.
*Specialist mental health employment-related support
• The caseload size of these programmes relative to one another and to size of 
the claimant groups.
• The length of time interventions last for
A.2 What range of outcomes are the provision of these services aimed at?
•  Likely to range from soft outcomes like health improvement to progress 
towards employment, to employment-only outcomes. The definition of 
employment may range from sheltered or supported employment to 
employment only in the open labour market.
A.3 How wide a range of claimants are these services aimed at?
• Target groups will either be stated in programme/policy documentation, and 
can be inferred from the nature of the services; range of outcomes and caseload
data.
• Distinct programmes for different target populations, or distinct pathways 
through common programmes are likely to be indicators of a broad approach. 
B. The right to activation
B.1 Do claimants have a right to activation?
• Benefit and activation programme and/or governing legislation will indicate 
what services claimants can access as a legal minimum. 
• May indicate types or minimum length of support or less specific minimum 
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standards of service.
B.2 What right to appeal is available to activation participants who do not receive 
support, or receive poor quality support?
• The same regulations will likely indicate the grounds and procedure for appeal.
These may be part a general public service complaints process or a specific 
social security complaints process.
3.4 Sorting and selecting for activation
At this point in the two country chapters the analysis should go further than just 
describing what services are provided to which of these claimant categories.  How the 
organisation and regulation of access to activation – for example, how claimants are 
identified for different programmes and types of support; the conditions they have to 
meet, and so on – works to channel certain types of claimants to different kinds of 
support, possibly of varying quality is likely to be, based on previous work, crucial to 
the form and strength of institutionalisation.  This is what Evans (2001) calls 'the 
organisation of opportunity' and Grover and Piggott (2010) refer to as the 'social 
sorting' of claimants.  
A related point here is whether sick and disabled claimants are treated on a 
specialist or general mainstream scheme, an issue which featured prominently in the 
literature review.  The review of literature showed that there has been a general trend 
away from specialist programmes on the grounds that they can become 'ghetto' 
schemes that do not properly tackle the claimant's full range of barriers, to 
accommodating sick and disabled claimants are general schemes, but this is likely to 
make it more difficult to draw up protections for harder-to-help claimants and exposes
them to resource competition from easier-to-help groups (Evans 2001, Mabbett 2003). 
Much the same issues apply to funding. Mainstreaming is likely to go hand-in-hand 
with common funding structures rather than ringfenced resources for sick and 
disabled claimants, which again may make it difficult for government to ensure 
resources are targeted proportionate to need.
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A.  Mainstream versus separate programmes
A1.How are services organised relative to other groups of non-employed people?
• Existence of specialist programmes versus treatment of sick and disabled 
claimants on mainstream programmes; merging of specialist into general 
programmes.
• Access of claimants of benefits other than incapacity benefits to specialist 
sickness/disability programmes
B. Selecting claimants for activation
B.1 How are claimants matched to programmes/services?
• Likely to either be an individual assessment or be determined by central rules 
like benefit group/time benefit has been claimed for.
• Programmes may have a participant cap, or there be a less formal rationing of 
certain services, likely the more specialist and expensive ones.
B.2 What access criteria must claimants satisfy to access different programmes/services?
• Programme rules will have more or less specific requirements around what 
level of need a claimant has to demonstrate to access certain services. Again, 
this is likely to be either a personalised assessment or a centrally-defined 
proxy for incapacity, such as benefit claim length or benefit type.
• Services are likely to be ordered so that claimants have to demonstrate a 
greater need to access more specialist services.
B.3 Are there distinct strategies for different categories of claimants?
• The extent to which the above mechanisms channel different types of 
claimants towards different types of activation.
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3.5 Regulating and securing activation: Steering activation for sick 
and benefit claimants
This section of the framework now moves on from establishing the important political,
organisational and service context to looking at how these have an impact on the 
extent which sick and disabled claimants can access appropriate support in the every-
day operation and management of the activation regime in the two countries.  These 
factors interact with, in particular, the management of activation service providers; 
the channelling of funding for services and the operation of provider incentives. Thus, 
a relatively strong commitment centrally and the formal existence of a broad range of 
service might founder in the absence of, for example, ineffective application of 
provider incentives and limited steering of providers, or failed steering.  The link 
between these two factors may also work the other way round: close steering of 
providers and well-designed incentives may will be undermined, for instance, by 
faulty categorisation of claimants or insufficient funds committed by central 
government.  This part of the framework shows these dynamics at work.
As with other parts of the framework, the features of the structure of ALMP included 
here have not been chosen according to any one theory, but rather in a grounded way 
from the fieldwork and from existing studies of ALMP for disadvantaged groups.  
Based on a number of previous studies of activation of harder-to-help groups 
(Larsen & Bredgaard, 2008; Shutes, 2010, for example), it seems to be the case that 
harder-to-help claimants often find it difficult to access activation support. Particularly
when there is no formal separation between groups, they can be exposed to 
competition for support from more work-ready groups, and may be crowded-out of 
access to services (Mabbett, 2005). There are often a number of pressures on providers 
to help the easiest-to-help, rather than groups with more complex employment 
barriers, thus institutionalisation of support for sick and disabled claimants depends in
part on what tools central government has to increase incentives to help such 
claimants and combat gaming behaviour which disadvantages them – and to what 
extent they are used, and used successfully. Such tools often, but not exclusively, 
involve the funding of policy – and so the existence and successful use of tools that 
ensure funds are spent on sick and disabled activation participants will be considered 
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signs of strong institutionalisation.
Many of the other factors laid out here appear to have a bearing on this process. These
links and others between the components discussed here are displayed below in a 
graphical presentation of the framework – see Chart 3/1.
The second part of this section of the framework is perhaps the most crucial. It looks 
at the end result of the operation and inter-operation of the factors discussed so far: 
how widespread activation for sick and disabled claimants is relative to the overall size
of the claimant group; how successfully parking of harder-to-help claimants is 
combated; how well groups with the greatest needs are able to access support, and the
extent to which sub-national variations in access to activation are ironed out.
A. Steering providers
A.1 What tools does central government have to ensure appropriate service provision and 
to what extent has it used them?
• Existence of general incentive to help to sick and disabled claimants with 
multiple and complex employment barriers, and incentive relative to other 
more work-ready groups.
• Extent to which funding is specifically ear-marked/ring-fenced.
• Extent to which central government has used steering tools to promote 
activation for sick and disabled claimants.
A.2 To what extent has 'creaming' of easier-to-help claimants and 'parking' of more 
difficult-to-help claimants been designed-out and/or tackled?
• Extent to which there is evidence of systematic under-provision of support to 
harder-to-help claimants in favour of helping easier-to-help sick and disabled 
and/or general unemployed.
B. Accessing activation
B.1 What proportion of the target groups take part in active measures?
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• Number of claimants accessing activation programmes/registered as being in 
activation as a proportion of total claims.
B.2 Are claimants with the most complex barriers able to access appropriate support?
• Ease of access to multi-approach, holistic measures.
• Provision of support over sufficiently long periods.
• Sufficient supply of places in sheltered and supported employment.
• Extent to which there is 'crowding-out' of incapacity benefit claimants' access 
to specialist support from other groups.
B.3 Are there notable sub-national variations in access to activation?
• Sub-national variation in 2.1 – 2.3 
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3.6 The form and strength of the institutionalisation of activation 
for sick and disabled claimants over time
This part of the framework seeks to help the national chapters come to a conclusion 
by collapsing this very great number of questions and indicators back into 4 key 
questions, the answers to which are intended to give an overall picture of the form 
and strength of institutionalisation of activation. This is also the best place to consider 
changes over time. This section is also a good point at which to describe what ideal-
type well-institutionalised and poorly institutionalised regimes would look like.
1. Has the scope of activation changed over time in terms of the range of 
claimants targeted and range of employment barriers tackled?
• Strongly institutionalised: (Assuming claimant pool is diverse), the activation 
offer will be broadly targeted; services will range from specialised health and 
disability-related support to general employability support; to multi-service 
offers.
• Weakly institutionalised; (Assuming claimant pool is diverse), activation offer 
will either be narrowly targeted at most severely disabled through sheltered 
and supported employment or, conversely, be largely job-outcome focused 
support for claimants closer to the labour market.
2. Has political commitment to this scope of activation for sick and disabled 
benefits claimants strengthened or weakened over the period of interest?
• Strongly institutionalised: Commitment will be strong, backed up by research 
into sick and disabled claimants' activation needs; a range of institutions and a 
stated commitment to regulate for access to activation. Funding will is likely to
be high on the various measures: in absolute terms; relative to ALMP and 
benefit spending, and per head. Funding should keep pace with activation 
caseloads.
• Weakly institutionalised: Commitment either superficial – stated commitment 
but not backed by the features above – or variable, reducing when faced with 
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difficulties, especially the pressing needs of other non-employed groups or 
poor results.
3. Has the institutional protection and promotion of sick and disabled 
claimants' right to the type of activation described in 1) increased over the 
period of interest?
• Strongly institutionalised; Claimants have a recognised right to activation 
which is codified in law and/or regulations which are enforced. Right to 
support is not contingent on work readiness or likelihood of job entry.  
Categorisation of claimant does not significantly impact upon the level of 
support claimant can access.
• Weakly institutionalised: Right to activation support does not exist, or not 
enforced. Likelihood of accessing appropriate support is contingent on meeting
high work-readiness requirements or on perception by providers of entering 
work quickly. Apportionment of support according to categorisation of 
claimant.
4. Has the sick and disabled claimants' right to the type of activation 
described become more or less secure over time?
• Strongly institutionalised; High proportion and wide range of claimant pool can
access appropriate support; claimants further from labour market can access 
appropriate type and length of support; parking practices and other gaming 
behaviour are designed-out or tackled; limited sub-national variation in access.
• Weakly institutionalised: Low activation rate; evidence of extensive parking and
gaming behaviour of hardest-to-help which limits their access to necessary 
length and type of support; notable sub-nation variation.
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Chart 3/1 Conceptual framework
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3.7 Reflecting on the use of institutionalisation as a 
concept
By way of concluding this chapter, it is worth reflecting on the value and wider 
implications of the concept as it has been constructed and operationalised.
In building the concept, a number of key issues and factors that have not 
previously explicitly been used together in existing studies of incapacity benefits 
activation are brought alongside one another – most notably, conventional 
policy/programme content analysis and governance perspectives. Conversely, in most 
studies the political agenda behind activation infuses the entire analysis, whereas here
it is isolated as an individual aspect in this study's concept and framework.
Taken to its natural conclusion, the concept suggests that actual policy change 
in welfare to work for this group is driven at least as much by the internal dynamics 
of target setting – central management of service providers to align their practice with
political objectives and the consistency of policy tools with policy targets – as by 




4.1 Justifying and using small-n cross-national 
comparisons 
4.1.1 The logic and purpose of the cross-national comparison
Skocpol and Somers argue that comparative analysis has three main purposes: to 
detect covariation for the purpose of causal analysis; to show how parallel process of 
change are played out in different contexts, and to show how a particular framework 
or set of concepts usefully illustrates the cases chosen (1980, cited in Collier, 1993). 
Although the concept of institutionalisation is a product of other factors and thus 
there is some causal analysis in the study and whilst the empirical accounts inevitably 
touch on how processes of adaptation to the changing nature of incapacity differ in 
two distinct national contexts, it is the latter of the three that most closely resembles 
the overall purpose of comparison in this piece of research.  The purpose of the 
comparison of the UK and Denmark is to show how the framework presented in the 
previous chapter can enable the user to better understand the provision of 
employment services for sick and disabled claimants not so much in those countries in
particular, but in any mature welfare state where the labour market integration of 
such people has been an issue, with those two being used as worked examples. 
4.1.2 Case selection
The somewhat unorthodox nature of the study makes case selection an uncertain 
process. Most of the methodological literature on case selection assumes that the aim 
is to explain a certain outcome. For example, there are a range of established case 
selection methods for studies seeking to explain variation on an outcome of interest 
by controlling variables. Similarly, it is often assumed the researcher’s goal is to 
produce findings that can be extrapolated to a larger group of cases than those that 
were studied.  The problem here is that neither of these completely apply to this study.
The study is not aiming to explain variation on a variable of interest between the 
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cases, but rather to argue that the variable of interest – institutionalisation – is 
something worth studying per se. By extension, it is difficult for the “choice of cases 
[to be] driven by the way a case is situated along the dimension [of interest] within 
the population of interest” (Seawright & Gerring, 2008, p.296) if the dimension of 
interest is still essentially being developed.  Similarly, extrapolation of the findings to 
a wider set of cases is not an aim – all that is aimed at regarding the broader universe 
of cases is that the UK-Denmark exposition should provide a convincing case for using
the same framework to better understand other countries. 
In the absence of the need for case selection in the ways described, all that is left is to 
apply a fairly practical set of criteria. The total universe of cases is thus all countries 
where labour market integration of non-employed sick and disabled benefit claimants 
has been something pursued by government. Countries without sickness and 
disability non-employment benefits or countries that have not made efforts to 
reintegrate such claimants into employment (as distinct from efforts to increase the 
employment rate of disabled people more generally, which may exist independent of 
the benefits system8) can therefore be excluded. This still, however, leaves a relatively 
large group of possible cases: the UK; Sweden; Belgium; the Netherlands; Germany; 
Norway; Australia; Denmark, and several others.  Whittling this down to a 
manageable set of cases is where the likely difference or similarity between the cases 
is a useful tool.  Whilst difference between the cases in terms of institutionalisation is 
not known for the reasons given above, broader policy differences between them on 
their benefits systems and use of activation are known. We know, for example, that 
Denmark, Sweden, Belgium and the Netherlands are relatively high spenders on 
activation and the UK is very low, and that the UK and Australia are usually 
considered to be essentially work-first, whilst Denmark and Sweden in particular are 
recognised as investing in the human capital of their non-employed.  
The question now is whether to pick two similar countries, or two very 
different ones. For the purposes of proving the utility of the concept and framework, 
either of these could work. However, two supposedly dissimilar cases were chosen. 
8 This was in fact an initial point of confusion with a small number interviewees, who did not 
understand that I was researching activation programmes for sick and disabled benefit claimants 
specifically, rather than disability employment issues – primarily discrimination and accessibility – 
more generally.
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This is because, if the concept can be shown to usefully understand two countries that 
are thought to be very different in their approaches to activation, then this would be 
all the more impressive for the new concept. The first and highest hurdle would have 
been cleared, and later studies could then fill in the population in between by studying
less disparate cases.  This decision was also driven by a suspicion, based on a reading 
of the general activation literature and the specialist work on the development of 
welfare-to-work for vulnerable groups, that a government in any country – regardless
of the activation model supposedly operating there – seeking to activate this target 
group will encounter similar challenges in doing so. Choosing a supposedly dissimilar 
pairing of cases will thus allow me to help prove the usefulness of the framework and 
concept, and give me the opportunity to offer a challenge to an existing dominant 
framework and concepts in the process of doing so.
Given all the advantages of being a UK researcher studying the UK – existing contacts;
familiarity with policy; ease of access to research sites – this is a natural choice. 
Similarly, although the UK compared with Norway, Sweden or Denmark all likely 
would have been workable, Denmark was favoured because of pre-existing research 
contacts and good access to data – primarily data in English and quantitative data on 
activation. 
4.2 Multi-methods approach
The choice of which research methods to use has been a largely pragmatic one based 
on the needs of the research, rather than one derived from a particular epistemological
position. To explore the utility of the concept of institutionalisation and examining 
activation in the way suggested, a framework has been developed and that framework 
necessitates a number of different sources of data and ways of extracting that data.  
Due to the fact that I am attempting to pull together findings from a range of distinct 
areas of interest in welfare-to-work – each with their own traditional sources of data 
and methods – into an overall framework, a diversity of types of data and methods is 
inevitable.  Even just looking at one aspect – the right to activation, for example – I 
need to find out what rights to activation exist, both de jure and de facto and how the 
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existence or otherwise of a right influences the delivery of services, and what the 
impact is. In that same order, those would involve reading legislation and 
programme/policy documentation; interviewing people likely to have an 
understanding of how service providers deal with this issue or otherwise obtaining it 
through reading submissions to committees of inquiry or government reports, and 
looking at what data there is – both qualitative and quantitative – on the impact on 
access to various types of support.
Although using data in the real world research is never this neat, qualitative sources – 
in particular interviewees and documents – were generally used first to help build up 
a broad understanding of the policy field and context, and then to start exploring some
of the key issues –   the scope and purpose of the activation offer; how activation for 
sick and disabled claimants is governed; the existence of the right to support, and so 
on. Quantitative sources, especially the Jobindsats database in Denmark for a whole 
range of purposes and UK DWP programme tabulation tools for referral statistics, 
were then used to substantiate findings from qualitative sources, and to develop a feel 
for how widely those findings were applicable. In some cases I then returned to 
qualitative sources – for example, re-reading the interview transcript or conducting a 
new interview or sourcing additional documents – to get at the nuances and 
exceptions, and to look again at issues on which two pieces of evidence did not agree.
Sometimes the type of data and method of collection chosen were the only ones 
possible.  Determining the level of expenditure in the two countries cannot be found 
out by an other way than using expenditure databases, or asking government 
authorities to release accounts data if more detail is required. On the other hand, 
establishing whether the regulatory and steering tools the two governments use are 
successful in securing access to activation and the delivery of appropriate services can 
be done in a number of ways, and these in fact do differ between the two countries.  
The problematic issue here is not so much whether to use one source over the other as
the opportunity to strengthen the reliability of findings by comparing two sources 
should never be passed up, but the extent to which we can be sure that different types 
of data extracted using different methods are telling us about the same phenomena, 
especially if different data sources and methods are used for each country.  Taking the 
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immediately preceding example, does a low Activation Intensity percentage for a 
scheme in Denmark and a series of interview statements from a UK Disabled Persons 
Organisation (DPO) representative that the people they represent receive very little 
support from UK programmes show the same thing and should they be given equal 
weight? The first represents the average weekly amount of time spent in activation as 
a percentage of the maximum time (37 hours), recorded for most claimants, whilst the 
second is the view of a small number of people claiming to represent a group of 
participants.        
            Clearly, the data they provide is of a quite different order and they have 
different strengths and weaknesses. The Activation Intensity measure offers a great 
deal of precision and has the advantage of being calculated from national data, yet it 
says nothing about the distribution of activation over the entire population9, nor 
anything about how the amount of activation provided in a week fits into the broader 
picture – why is it at the level it is, and if there is change over time, what is the cause 
of that change? On the contrary, interviews will often provide that kind of 
information, but the researcher has to establish how the interviewee knows what they
are saying, and whether they have appropriate and sufficient evidence for it. In the 
second example, an assessment would have to be made about how they have 
ascertained their clients' experience and whether those experiences were 
representative of the programme as a whole. These considerations of what a source of 
data does and does not tell us should influence how strongly the claims based on them
are made, and how many other sources need to be found to corroborate them in order 
to be confident about what they tell us.
                Conversely, the same type of data in the two countries may non-comparable 
due to some specific feature of the activation system.  It is worth recounting here the 
pitfalls experienced in attempting to compare per-head expenditure, as it is an 
interesting insight into the way national patterns of activation can frustrate what 
appear at first sight to be beguiling and easy comparisons. Tables 7/2 and 8/5 worked 
out an average cost per head by dividing the cost of the various schemes by the 
number of referrals. This is generally useful, but becomes problematic if schemes have 
9 A 50% rate would indicate the average amount of activation is 18.5 hours. This could indicate a 
great deal of uniformity in that most claimants would get this level of support, or there could be 
clustering at the extremes, with some claimants getting the maximum and some getting none. 
Examination of sub-national quantitative data and asking interviewees about variations was needed
to establish which was the case.
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substantially different patterns of referral. Pathways-to-Work referral, for example, 
was triggered by a successful benefit claim and so would have had large numbers of 
people dropping out due to them regaining employment before interventions could be 
made. Dividing the total cost by the total number of referrals is therefore likely to 
underestimate the amount spent on support for claimants who stayed on long enough 
to get support.  This is true for Pathways but less so for most other UK schemes 
because of the long lead-in times before claimants participate, but it is true for almost 
all Danish schemes. The incentives to activate are such that an active offer will often 
be recorded very soon, but most claimants will likely gain employment quickly 
thereafter. As for Pathways, the method described will drag down the average and 
give a misleading figure. This is not so problematic when comparing Danish schemes 
with one another – as like is being compared with like – but it becomes a problem if 
they are compared with most UK schemes.
Sometimes, I had to use methods that were significantly less than ideal and, 
considered alone, in which I was not strongly confident. For example, wanting more 
than just interviews with which to look at the issue of low provision of specialist 
support in the UK, I contrasted provider answers to a DWP survey about how widely 
they used a particular specialist service with the DWP's data on what proportion of 
claimants were defined as suffering from ill-health or a disability. If the former was 
significantly lower than the latter, some underprovision could be said to be taking 
place. This was very much improvised and there are clearly several reasons why some 
caution should be exercised when using these results. The survey used no standard 
definitions of the various types of support asked about and indeed, services for 
claimants with health conditions is combined with 'other services'. It is arguable also 
that providers have an incentive to exaggerate the extent to which they offer specialist
support. Further, the disability and health indicators attached to claimant records are 
self-definitions, and identifying as disabled does not necessarily mean that specialist 
support is needed. That said, the results of that exercise did give a similar impression 
of the level of support to another part of the same survey – which asked participants 
what types of support they received – to what my interviewees reported, and what 
providers themselves have gone on record as saying.  Thus, whilst an individual 
method or source of data may in itself be suspect in how well it measures what I am 
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using it to measure, this can be managed by triangulating the results with other 
sources and methods.
Researching the social world, especially when, as here, the issues concerned are 
multiple and interacting and when there is only a single researcher with a very limited
research budget – is always going to be the art of the possible. Aside from interviews, 
there is little opportunity to generate new data over which the researcher has control, 
and so existing data – with its attendant limitations – has to be accepted, and these 
limitations managed by using multiple sources of data with complementary strengths 
and weaknesses. 
        Most of the issues discussed here arise in most types of research. There is, 
however, also the added difficulty – which is specific to this piece of research's 
positioning – that I have argued that a better understanding of the activation of sick 
and disabled claimants requires both an understanding of the certain crucial policy 
details and their operation, and the pulling together of a large number of different 
issues. There is obviously somewhat of a tension here given the lack of rsources. 
Again, this requires a certain amount of pragmatism in accepting what data already 
exists and valuing it for the information it offers; also accepting its limitations, and not
seeking to resource-intensively generate new data that might be considered more 
reliable. For example, most measures of political commitment involve some kind of 
recording of the how often a commitment is mentioned in ministerial speeches and 
official documentation. Doing this is very time consuming for something that is only 
one of four main sections of the framework. Thus, political commitment has been 
boiled down to expenditure and some other easily observable and obtainable 
measures. This is less than ideal from the point of view of having a rigorous indicator 
measure of political commitment, but it harvests the detail of issues – expenditure and
the testing and trialling of new measures – that are most relevant to the broader 
framework.
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4.3 Data sources and methods
4.3.1 Interviews
Interviews were an integral part of the data collection phase of the research. The 
interviews were semi-structured, a common choice for qualitative researchers in this 
field of study because they are focused enough to touch on specific research questions 
but are sufficiently flexible so as to capture evidence which is “contextual, situational 
and interactional” (Mason, 2002, p.64, emphasis added).  The project is trying to arrive 
at a better understanding of how different features of ALMP interact to produce more 
or less well-embedded activation regimes for sick and disabled benefit claimants and 
so rests on a number of key issues like the intentions and priorities of policymakers 
and their understanding and interpretation of the problem of the labour market 
inactivity of incapacity benefit claimants. Qualitative interviews are likely to be the 
best way of accessing these.   It was hoped that interviewees would be able to draw 
connections between different policy decisions (and through time) in ways that policy 
documents – often relating to a single policy at a particular point in time – cannot.
Civil servants in national government agencies were interviewed first in both 
countries, along with representatives of relevant external policy advisory 
organisations. It was felt that they would offer the most complete overview of the 
policy field and the issues involved, and specific issues that emerged as important in 
these interviews could be explored in further interviews, especially with non-
government sources. As actors within policy networks tend to share the same norms 
(Macmillan & Scott, 2003), it was thought that interviews would need to come from a 
broader array of organisations to avoid selection bias. Representatives in DPOs in 
particular were judged necessary to address this imbalance and by virtue of the work 
they do, it was hoped that they would be familiar with the most common problems 
experienced by activation participants and thus be a direct route to the issues around 
service delivery in particular.  Making an attempt “to view the proposed goals and 
actions from the vantage point of every relevant subset, not just from the perspective 
of [government] leadership” (Mayer & Greenwood, 1980, p.43) is good practice in the 
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sense of producing reliable, well-rounded data that help the project answer the 
research questions in a reliable way, as well as in the political sense that Mayer and 
Greenwood meant. 
A preliminary list of potential interviewees was compiled, based on a range of 
sources. Some interviewees were recommended by gatekeepers in each country – civil
servant contacts in the UK and a government researcher in Denmark. Others were 
identified because they had made some seemingly relevant statement that was in the 
public domain – commonly testimony to inquiries; quotes in media articles or having 
authored reports or policy summaries. An e-mail summarising the research and 
inviting participation was sent out to prospective participants, and most replied and 
an interview was arranged.  Although I identified potential participants in advance,  
Duke (2002) argues that interviewees themselves can be valuable in helping the 
researcher identify other informants and indeed, about half the interviewees were 
identified by other interviewees. This approach enables the researcher to “Establish a 
fairly accurate picture of the membership and shape of the policy” (ibid, p.47). 
The research plan aimed for between 30-40 interviewees. This was based on the 
minimum number I thought needed to acquire information in the necessary amount; 
detail and quality in each set of interviewee types, in each country. Ritchie, Lewis, & 
Ellam (2003) argue that more than 50 are not required with qualitative research if 
sampling has been appropriate. The final number of interviews was 33, close to the 
average number used in 570 UK qualitative PhD theses and in 170 qualitative case 
study PhDs sampled by Mason (2010)  – 31 and 36, respectively.
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Table 4/1 Interviewee breakdown
UK Denmark
Civil servant (Of which, 
former)





DPO Representative 6 5
Government researcher 2 1
Total 19 14 33
It was anticipated that I would have to negotiate some amount of disagreement 
between the information provided by government and external interviewees in this 
most contested area of public policy, especially in the UK. On the whole, however, this
was not the case. With one exception, interviewees engaged fully and frankly with the
issues. This is likely due to a number of factors. Firstly, several government 
interviewees were interviewed after they had left their posts, and so were likely to feel
freer to speak as a result. Similarly, all interviewees were told that their contributions 
were in confidence and their names would not be published. Perhaps most 
importantly, most interviewees were very used to talking to academic researchers and 
because of this and the briefing I gave to them before the interview, understood what I
wanted to know, and why. They seemed to accept that my interest was a legitimate 
academic one, and engaged with me in that spirit. In Denmark in particular, there 
appears to be a close culture of co-operation between government10 and academia.
4.3.2 Documents
Documents are a popular method of data collection in qualitative policy studies 
because a range of detailed policy documents published by government; partner 
organisations and external interested organisations such as think tanks and charities 
are usually freely accessible and provide an inexpensive method of data collection 
(Matthews & Ross, 2010). Documentary analysis is an efficient mode of data collection 
10 To that extent that a Danish Labour Market Authority official told me that Danish officials have a 
phrase that translates to 'the academic quarter', referring to the fact that academics are often 15 
minutes late to appointments which, owing to the tightness of my schedule and my poor map-
reading skills, I often was.
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– analysing the output of an organisation on a particular subject is often easier and 
quicker than undertaking fieldwork and interviews in all the sites of interest (Shaw, 
Elston, & Abbott, 2004).  This meant that I was able to concentrate more resource-
intensive methods like interviews to investigate issues that were not available in 
documents.  This is particularly important for this project, whose broad terms of 
reference mean there was a large amount of ground to cover, in both a conceptual and 
geographical sense.  
Table 4/2 lists the main types of documents, which specific types were consulted, and 
the purposes as they related to the aims of the project, as well as some illustrative 
examples.  On the whole, however, they serve three broad purposes. During the earlier
stages, an analysis of documents detailing policy helped me to conceptualise the field 
– to decide which reforms have been the most important and which might be more 
fruitful to investigate in more detail later; the kinds of issues that the policy debate in 
each country has revolved around; the ways in which non-employment of sick and 
disabled benefit claimants is seen as a problem and also which institutions are the 
most important. This also provided me with the contextual and background 
knowledge that allowed me to go into the interviews with enough knowledge for 
myself and the interviewee to discuss issues in sufficient detail to make them useful, 
and for me to be able to know which people to interview.  In the next stage of the 
research, more specific and particularly internal documents like provider guidance 
allowed me to describe the arrangement of activation services and their governance. 
Thirdly, evaluative documents like transcripts of parliamentary investigations, in-
house and external assessments and studies, and surveys done by advocacy groups 
were used in order to uncover the interaction of factors and how they produce 
stronger or weaker institutionalisation.
           To an extent, there was an element of meta-analysis in this later stage.  Due to 
the expansive nature of the project, it was necessary to collate the findings of other 
research. However, because this sort of research (principally done by government 
agencies and independent bodies) is plentiful; usually high quality; detailed and up-to-
date, this strengthened the project rather than weakened it. This was also necessary 
for the UK in particular, due to the very limited amount of quantitative data about the 
amount, type and targeting of activation.
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Table 4/2 Types of documents; examples, and their purpose in relation to the aims of 
the research


















Establishing the content; scope and nature 
of the activation offer. Establishing the 
legal/regulatory basis for employment 
services.










(Department for Work 
and Pensions, 2015c)
Examine implementation and steering of 
policy.
Uncover how issues around above are 
identified and tackled/ignored.
Contrast with external documents to 






for Work and Pensions, 
2013a)
Examine level of and problems with 
participant access to programmes and 
provision of different types of services.
Examine governments' perceived success 







Think tank evaluations 
(Centre for Social and 
Economic Inclusion, 
2014)
Contrast with government evaluations to 
detect differences in issues identified; 
control for political bias.
Obtain perspectives of non-governmental 
actors.
Media reporting Policy reporting in 
mainstream press 
(Politiken)
Specialist disability press 
(Disability News Service)
Limited use made compared to other 
sources, but helpful in assessing the 
importance of a particular issue.
Specialist disability press useful in 
bringing in perspective of non-




The language barrier was not a major one when doing research in Denmark.  All 
interviewees I selected spoke excellent English and I did not detect any major 
misunderstandings from them around what I was looking for. In some cases, they 
provided (often unasked) English summaries of documents they thought it important 
that I see.  Where documents were not available in English, I used a variety of 
methods to being able to understand them. I learned enough Danish – particularly the 
specialist phrases used in ALMP – to be able to read chapter headings and then used 
Google Translate (GT) to translate target passages. Anything to be quoted that was in 
doubt was professionally translated.  Though never as accurate as a human 
translation, GT is accurate enough for the purposes for which it was used in this 
study. Based on a study of GT translation of Chinese and Malay academic texts into 
English, Groves & Mundt (2015)  argue that GT is appropriate for discriminate 
academic use. In a study of Google Translate's comprehensibility that tested 1275 
language pairs, Aiken & Balan's (2011)  analysis ranks the average of Danish to 
English and vice versa as the fourth most11 comprehensible pair of languages tested. 
This very much accords with my own experience, having found that GT almost always
provided a basically readable and understandable translation.
4.3.3 Quantitative data
Using expenditure data as an indicator of policy effort over time 
Spending on welfare programmes is one of the most widely-used ways of tracking 
welfare effort and the data plays a significant contexual role in the analysis.  Given 
current policymaking’s emphasis on ‘value for money’, providing funding for 
interventions whose net impacts – when they can be discerned  – are relatively small 
and whose subjects are often very difficult to help and require expensive long-term 
interventions, should be a sign of a genuine work-focus.  As the research proceeded, 
the difficulties in using accessing and using such data quickly became apparent and 
these are worth briefly discussing, reflecting as they do interesting issues in doing 
11 Full results table: http://faculty.bus.olemiss.edu/maiken/pairs.htm 
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cross-national analysis in social policy.
The first limitation that became apparent is that expenditure data would only be 
possible as a measure of central-level policy change. In both national cases, what is 
actually spent on claimants is not necessarily what is originally allocated by national 
governments. Danish municipalities decide on their own spending. Further, spending 
is spread across ALMP; health; education and other budgets, and so an accurate total 
figure is difficult to calculate. The problem I had with UK data in this regard is 
comparable: much of UK provision is now delivered under contract by private and 
third sector providers and for this they are paid a fee for taking on the claimant and 
then a range of performance-related bonuses.  Thus, the decision to spend funds on 
moving claimants back to work – and how much to spend – is not directly in the 
hands of policymakers. Governments will spend a figure that is easily discernible (the 
number of claimants multiplied by the fees paid) but what is actually spent on sick 
and disabled claimants could be much more or much less than this.  Such data is not 
available as providers are are unwilling to reveal their practices for reasons of 
competition.  This is significant point for the analysis that I have discussed at length 
elsewhere – it means that policymakers cannot easily direct funds to the most in-need
groups and conversely it may mean they cannot shelter such claimants from their 
activation dropping off the government ALMP agenda – but on the question of how 
developing an account of policy effort through expenditure data, it limits activation 
scholars to the national level.  Furthermore, even at the national level, funding streams
for activation programmes have been merged and so it may not always be possible to 
isolate what is spent on measures for incapacity benefit claimants from spending on 
activation policy generally.
OECD (2010) did calculate an overall measure of ‘Active labour market spending on 
employment programmes and vocational rehabilitation’ for sick and disabled 
claimants for 2007, raising the possibility that this may have been possible for other 
years. On further inquiry, however, this turned out to have involved an ad hoc data 
request that has never since repeated (Personal communication, Christopher Prinz, 1st 
December 2013).   However, the OECD’s Social Expenditure database contains 
expenditure data for the policies of interest, countries and time period under 
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investigation and so was an important starting point for developing an understanding 
of how spending priorities have changed over time. They are disaggregated by 
programme, so some level of precision is possible.  Soc Ex was used for Danish 
expenditure on activation but data direct from UK authorities was available, so that 
was used for the UK analysis. The OECD and UK figures for several programmes were 
compared to ensure that the two sources of data were comparable.  HM Treasury 
budget datasets were used for UK benefits expenditure and a Freedom of Information 
request to the Department for Work and Pensions for expenditure on specific 
programmes.
It became clear that some level of caution would be needed in using this data. 
There appears, for example, to have been some misclassification of some Danish 
expenditure by the OECD, and some adjustments that are less precise than is ideal had
to be made accordingly (see 7.1 for a discussion of this).  All that said, the expenditure 
data has been useful and using it with caution is better than not using it at all. 
Without it, interesting and highly relevant variations in expenditure over time and 
between programmes targeted at different groups would not have been identified.
Programme data
The scale of access to activation programmes and the types of activation provided are 
very important issues in the study. Accordingly, a great deal of effort was expended in 
compiling data on these issues. This was not difficult for Denmark, as voluminous 
statistics on these and related issues are available through the Danish National Labour
Market Authority's Jobindsats database, “a databank with detailed and updated 
information about the number of unemployed persons in different kinds of active and 
[…] passive income support” (European Employment Observatory, 2011 p.31). Data is 
less easily available for the UK, especially for defunct schemes, though most of the 
data was obtainable through an often fraught process of submitting Freedom of 
Information requests (see 4.3.4).
4.3.4 Freedom of Information requests
Freedom of Information (FOI) requests to UK authorities under the Freedom of 
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Information Act (2000) were used to capture a significant proportion of the 
information presented in Chapter 8.   This was not initially intended to be such a 
frequently-used source of data, but it was needed because of the paucity of published 
programme data in the UK.  FOI requests as a social science method are not much-
remarked upon, but I have found it a useful source of data, particularly expenditure 
data and caseload data for UK programmes. A brief discussion is therefore merited.  
In some cases, these requests have resulted in data not previously released 
being put in the public domain, data that can be used by other academics and by the 
public.  In using FOI requests to get mainly quantitative data to corroborate claims 
made by interviewees, I have followed the Research Information Network's advice on 
using FOI requests in social research: “FOI should not necessarily be the default 
approach to obtaining information. It may be more helpful to envisage it as a means of
complementing information already obtained from elsewhere, to plug gaps through 
the use of focused and well thought-out inquiries” (Research Information Network, 
2010, quoted in Bourke, Worthy, & Hazell, 2012, p.1)
Getting a refusal to a request does not always mean that the time has been 
wasted. Knowing that the public authority has not seen fit to record the information 
can in itself be an indicator of the importance it attaches to an issue, and it was useful 
to build up a picture of the data on employment programmes that the DWP does not 
keep – this can be used to guide the data collection of future research.  That said, 
although FOI was very useful with regard some specific requests and refusals were 
sometimes insightful, the overall return from requests was probably not proportionate
to the amount of time and effort put in, particularly into challenging DWP's refusal to 
provide information on the grounds provided under the Act.  The most egregious 
example of this was a request asking for all spending on active measures (ie. all 
employment programmes and all Jobcentre Plus expenditure) for 2012 onwards – 
OECD SocEx only provides data up until 2011. This was refused on the grounds that to
calculate the costs was beyond the £600 limit set by the 2000 Act. I challenged this on 
the basis that it had already been done for specialist programmes with no problem, 
and because the data already exists for all years until 2011 in the OECD data.  The 
challenges were met with rote responses that did not address the substance of my 
argument that the information existed12. I pursued this for several months with what, 
12 In a small number of cases, including this one, a lack of basic understanding on DWP's part seems to 
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in hindsight, was a tenacity driven by the frustration that I knew the data existed but 
access to it was being blocked on spurious grounds13, rather than by an absolute 
necessity for the data. While it would have been very useful to include overall ALMP 
data until 2013/14, given the declining specialist expenditure in those years and the 
increasing performance (and therefore increasing costs) of the Work Programme (WP) 
for Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) groups, the ratio between them would probably not 
have shown a different trend – ie, decreasing specialist expenditure as a percentage of 
the total – than that in 2010/11.
Whilst FOI requests have allowed me to glean some useful information that as a result
of my efforts are now in the public domain, it is worth noting that both my efforts to 
request the information and the public money and resources used to reply to them 
would not have been necessary had the data been made publicly available in the first 
place. Although under the Coalition's Open Data initiatives the availability of 
information on government activity is generally much better than it was, there are 
still baffling inconsistencies. All Work Programme data is available through the Work 
Programme tabulation tool and users can generate their own data, at no cost to the 
public other than that initially used to create the tool. Although Work Choice operates
under the same framework at the same time, and uses some of the same providers as 
Work Programme, DWP still publishes data through its own statistical releases, which 
don't contain the level of detail as that available through the WP tabulation tool. These
are impossible to interrogate in the PDF file format DWP uses, and so the user has to 
copy all the data across onto a spreadsheet.  Accessibility and useability of data 
worsens as one goes further back to previous governments, with data having been 
moved or archived such that recovering it exceeds the £600 limit; staff with the 
requisite knowledge to find and use data sources having left, and similar issues.
It is notable that although Denmark does have a FOI law [Offentlighedsloven14], 
have been behind the refusals to supply information. In this case, it took four e-mails for the DWP 
official to understand what was meant by 'Active Labour Market Programmes' and in another, the DWP 
response confused Work Choice with the Choices element of Pathways to Work.
13 “Kafkaesque” (p.12) was the phrase used by some of the researchers who contributed to the Bourke, 
Worthy and Hazell's  (2012) handbook to describe this kind of struggle over the availability of 
information, and that very aptly describes my experience. 
14 https://www.retsinformation.dk/forms/r0710.aspx?id=152299 
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I have not once had to invoke it.  A large amount of data is available online and if it is 
not, most public officials have a publicly available webpage with their e-mail and 
phone number, and almost always reply with the information requested. There 
appears to be more of a culture of openness in government and a culture of co-
operation between government and academia, and this has made the process of 
researching Danish policy often much faster and more efficient15 than in the UK, 
despite the various additional barriers of language and my lesser familiarity with the 
country.
15 Not to mention more enjoyable and less stressful. 
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Chapter 5 Ethical and Political Considerations
5.1 Research ethics and the politics of research in the ALMP field
The research was guided by the University of Edinburgh School of Social and Political 
Science's (SSPS) ethical guidelines. All students of SSPS doing a research project are 
required to complete an assessment of what level of risk is involved in the research 
and lodge it with the SSPS Graduate School. This was done and a copy of the relevant 
paperwork can be found in Appendix C. I considered that completing the assessment 
and the following discussion of some of the ethical considerations were sufficient to 
satisfy the demands of the School's ethical research guidelines.   
All interviewees were approached with a brief summary of the nature and 
purposes of the research so they could make a fully-informed decision on whether or 
not to participate. If they choose to do so, they were give assurances that their names 
would not be used.  However, because of the interconnected nature of the policy field, 
it may still have been possible to identify people even if their names were anonymised
and so I took strenuous efforts to protect the identities of my participants by assessing
the likelihood this might happen with a particular description, balancing this, of 
course, with the need to ensure that evidence and its context was sufficiently clear. 
A consideration of the ethics of research is not complete without and is not anyway 
really separate from a discussion of the political nature of research. By definition, 
ethical research is research that is aware of the political nature of its subject matter 
and that aims to make some positive impact on political and social life.  Thus, it is 
incumbent on me to make clear where and in what ways political or otherwise 
normative concerns enter the design of our research.  This is not to admit that the 
research lacks integrity. On the contrary, in doing so I honestly hold up my choices 
and motives to stand or fall under scrutiny.  Choosing who and what to study involves
judgements related to the academic significance and value of what could be found, but
there are also assumptions – perhaps often unconscious and only clear when one 
pauses to reflect as I am doing here – made about the wider social and political 
contribution that the research could make, and these should be made just as explicit.  
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If sick and disabled people are disadvantaged in their relationship to the labour market
then it is a priori a positive thing to examine the process by which reversing this 
becomes and remains (or does not) a public priority. This is not so much about taking 
sides (Lawson, 1991)– about championing the cause of incapacity benefit claimants as 
underdogs against the government and setting out to produce explicitly emancipatory 
knowledge (Oliver, 1997)– but about more clearly describing how policy has 
developed. In the event that I find that inequities have developed, such a description 
may be useful for those seeking a more equitable settlement.
This very issue arose during the research and it is an interesting dilemma to discuss 
briefly. As my findings and framework began to coalesce, I became aware that the idea
that governments should be judged on how well they provide work-focused 
employment support would be controversial in some parts of the disability and 
welfare rights movements.  The framework could be read as arguing for good quality 
activation as a justification for the application of conditionality to incapacity benefits. 
There is a strand of thought in critical disability studies, for example, that it is not 
acceptable to encourage claimants into what is still a disabling labour market and that 
non-wage work ('illness work' – receiving physiotherapy and organising medication; 
every day work such as household tasks and biographical work – activities 
undertaken by disabled people 'in order to incorporate impairment into their every 
day lives'  – Barnes & Roulstone, 2005, p.323,cited in Grover & Piggott, 2015,p.248) 
should be valued at least as high as wage-work:
Even if only a minority of disabled people do not countenance wage work as being a good, it 
should not be privileged over non-work-based notions of the good. The implication in 
employment terms is that if disabled people are to have a choice, that choice must involve not 
being pressurised, as is currently the case, into preparing and competing for wage work.
Grover & Piggott (2015), p.250-1
This was never the intention of the framework. The response to this kind of 
potential criticism is that the research does not take a moral, political or ethical 
stance on the rights and wrongs of activating sick and disabled claimants, and 
that it is social-scientific exercise in trying to establish a way of thinking about 
and measuring how well activation for this group is established.  It doesn't make 
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value judgements about governments' aims – whether it is wrong to expect sick 
and disabled claimants to seek work – but instead assesses them on their own 
terms: chiefly whether the activation support they claim to offer is adequately 
provided and secured.  Regarding the type of work policy is seeking to get 
claimants to take, the framework assumes that this is important not because a 
diversity of different types of work is not preferable to paid work per se, but 
because it is likely to have an influence on how wide a claimant group can be 
helped and the success of incentive structures. An activation regime which 
recognises a range of outcomes – supported and sheltered employment and a mix
of employment and other activity, and movements towards employment – is 
likely to encounter fewer problems with ensuring a wide spread of support than a
system which his geared chiefly towards any type of employment regardless of 
appropriateness.  
Whilst that is my defence as a researcher and one that I feel is adequate 
for research purposes; as a left-leaning ordinary citizen entitled to hold my own 
political views I found it troubling that work with my name on it could be viewed
as justifying benefit sanctions. I struggled with this for some time, but the way I 
resolved this was by reminding myself of the earlier point about the use and re-
use of research. I can protest against any such interpretation all I like, but once 
the research is put into the public domain – and especially considering that the 
research was funded by public money – anyone else is free to interpret and use it,
even if that is in a way that I did not foresee or intend. 
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Chapter 6 Institutional and policy context 
The process of institutionalisation examined in the next three chapters takes place 
against the background of – and is shaped partly by – the pre-existing institutional 
and policy landscape. In the interests of readability, this chapter describes the 
institutional and social security policy context for ALMP for sick and disabled benefit 
claimants in the two countries. 
6.1 The Organisation of ALMP in Denmark 
The Danish policy story told is this chapter starts at the same time as a major re-
organisation of local government and its relationship with central government 
(known as the Strukturreformen or Kommunalreformen) and so this section provides an
overview of the organisation of ALMP from 2007 onwards and a brief review of how it
is been dealt with by the academic literature. The reforms made municipalities larger 
but much smaller in number, abolished the counties – until that point the middle tier 
of government – and created what is argued by most observers to be more target-
focused and centrally-directed ALMP system (Carstensen & Pedersen, 2008).
6.1.1. National level 
At the national level, the Ministry of Employment (Beskæftigelsesministeriet) has 
ultimate responsibility for employment policy. For the period of interest, the National 
Labour Market Authority (Arbejdsmarkedsstyrelsen [AMS])16 on behalf of the minister
directed the implementation of legislation, coordinated regional and local employment
efforts and developed new tools and methods that support employment policy, as well 
as trialling new interventions in partnership with selected pilot municipalities (Danish
Labour Market Authority, 2012). The Minister for Employment sets three to four 
yearly targets. These may be process or outcome-oriented and relate to benefits or 
16 In 2014, AMS was abolished and replaced by the Labour Market and Recruitment Agency (Styrelsen
for Arbejdsmarked og Rekruttering [STAR])
89
activation and are written into contracts between the Minister and sub-national units 
of AMS and the municipalities. AMS/STAR also administer the refunding of the 
municipalities for costs incurred paying benefits and providing labour market 
programmes. The Minister is advised by the National Employment Council 
(Beskæftigelsesrådet [BER]) formed of stakeholders, including Danish Disabled 
People's' Organisations (Danske Handicaporganisationer), the body representing 
Danish DPOs. There are various specialist bodies set up and funded but not controlled 
by the Ministry of Employment that work to generate and disperse specialist 
knowledge on disability; health and employment to all levels, but particularly the 
municipalities. The Prevention Fund provides [Fonden for Forebyggelse og Fastholdelse] 
funding for projects aimed at preventing health-related exits from employment and 
promoting return to employment. These are discussed in more detail in 7.1. Chart 6/1 
summarises the organisations involved in ALMP at the national; regional and local 
levels, and the relationship between them.
6.1.2. Regional level 
The structural reform process abolished the 15 counties – the middle tier of 
government – and replaced them with five much larger regions, in the case of ALMP 
playing both an assistance and supervisory/follow-up role through their 
corresponding Regional Employment Authority (Beskæftigelsesregion [BR]) in five 
regions, one each for the Danish capital region (Copenhagen and surrounding areas), 
North, South and Central Denmark, and Zealand. They provide municipalities with 
labour market analysis and knowledge of best practice to help them set their local 
targets, ensures local targets aligned with the Minister's national ones and challenge 
them on their ambition in setting them, and subsequently monitor their performance 
in meeting these. All this takes place in a legally-enshrined year-round 'dialogue 
process' between the RBRs and the municipalities (Mploy, 2009). It is advised by the 
Regional Employment Council (Regionalt Beskæftigelsesråd [RBR]), a body formed of 
the same social partners as BER. This represents a weakening of their position 
compared to the predecessor Regional Labour Market Councils, in which they had 
decision-making power (Lindsay & McQuaid, 2009) and appears to part of a trend of 
the marginalisation of social actors from decision-making processes (Weishaupt, 2011)
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Chart 6/1  Organisations involved in ALMP for sick and disabled claimants in Denmark, and the relationships between them
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6.1.3 Municipal level 
Until 2007 there had been separate local offices providing activation and benefits for 
the uninsured and the insured unemployed – the responsibility of local and central 
government, respectively. The reform merged these into 77 Jobcentres [Jobcenters] run
jointly, with a further 14 pilot Jobcentres run entirely by the municipality. The 
municipalities themselves were merged from over 200 to 97, on the grounds that they 
were too small to cope with the increased demands that were being placed on them in 
terms of the scope and reach of activation (Carstensen & Pedersen, 2008). In 2009, the 
pilot model was extended to all 91 Jobcenters. There had for some time been 
dissatisfaction with the divide between different types of claimants and the variation 
in the quality of the services they were offered (Jorgensen, Norup, & Baadsgaard, 
2010), and there was the related concern that insured claimants were not having their 
social (as opposed to work-related) problems addressed whereas uninsured claimants 
were being treated mainly as social cases and not potential employees (ibid). The 
divide between insured and uninsured claimants in terms of activation was argued to 
be largely illusory (ibid) and one that caused employment service workers 
underestimate the support that insured claimants needed and overestimate (or entirely
ignore) the needs of groups considered further from the labour market. Unified 
Jobcenters were seen as a way to overcome this divide, with benefit administration 
moved out to separate benefits offices17, on the grounds that Jobcenters should only 
focus on getting claimants back into employment. In relation to sick and disabled 
claimants specifically, it was hoped that by creating an employment-focused gateway 
that they had to go through to register a disability pension claim, it would be easier to 
engage claimants in back-to-work support. A further motivation for removing 
responsibility for the PES and its insured claimants and passing them over to the 
municipalities is that the PES had hitherto been a source of embarrassment for central 
government (Brodkin & Larsen, 2011) and so devolution to municipalities was a way 
of depoliticising ALMP and isolating ministers from blame. 
Local authorities have a significant amount of autonomy with regard the types 
of support offered – they can combine standard activation offers like training and job 
subsidies with other services delivered locally, such as social services; what their 
17 Except for Disability Pension and Housing Benefit, which are administered by Payments Denmark 
(Udbetaling Danmark), an agency run by an arm of ATP, a pension fund.
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priority targets and target groups are; their activation budgets, which are set by the 
municipal council in accordance with its other areas of responsibility; how support is 
delivered – whether in-house or contracted-out, and the extent to which they work in 
concert with other municipalities. Their aims and approaches to realising them are laid
out in the Local Employment Plan, produced by the municipality but advised by the 
BR and the Local Employment Council (Lokale Beskæftigelsesråd [LBR]), a board of 
stakeholders similar to those at the regional and national levels. LBRs, whilst mainly 
advisory, are provided with a yearly fund to promote labour market inclusivity and 
can choose to spend this through the municipality, or independently. Municipalities 
have traditionally been hostile to labour market parties – employer organisations and 
trade unions – and so municipalisation was seen as a way of marginalising them so as 
to shift policy from a core labour strategy – their preference – to a broader strategy of 
increasing the number of work-ready unemployed (ibid).
Whilst local autonomy with regard ALMP is extensive, municipalities do have 
to work within a national framework that central government has appeared 
increasingly determined to impose, and indeed increasing central control was one of 
the aims of the reform. Central government certainly now has a much wider range of 
tools to steer municipalities than they once did. The Ministry of Employment can 
monitor Jobcenters across on a wide range of measures – with particular emphasis on 
the concordance of local employment plans with the yearly national employment 
targets. It can sanction and 'name and shame' poorly performing Jobcenters, and 
directly intervene in the most serious cases (Mploy, 2011)
The 2007 reforms also introduced a new set of centrally-designed standardised 
tools that municipalities are obliged to use. All municipalities must also classify their 
claimants according to three (previously five) centrally-defined groups, with each one 
laying down minimum standards in terms of service provision, depending on the 
claimants degree of 'match' with the needs of the local labour market (ibid). Thus, 
what we see since 2007 is a system where decision-making has been centralised but 
implementation localised, one in which social partners have much less formal 
opportunity to influence policy than previously was the case, and one run along 
increasingly according to centrally-defined targets and using standardised tools . 
Whilst the later sections of this chapter deal with the impact of the 
organisation of ALMP on the institutionalisation of activation for sick and disabled 
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people, it is worth looking at the evidence tells us about the impact these changes 
have had on ALMP generally, this being a major theme of recent Danish ALMP 
research. Bredgaard & Larsen (2008)  argue that there is a clear link between the 
changes in the organisation of ALMP and the noticeable shift towards a work-first 
orientation in municipal Jobcenters, a trend they detected in the changes between two
nationwide surveys of Jobcenter managers in 2001 and 2007.  Managers focused more 
on labour market than individual needs, there was greater standardisation in methods 
and the offers made to claimants and a move away from gradual improvement of 
employability towards the quickest route to employment. Jorgensen, Norup, & 
Baadsgaard (2010), looking at Jobcenter practices before and after the reforms in four 
municipalities, argue that the imposition of new standardised tools has led to 
deprofessionalisation in labour market policy and this leads to claimants' problems as 
being seen by Jobcenter staff as questions of behavioural management, and not as 
complex and overlapping employment barriers. Along with the new emphasis on 
work-centric targets, they argue “a new policy has been institutionalised, often in 
ways not openly discussed and politically decided on, but brought about by changing 
the organisation and implementation structures.”(p.9) The noticeable decrease in re-
training, rehabilitation and other more resource and time-intensive activation 
measures since 2007 are attributed by them in part to the increased number of and 
focus on employment outcome targets brought in by the structural reform.
6.2 Non-employment benefits for sick and disabled people in 
Denmark 
6.2.1 Sickness Benefit
All wage-earners and the self-employed are eligible for Sickness Benefit 
(Sygedagpenge [SB]). There is no nationally-mandated sick test, though for a claim of 
five weeks or more (the point at which the financing transfers from the employer to 
the municipality), most municipalities will require the claimant to document their 
illness and the claimant must have worked for 26 weeks prior to becoming ill and for 
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no fewer than 240 hours in that period)1819. The value is calculated according to their 
salary and hours, up to a maximum of DKK 4,07420per week. For the first 15 days the 
benefit is paid by the employer and by the state thereafter. Central government meets 
the cost for the first four weeks after that, the municipal and central government share
the cost from then until the 52nd week. The cost from the end of the first year 
onwards is borne entirely by the municipality. 
The overall number of claimants and their cost was a major policy concern at 
the beginning of the period of interest. It was high in both absolute number of 
claimants21 and as a percentage of the labour force (see Graph 6/1) and in total cost 
(see Graph 6/2). Successive reforms tightened eligibility and increased the 
requirements on municipalities to follow-up claims sooner after the original claim and
more frequently thereafter, with a major reform taking effect in 2014 (see 7.2.1).
18 2014/15 rules: https://www.borger.dk/Sider/Sygedagpenge-hvis-du-er-loenmodtager.aspx (Accessed 
3/3/15)
19 These requirements have been stepped up significantly over the period in question. The 2007 
requirements were 13 weeks and 120 hours.
20 Monetary values are given in the respective currency, but a rough conversion can be made by 
deleting the last digit when converting from DKK to £ and adding one for a £ to DKK conversion. In
this case, therefore, DKK 4074 is approximately £400
21 Claims are recorded in three ways: individual claims; individual claimants (some claimants will 
have more than one claim in a year) and full-time claimants. For the latter, each claimant is adjusted
to represent the time spent on benefit and so, for example, a claimant spending 26 weeks on benefit 
will count as 0.5. The second two are used in this study.
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Graph 6/1: Sickness Benefit claims 2004-2013: total number of claimants and full-
time claimants as % of labour force (16-66 years)
Source: Jobindsats database. Antal personer, gnsn. varighed og fuldtidspersoner  option of the 
Sygedagpenge data set     http://www.jobindsats.dk/sw173.asp 
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Graph 6/2: Sickness Benefit expenditure 2004-2013 (DKK constant prices): total 
government and local and central government




Disability Pension (Førtidspension [DP]) is the other main benefit paid to people with 
reduce work-capacity due to sickness or disability. It is a taxable flat-rate benefit (prior
to 2002 there were several levels reflecting varied levels of reduced capacity) paid at a 
monthly rate of DKK 17,660 for a single person22. Until 2013, it was not time-limited 
and the claimant could continue claim until 65, at which point they apply for old-age 
pension. Holders of a pension wishing to  return to work can have their payments put 
on hold – rather than surrendering the benefit entirely – so they do not have to 
reapply should it prove unsuccessful. On average, disability pensioners claim for just 
under one year – 50 weeks in 2013 (Jobinsats database). Given the generous rate and 
long average claim period, a disability pension is only the very last option once all 
other options have been considered. The claimant and the municipality must 
demonstrate that the claimant cannot be supported in any other way. Supported 
employment or subsidised employment through the Flexjob (Fleksjob [FJ]) scheme (see
7.2) are frequently offered as alternatives and only when these are not considered 
viable is a pension granted. Despite this, a number of reforms in the 1990s and early 
2000s and good labour market conditions until 2008, the DP caseload has remained 
high, with only relatively modest decreases in recent years (see Graph 6/3, below). 
Even with these, disability pensioners account for around 9% of those of working age 
and it costs around DKK 42 bn yearly (see Graph 6/4, below). The cost has been of 
particular concern to the government considering that a significant part of its strategy
with Flex Jobs and other measures was to reduce the total DP population (Danish 
Government, 2012) By 2011, there were ~27,000 more claimants than was intended by 
those who introduced the 2002 reforms and despite an additional ~50,000 subsidised 
employment places being funded over the period (ibid).
22 2013 rules: https://www.borger.dk/Sider/Foertidspension-nye-regler.aspx (Accessed 1/6/2014)
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Graph 6/3: Disability Pension claims 2004-2013: total number of claimants and full-
time claimants as % of labour force (16-66 years)
Source: Ibid Antal personer, gnsn. varighed og fuldtidspersoner  option of the Førtidspension data set 
http://www.jobindsats.dk/sw177.asp 
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Graph 6/4: Disability Pension expenditure (DKK, constant prices) by benefit and per 
person in labour force (16-66 years) 
Source: Ibid Forsørgelsesudgifter option of the Førtidspension data set 
http://www.jobindsats.dk/sw177.asp
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The changing nature of the caseload has in particular been of concern to successive 
governments: by 2012, one in four new claimants were below 40 years old and the 
average age of claimants decreased by three years, raising the prospect of government 
having to support a large group of claimants on a permanent benefit for many decades
(ibid).  Further, reduced capacity due to mental health difficulties was the chief reason 
for 51% of DP cases in 2010 (up from 32% in 2001) and for 82% of claimants aged 20-29,
seven in ten of new claims are for reasons of mental health (ibid). The new centre-left 
government introduced a reform in 2012 (taking effect in 2013), in most cases ending 
eligibility for anybody under 40. Potential disability pensioners under this age must 
instead undertake a compulsory activation scheme which attracts a benefit equal to 
their previous benefit (commonly Social Assistance) (ibid). 
6.2.3 Flex Benefit
The other major sickness/disability benefit is Flex Benefit, paid to those eligible but 
unable to obtain a Flexjob, or  those who have been dismissed from or had to leave a 
Flexjob.  As demand for FJs has greatly outstripped supply, Flex Benefit rolls have 
increased substantially.  Aside from these three benefits, sick and disabled claimants 
can claim general benefit – Unemployment Insurance (A-Dagpenge [UI] or Social 
Assistance (Kontanthjælp [SA]) – uemployed people taking part in rehabilitative 
measures can claim a Rehabilitation Allowance (Revalideringsydelse) at DKK 17,663 
per month for a single person, or half that if the claimant is younger than 2523. 
23 2014/15 rules.: www.borger.dk/Sider/Revalidering.aspx  (Accessed 30/90/15)
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6.3.4 Claimant caseload profile 
As employment service interventions should be based on the disability or health 
condition the claimant has, as well as the length of their claim – a proxy for a range of
other characteristics of the claimant, including the relevance of their skills to the 
labour market and their overall 'distance' from the labour market, which is assumed to
lengthen with time – it is worth establishing the profile of the claimant caseload. In 
terms of the reason for a DP claim24, mental or behavioural disorder is by the far the 
largest, followed by disease of the musculoskeletal system. (See Graph 6/5). This is part
of a long-term trend, with significantly more people suffering from mental or 
behavioural disorders25 claiming DP according to the most recent figures, compared to 
2000, the earliest year for which figures are available. 
 Data on the total length of claims is not recorded, though it is possible to put 
together a rougher image of the length of claims by looking at two adjacent sources of
data. Data on the average length of claim within any given year is available and shows
the average length of a claim is around 50 weeks for DP26. Thus, we can assume that 
the majority of claimants claim for more at least 1 year and very likely more. 
24 Breakdowns of the other benefits by diagnosis are not available
25 'Disorder' is a loaded term which I prefer not to use, but it is the phrase used in both the British and
Danish (as
Lidelse) and so is used to avoid confusion.
26 Jobindsats database. Antal forløb fordelt på varighed option on the Førtidspension data set
http://www.jobindsats.dk/sw177.asp
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Graph 6/5 Disability Pension claims  (% of total), by diagnosis, 2000, 2004, 2009 and 
201227
Source: Danish National Social Appeals Board (2006, 2010, 2013)
27 Reasons for claiming representing less than 10% of the total are grouped as Other. They include 
Cardiovascular conditions, Respiratory diseases, birth defects, and external causes (accidents)
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6.3 The organisation of ALMP in the UK 
As with many areas of UK public policy, ALMP and social security is organised 
nationally to an extent that sets it apart from other comparable countries. A single 
UK28 government department, the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), is 
responsible for social security and active labour market policy, replacing separate 
ministries for each in 2001. DWP ministers are responsible for setting benefit rules 
and rates; providing employment programmes and determining claimant eligibility for
them. 
There is no national advisory body on employment and disability/health, 
though the government does commission frequent reviews to inform policy – the  
Black; Black and Frost and Sayce, most notably (Black, 2008; Black & Frost, 2011; 
Sayce, 2011). The Office for Disability Issues (ODI) is based in the DWP but offers 
advice to ministers and officials across government on a range of disability-related 
issues.
Jobcentre Plus (JCP) is both the UK's PES and social security agency, replacing 
separate organisations for each function in 2002. JCP and its predecessor were arms-
length 'next-steps' executive agencies operating on behalf of but managerially and 
budgetarily separate from DWP, but in 2011 JCP was brought under the direct control 
of the DWP, with Jobcentre Plus remaining as a brand only. DWP operates around 800
local Jobcentres, organised into 39 districts and 7 regions. JCP offices are the first point
of contact for claimants applying for benefits and seeking employment-related 
support. Benefit claims are not any more routinely handled by local offices, with 
claimants instead applying online or by telephone to Customer Contact Centres 
(CCC), which record the claimant's details and then pass them onto a Benefit 
Assessment Centre (BAC) to be assessed (Citizens Advice Bureau, 2007). Whilst local 
JCP offices and districts may choose to work in partnership with local government, 
local authorities play no major, formalised role in either sickness and disability 
benefits administration of active labour market policy, again making the UK an outlier
in the European context. 
28 Social security and Active Labour Market Policy are devolved to Northern Ireland (not part of this 
research) but at the time of the research not to Wales or Scotland
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The past 15 years has seen a gradual movement towards employment services 
being provided by external contractors, rather than in-house by JCP. JCP offices and 
their Personal Advisers (PAs) provide non-contracted employment support initially 
and then refer claimants to contracted programmes at a given point in the claim, and 
so are the primary provider of support to sick and disabled benefit claimants of 
working-age until they are registered with a Work Choice or Work Programme 
provider, the two programmes which provide most employment support beyond JCP.  
As in Denmark, there appears to be a process of highly managed 
decentralisation, with flexibility for sub-national units of the PES, but in exchange for 
a more rigorous and more outcomes-focused management regime.  Though the UK has
a prior history of social partnership in ALMP in the form of the Manpower Services 
Commission  (Clasen, 2012), social partners for quite some time have not had a formal 
role in the design and delivery of social security or ALMP at either the national and 
local level. The DWP does regularly consult a range of stakeholders on reforms 
(though is frequently criticised for the design of such consultations and how ministers
respond to them, see, for example, (Crossley & Veit-Wilson, 2013) but social partners 
are not systematically represented on formal consultative boards, as in Denmark and 
other European countries. There have been a succession of non-governmental 
advisory bodies in recent years, and these are discussed in 8.1. Chart 6/2, below, lays 
out the national and local organisations involved in ALMP and social security for sick 
and disabled benefit claimants in the UK.
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Chart 6/2  Organisations involved in ALMP for sick and disabled claimants in the UK, and the relationships between them
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6.4 Non-employment benefits for sick and disabled people in the 
UK
Unlike Denmark, the UK does not have a publicly-financed sickness benefit. Rather, 
sickness absence is compensated by Statutory Sick Pay (SSP) for 28 weeks, at which 
point the claimant can then claim benefit on the grounds of sickness or disability.  The 
period of interest coincided with the introduction in 2008 of a single sickness and 
disability benefit with two different rates and conditionality regimes, based on an 
assessed level of capacity for work.  This consolidated several individual predecessor 
benefits.
6.4.1 Pre-2008 benefits
Until 2008, people unable to work for longer than 28 weeks due to ill health or 
disability could claim one of several benefits for the duration of their incapacity. 
Claimants under the pension age, with the requisite National Insurance (NI) 
contributions and demonstrating a reduced level of capacity through a medical test 
could claim Incapacity Benefit (IB). IB paid a basic short-term rate until 28 weeks 
(£74.80 standard rate), a higher short-term rate from 29 to 52 weeks (£88.55) and a 
long-term rate from the end of the first year onwards (£99.15)29. Those without 
sufficient NI contributions could claim Income Support (IS-D) – a general benefit paid 
to people in or out of work on low incomes – on the grounds of disability, or Severe 
Disablement Allowance (SDA), abolished in 2001 but is still paid to continuing 
claimants. IB; IS-D and SDA are often taken together as Incapacity Benefits (IBs) and 
this is also the case for this research, unless otherwise indicated. 
Claims for Invalidity Benefit, the main benefit for unemployed people with 
reduced working capacity until 1995, when it was replaced with IB, increased steeply 
over the 1980s and 1990s, a result of governments of the time pursuing an informal 
policy of labour shedding, whereby unemployed people – particularly older industrial 
workers losing jobs as a result of the decline of heavy industries – were encouraged to
claim for IVB, thus removing them from the unemployment figures (Prideaux & 
29 All rates are for 2012/13: http://www.rightsnet.org.uk/pdfs/benefit_rates_poster_2012_2013.pdf 
(Accessed 9/9/15). All rates for all UK benefits are for 2012/13 and were taken from this source, 
unless otherwise stated.
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Roulstone, 2012). As a result, IVB/IB has had a strongly regional character, with West 
Scotland, South Wales and the North of England having the highest proportion of 
claimants (Beatty & Fothergill, 2005). This has given rise to the government, media 
and often public perception that a significant proportion of the IBs caseload is 'hidden'
unemployment, rather than genuine incapacity. Claimant numbers did not reduce by 
as much as government hoped given the strong decade of growth from the mid-late 
1990s onwards, giving rise to concerns that the labour market was being starved and 
there would be inflationary wage increases (Grover & Piggott, 2005).  New claimants 
of IB were required to attend a Compulsory Work-Focused Interview (WFI) from 2000 
onwards (Kirby & Riley, 2004)  a model which informed later attempts to engage IB 
claimants in work-focused support. A number of trials over the next few years; the 
apparent success of the voluntary New Deal for Disabled People and the continued 
high claim rate led to the abolition of IB and replacement with a new benefit, 
Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) in 200830.
6.4.2 Post-2008: Employment and Support Allowance
People out of work for reasons of sickness or disability have since 2008 been eligible 
for ESA instead of IBs, which were closed to new claimants but still had active 
claimants until 2014, when the transition between the two was completed. ESA has 
two separate categories depending on the claimant's level of capacity reduction. ESA 
Support (ESA-S) is unconditional and paid at the higher rate of £105.05,whilst a 
claimant considered able to work with assistance claim ESA-Work Related Activity 
(ESA-W) at the lower rate of £99.15 and are expected in return to attend CWFIs and 
enroll on employment support programmes. Claimants are granted ESA at an 
introductory basic weekly rate of £71.00 for 13 weeks whilst they are being assessed 
for the level of their working capacity. The Work Capability Assessment (WCA) is 
used for this purpose. The claimant is first assessed for whether they have sufficiently 
reduced capacity to continue to claim ESA through the Limited Capacity for Work test
(LCWT), which scores the claimant on their difficulty in performing everyday tasks 
relating to mobility; cognition; communication and social engagement (see Chart 6/3, 
below). A score of 15 points indicates that the claimant has reduced capacity such that
30 Claimants could continue their claim until migrated to ESA.
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they cannot immediately be expected to work, and in that case the claimant is granted
ESA. A lower score means that the claimant cannot claim ESA but can be granted 
another benefit, JSA most commonly. Claimants assessed as being eligible for ESA are 
then subjected to the Limited Capacity for Work-Related activity test to assess 
whether or not they can be asked to take steps towards work. This asks a similar set of
questions and claimants scoring 15 points or higher are granted ESA-S. Claimants 
scoring lower claim ESA-W. Claimants at any stage of the process and ESA-W 
claimants not attending CWFIs or otherwise deemed to be non-cooperative can have 
their benefit reduced to the level of JSA, though they cannot be sanctioned for 
refusing a job or job interview. 
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Chart 6/3  ESA claimant journey
Source: Adapted from (Grover & Piggott, 2010)
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The WCA has been a source of considerable controversy, attracting criticism for its 
poor design – in particular its insensitivity to fluctuating conditions and mental health
conditions; inadequate administration by ATOS Origin – until 2014 the company 
contracted to operate the test, the high rate (40%) of successful appeals and the 
associated cost, and its assessment as being fit for work people with serious and even 
terminal conditions (Gulland, 2011).  From 2012 onwards, fewer claimants were found 
fit for work and more were placed in the Support Group, likely a result of changes to 
the design and implementation of the test as a result of a series of yearly reviews into 
the WCA from 2010 (Harrington, 2010, 2011, 2012; Litchfield, 2013) and the re-
assessment process getting further into the pool of IB claimants, reaching at that point
claimants who had claimed IB for longer periods.
6.4.2 Claimant caseload profile
As for the Danish benefits, it is possible to use existing data to get a broad overview of
the nature of the caseload.  In terms of the reason for an IB/SDA/ESA claim, mental or 
behavioural disorder is by the far the largest, followed by disease of the 
musculoskeletal system and connective tissue (See Graph 6/7).  This is part of a long-
term trend, with significantly more people suffering from mental or behavioural 
disorders claiming IB/ESA according to the most recent figures, compared to 1999, the 
earliest year for which figures are available.  With respect to the length of claim, the 
time claimants spent on IB was one of the major motivations for attempts to reform it,
and indeed, at the switchover to ESA in October 2008, a majority of claimants had 
been claiming for five years or more31 (see Graph 6/8).  
31 Tracking changes in the caseload over time in terms of time spent on benefit is not possible after 
October 2008. DWP does not record claimants' cumulative time spent out of work over more than 
one benefit, so the migration of claimants from IB to ESA effectively 'resets the clock'.
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Graph 6/7 IB/SDA/ESA claims (000s), by International Classification of Diseases (ICD)
code diagnosis, August 1999, August 2008 and May 2014
Source: DWP Tabulation Tool, Incapacity Benefit/SDA combined data, and ESA data. http://tabulation-
tool.dwp.gov.uk/100pc/ibsda/tabtool_ibsda.html http://tabulation-
tool.dwp.gov.uk/100pc/esa/tabtool_esa.html 
[Key: 1 – Other, 2 – Mental/Behavioural Disorder, 3 – Diseases of the Nervous System, 4 – Diseases of 
the Circulatory or Respiratory Systems, 5 – Diseases of the Musculoskeletal system and Connective 
Tissue,  6 – Injury, Poisoning, other external causes]
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Graph 6/8: Length of IB/SDA claims (000s), August 2008
Source: DWP Tabulation Tool, Incapacity Benefit/SDA combined data, http://tabulation   
tool.dwp.gov.uk/100pc/ibsda/tabtool_ibsda.html 
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6.5 Conclusion: changing institutional and programmatic 
landscapes 
This chapter has given an overview of the organisation of ALMP and the 
structure of the sickness and disability benefits system in the two focus countries.
Though historically very different in the organisation of ALMP, they appear to be 
converging. UK labour market policy has always been centralised, with policy 
driven through a centrally-controlled PES, but contracted providers are 
increasingly responsible for activation efforts, and how their behaviour can be 
aligned with policy intent has increasingly become an issue in recent years. 
Denmark seems to be making the reverse journey, coming from a tradition of 
local autonomy in much of its social policy and whilst municipalities are taking 
on more and more responsibility, central government has developed a large 
number of tools with which to steer them towards national goals.
The benefits systems are more distinct, most notably the greater number of non-
employment sickness and disability benefits in Denmark and the fact that 
Denmark has a publicly-financed Sickness Benefit whose claimants are subject to 
activation, whilst the UK does not. However, the challenge of a large and diverse 
group of a long-term unemployed for reasons of sickness and disability – 
Disability Pension in Denmark and Incapacity Benefit and then Employment and 
Support Allowance in the UK – is common to both countries.
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Chapter 7 Denmark
7.1 Political commitment to the active work principle for sick and 
disabled claimants
7.1.1 Nature and scope of the activation agenda
As was explained in the previous chapter, Denmark's pool of claimants out of work for
reasons of sickness and disability is a highly diverse group – from newly unemployed 
claimants on sickness or other entry benefits to claimants of DP, many of whom will 
have been out of the labour market for a number of years. The barriers to employment
can be limited to their health condition or disability or be a mix of specific 
health/disability-related barriers and more general barriers stemming from spending 
time out of the labour market, and all of these can vary from minor to severe. The 
question here is the nature of the stated commitment and to what extent it applies to 
this full range and diversity of claimants. 
The period of interest can be usefully understood as one in which the 
ambitions in terms of the number and range of claimants increases steadily.  As is 
explained in more detail in section 7.2, Denmark's approach has been historically been
preventive – intervening very soon after the claimant applies for Sickness Benefits so 
that their capacity reduction does not become a permanent barrier to employment.  A 
variety of measures organised fairly rigidly32 by the severity of the claimant's 
reduction in capacity are applied in order that claimants can manage their capacity 
reduction within employment. These range from retraining for a job more compatible 
with their condition; to several different types of employment subsidy that provide 
employment opportunities more compatible with reduced capacity.  Whilst these 
extend to very large capacity reductions, they otherwise assume fairly high work-
readiness – indeed, some of the programmes are very intensive and demanding – and 
employability.  They do not provide support across the range of complex employment 
barriers that we know can develop when sick and disabled people are out of the labour
market.  This is because the benefit grouping containing such claimants – Disability 
Pension –  have not hitherto been seen as legitimate or worthwhile target for 
32 Though whether referral practices really reflect this is doubtable (see sections 7.2 and 7.4)
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intervention.  
However, the disability strategy active in the first few years of the period of 
interest, Disability and Employment – An Employment Strategy for People with 
Disabilities [Handicap & Job – en beskæftigelsesstrategi for personer med handicap] 
(Danish Ministry of Employment, 2004), shows the beginnings of a broader approach. 
It identifies three target categories and their needs similar to those outlined in Chapter
3: 
• those already in the labour market who need support to maintain their 
position or change jobs; 
• those 'on the edge of the labour market' [På kanten af arbejdsmarkedet], 
typically claiming unemployment insurance; social assistance or sickness 
benefit claimants who require specialist support as part of mainstream 
employment services to help them into employment
• Those 'far from mainstream labour market' [Langt fra det ordinære 
arbejdsmarked ] – estimated to be 50,000 claimants of DP who wish to return to
employment – for whom the main policy aim is to get them back into the 
labour market as competitive jobseekers. 
The strategy creates three aims – to increase knowledge about employment barriers 
and solutions amongst employers, social partners, disabled jobseekers and other 
stakeholders; to improve employer attitudes, and to remove physical and institutional 
barriers that prevent disabled jobseekers entering the labour market. These are 
coupled with three specific targets: to increase the employment rate of disabled people
by 2000 people a year; to increase the number of workplaces employing a disabled 
person by 1% a year, and to improve employer and jobseeker's understanding of 
employment and training opportunities.  With an eye to the then forthcoming reform 
of municipalities, the strategy at this point has a strong institutional aspect, with the 
new municipal Jobcenters presented as the key actor in helping to generate and direct 
disabled and sick jobseekers to appropriate support.  At this point, though, the detail 
of this broader agenda is still lacking; the mode of reform appears to be that of fairly 
incremental change to service delivery and organisation and improvements to 
capacity rather major structural changes to benefits or programmes, and the targets 
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are general employment targets, rather than for specific groups of sick and disabled 
claimants. 
The successor strategy in 2009 – Disability and Employment: It is Possible 
[Handicap & job - det kan lade sig gøre]  (Danish Government, 2009) continues with a 
similar set of aims, but with a sharper focus on DP claimants and improving support 
for those furthest from the labour market, including the additional aim of helping 15% 
of DP claimants who ask for support to be helped successfully into employment. There
is also more attention paid to specific types of disability and health condition and 
what specific barriers to employment they create.
The third main government strategy in the period of interest – A Part of the 
Community [En del af fællesskabet] (Danish Government, 2012) represents the 
culmination of these moves over the previous eight years. It introduced major changes
to the rules around Disability Pension and Flexjobs, meaning that those under 40 
wanting to claim DP are now no longer allowed to do so, except in cases of extreme 
disability. Instead, they are subject to Resource Scheme (RS), an interdisciplinary 
programme of support, for up to five years. At full extension, it will treat 50,000 
people (see Appendix B2) – a very significant and ambitious plan given that very little 
activation support has hitherto to been available for this group.  The support offered 
and its organisation is looked at in more detail later on in the chapter but the key 
point here is that A Part of the Community signals a major shift in the nature and 
scope of the agenda, from largely helping people recently having left the labour 
market to get back into it towards making major inroads into the stock of DP 
claimants, many of whom have major and complex employment barriers and long 
histories of non-employment. 
7.1.2 Building an institutional framework
An indicator of strong political commitment to the agenda is the extent to which 
government commits itself to the often costly and laborious process of building the 
necessary institutional framework, defined here as the launch of relevant programmes,
the setting-up of bodies to organise, deliver, research or inform ALMP for sick and 
disabled people and the building up of specialist capacity in these and existing 
institutions. 
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Launching new programmes 
In terms of the launch of new programmes, both Flexjobs (established 1998) and 
Vocational Rehabilitation (1990) existed before the period of interest, but Resource 
Scheme – discussed in 7.2.3 – is a fairly clear sign of commitment to providing support
for the most disadvantaged claimants, despite the political risk given the controversy 
it has caused. The intervening years, have seen a relatively steady stream of initiatives 
and smaller programmes aimed at improving employment support. Disability & 
Employment: An Employment Strategy for People with Disabilities [Handicap & Job - en 
beskæftigelsesstrategi for personer med handicap] (Danish Ministry of Employment, 
2004) provided DKK 80m for 12 projects including a new method of training Jobcenter 
staff to deal with people with disabilities; trials for new sheltered employment 
schemes that are more like ordinary workplaces, and a new internet job portal for 
people with disabilities. The second part of the strategy in 2006 funded 43 projects – 
10 general ones and the rest focused on specific disabilities included those for the deaf 
and blind, people with learning difficulties and those with dyslexia (Bengtsson, 2008). 
Similar platforms were launched also in 2008 – DKK 171m for 39 projects run by social
partners to reduce the length of sickness absence – and two in 2009 (ibid). Even 
officials at the National Council of Disabled People's Organisations, which is generally
critical of government policy on disability and employment, did argue in interviews 
that these had been part of a fairly clear and consistent – across two changes of 
government – strategy to re-integrate disabled people into the labour market: 
[Before 2000] you had some small projects, but it was tokenism – ‘we are doing something for 
the cripples’ so it has always been something that has been politically quite easy to get done. 
You did [then] not have any real approach to get persons with disabilities into the labour 
market. But for the last 15 years I think we have had a lot more strategic initiatives aiming to 
do that. We have had national action programmes with specific targets, a whole number of 
smaller projects, surveys looking at the development of unemployment/employment of people
with disabilities, and so on. 
Interview, DPO Representative, September 2012
Setting up new institutions and Building specialist capacity 
With the government structural reforms in 2007 came a number of new bodies aimed 
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at supporting the government's strategy to improve employment outcomes for the 
sick and disabled non-employed. The Specialist Centre for Employment and Disability 
(Specialfunktionen Job & Handicap) was established in order to provide a national 
resource centre for individual Jobenters to draw upon, with the Centre For Active 
Employment (CABI) playing a similar role, acting as an independent national centre 
for research and expertise on labour market inclusivity, with a particular focus on 
sickness and disability. The Prevention Fund (Forebyggelsesfonden), a foundation 
established in 2006 as part of a wider cross-party welfare agreement, disburses DKK 
350m a year to projects aimed and promoting occupational health and safety. The 
Danish National Centre for the Working Environment (Forskingcenter for Arbejdsmiljo)
carries out research and promotes knowledge of best practice in a number of relevant 
areas, including psychosocial aspects of the working environment, musculoskeletal 
disorders, labour market retention and sickness absence (National Research Centre for
the Working Environment, 2015).  The idea was that using these national institution as
a resource, each Jobcenter would have their own specialist (Nøgleperson) available 
whose role would be to advise their non-specialist colleagues dealing with claimants 
at the frontline, as well as communicate best practice and oversee municipality-wide 
efforts to reintegrate disabled people into the labour market (Specialist Centre for 
Employment and Disability, 2015). Regional labour market councils were supposed to 
oversee this spread of best practice and to ensure that municipalities collaborated 
where necessary. In practice, however, this has been a patchily-implemented strategy. 
In some Jobcenters the Disability Key Person is not, as it should be, a full time job and 
a survey of Jobcenter staff found that a significant proportion of the Jobcenter Key 
People felt they did not have a leading role (Danish Labour Market Authority, 2009a). 
The same survey found a large minority of staff responding that they did not know 
how to deal with claimants with disabilities, especially those with mental health 
issues. Representatives of the National Network of Disability Organisations and the 
Labour Market Authority confirmed this:
Disability has never really come on the local agenda and in a way this 'key person' was never 
in a position where they could influence their colleagues so the level of disability knowledge 
and expertise became and has become less and less. The knowledge that was supposed to flow 
between the Jobcenter workers, it hasn’t worked at all. The focus on disability is less today 
than it was five to six years ago 
Interview, DPO Representative, October 2012
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7.1.3 Steering, monitoring and target-setting 
The increasing central control of activation was a theme that recurred in several of the
interviews with Danish stakeholders. As was noted in Chapter 6, the reform of local 
government and its relationship with central government in 2007 has led to a welfare 
system is locally delivered and organised but in terms of policy direction and strategy, 
led from the centre. The steering (styring) of municipalities by central government 
towards more and better activation is now a perennial issue, and central government 
has commissioned a number of reviews into the effectiveness of its steering capacity –
see, for example, Slotsholm for Danish Labour Market Authority (2010). In terms of 
targets; standardised tools, electronic recording of benefits and activation, and funding
systems, central government has a number of ways in which it can influence who is 
activated, when and how, and it does appear that it is used them zealously to push 
activation of sick and disabled claimants.  In terms of the imposition of targets, 
reduction of the number of new claimants of DP or Sickness Benefit have been one of 
the employment minister's four national targets in 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 (see
Table 7/1, below). Additionally, Programme for persons with disabilities (Indsatsen for 
personer med handicap), set a number of similar targets, including one of moving 15% 
of existing disability pensioners into employment (Bengtsson, 2008). Municipalities are
generally very responsive to these targets and so it should be taken as a sign as firm 
political commitment, especially given the other pressing labour market challenges 
Denmark faced in the late 2000s.
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Table 7/1: Extracts from Employment Minister's Employment Targets regarding sick 
and disabled people  
Year Minister's Goal
2009 Goal 2: Jobcenters should intervene early to get Sickness Benefit claimants back 
into employment. Nationally, there should be year-on-year decreases in SB cases
and a 20% reduction by 2015.
2010 Goal 2: Jobcenters should intervene early to get Sickness Benefit claimants back 
into employment. Nationally, there should be year-on-year decreases in SB cases
and a 20% reduction by 2015.
2011 Goal 2: Job centers must ensure that the number of people on permanent 
benefits (Flex Benefit, Flexjobs and Disability Pension) is reduced.
2012 Goal 2: Measured by the reduction of people accessing Flexjobs and Disability 
Pension, Jobcenters must provide more support to people far from the labour 
market.
2013 Goal 2: Measured by the reduction of people accessing Flexjobs and Disability 
Pension, Jobcenters must provide more support to people far from the labour 
market.
Source: (Danish Ministry of Employment, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011b, 2012)
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More than targets, the central government's refunding of the municipalities' ALMP 
costs has throughout the period been its primary means of seeking to push the efforts 
of local government more strongly in an activation direction. Municipal expenditure is
funded partly by local taxes and charges and partly by refunds from central 
government. Altering the refund rates to encourage or discourage certain types of 
behaviour has been a key method of central control of local government for some 
time. To encourage activation, benefits are refunded more generously when the 
claimant is activated, and the refunding of benefits also decreases over time. When 
municipalities do not provide statutory interventions – or provide them late – their 
refund is sanctioned. Further, government has tried to use the refund system to 
influence not only the balance between the use of passive and active measures, but 
also the municipalities' use of different types of measures. The concern was that the 
non-employed groups, particularly those further from the labour market, were taking 
part in activation that did not have sufficient employment focus and that public 
money was being wasted on activation offers that had no or even negative impact 
(‘Aktivering af de svageste dumper [Activation of the Weakest critcised]’, Politiken.dk, 
14 October 2010) Thus, in 2010, activation with an employment-focus (a job subsidy or
traineeship, for example) attracted a higher rate of subsidy than other types that did 
not place the participant with an employer, such as classroom-based training.
The impact of these attempts at steering on institutionalisation of activation – 
which are dealt with later on this chapter in section 7.4 – aside, it does indeed seem 
that central government has with a variety of actions attempted to align local practice 
with its stated political commitment to a more active welfare system for the sick and 
disabled non-employed.
7.1.4 Trialling, research and evaluation 
Denmark has an established history of extensively trialling and researching activation 
approaches, and it has continued to do so with regard sick and disabled jobseekers 
throughout the period under study. As 7.1.1 established, creating and spreading 
knowledge of best practice has been one of the major themes of the sickness and 
disability activation agenda, It has made particular use of Randomised Control Trials 
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(RCTs) of innovative interventions. Active –Faster Return (Aktive - hurtigere tilbage) 
was an RCT conducted in 2009 to test earlier and quicker intervention regimes for SB 
and Flex Benefit claimants (Ramboll for Danish Ministry of Employment, 2010).  An 
interest in Individual Placement and Support (IPS) approaches led to a randomised 
trial providing IPS for Disability Pension and Sickness Benefit claimants with mental 
health support needs, connecting the claimant with a specially-trained IPS adviser; 
mental health support from a local specialist centre and an immediate job placement 
(Inklusion, n.d.)
The Prevention Fund provided DKK 240m for the Return to Work Project 
(Tilbage til Arbejde Projekt), a large RTC which piloted a new, more rigorously 
multidisciplinary approach approach to helping people on sickness benefit than the 
standard municipal intervention processes. It had 6500 participants across 22 of the 98 
municipalities. Based on emerging evidence from earlier trials, it tested earlier and 
more regular contact with the claimant, co-ordination of the employer, the Jobcenter 
and the health and social services; and a multidisciplinary analysis of each individual 
case. A single specially-trained TTA adviser led a team combining a representative of 
the employer; a Return to Work team from the Jobcenter (comprising a psychologist 
and a person experienced in occupational physiology and rehabilitation) and a group 
from the local health service, including a psychiatrist and a doctor with experience in 
occupational, social or general medicine. The TTA teams undertook a training scheme 
meant to improve team members' knowledge of relevant issues, including mental 
health problems and treatment; pain and stress management and interdisciplinary 
working, especially with employers and health services (Aust et al., 2012).
The Labour Market Authority also funds a range of 'Knowledge Pilots' 
(Videnspiloter) aimed at generating understand of what works. The KVIS scheme 
(Koordineret Virksomhedsrettet Indsats for Sygedagpengemodtagere kategori 2 – Co-
ordinated activities for Match 2 Sickness Benefit claimants) funded, monitored and 
evaluated 14 municipal trials of different strategies of early intervention for SB 
claimants (Discus for Danish Agency for Labour Market and Recruitment, 2014). 
These are all evaluated at some length internally and by organisations 
commissioned by the Labour Market Authority and Ministry of Employment, and the 
National Institute for Social Research has also conducted a wide range of qualitative 
and quantitative evaluations of specialist activation efforts, as well as producing the 
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annual Disability and Employment (Handicap og beskæftigelse) reports on the 
employment of disabled people (see, for example (Høgelund & Kjeldsen, 2013)
One of the most interesting features of the Danish trialling and research 
approach is a piece of intervention modelling software called Effectivindsats. This is 
available free to municipalities and uses live economic and benefits data to allow the 
user to model the budgetary impact of a given intervention and investment (Danish 
Labour Market and Recruitment Agency, n.d.). This is particularly important given 
that central funding of local government expenditure is very complex and liable to 
being misunderstood (see later sections of this chapter) and it automates most of the 
calculations.  This is part of a wider effort on the part of government to create and 
demonstrate to municipalities an incentive to provide activation. 
On the whole, the process of evaluation and trialling seems to be rigorous and 
used seriously and extensively by policymakers when developing activation policy. In 
the form of TTA-Projekt and Resource Scheme, for example, there is clear continuity 
between policy trials and the policy that followed. Central government appears to 
invest significant effort and resources (see 7.1.5 below for details of funding of trials 
and research) in fostering a research and innovation culture around activation service 
development at both local; regional and national level and appears committed to using
the results of this to inform policy. The exception to this is that there does lately 
appear to have been significant bearing down on costs relative to trial programmes. 
Resource Scheme, for example, is much less generously funded that either TTA-Projekt,
and less than recommendations for similar schemes (see 7.1.5, below).
7.1.5 Resource commitment 
It is possible, given the good availability and quality of data offered in the OECD 
SocEx and the Danish Jobindsats database, to track central government spending over 
the period of interest. However, in addition to the general cautions one should take 
when using expenditure data outlined previously in Chapter 3, two further caveats are
worth adding. 
Firstly, the figures here concern central government only and so do not reflect 
the total of what is actually spent on activation at the front line. Danish central 
government refunds municipal activation costs to a greater or lesser extent depending 
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on the type of activation and the target group, and it is up to the municipalities to 
decide how much of their own funds they wish to spend on top of this, and this varies 
considerably between municipalities. An account of the variation in municipal 
spending can be found towards the end of this chapter.
Secondly, as central government does not directly control inflow into 
activation and is bound to refund municipal expenditure according to the refund rules 
operating at the time, it does not have total autonomy over its disbursements. 
Thirdly, the actual amount disbursed by central government for activation 
purposes is likely to be slightly in excess of that recorded in these datasets. Outside of 
the main centrally-funded programmes, various employment-related interventions for 
workless sick and disabled people are given grants by the Ministry of Employment 
and organisations operating on its behalf, but this is on an ad-hoc basis and is not, as 
is clear from the documentation accompanying the SocEx database, included in 
reported spending. Similarly, given the multidimentional nature of activation in 
Denmark, central government does disburse funds that may at the municipal level be 
spent on employment-orientated support for sick and disabled people through budgets
other than that of the Ministry of Employment, notably through the Ministries of 
Health and Social Affairs, but it is rarely earmarked as being explicitly employment-
related. Consequently, this does not appear as activation spending in either the OECD 
or Danish government databases, and so it is impracticable to identify the amounts 
accurately and track this spending over time. Judging from available evidence (see the 
account of The Prevention Fund and The Development Fund, below), these 
expenditures are not likely to total more than around DKK 150m a year, about 1.5% of 
the OECD-reported sick and disabled-related ALMP spending. 
Some minor concerns I have with the OECD data and how I have tried to deal 
with them are worth pointing out here. Firstly, OECD figures appear to report the 
allowance that Rehabilitation participants are paid along with programme expenditure
as a single figure and as ALMP expenditure, which is misleading. This suspicion is 
based on the following: with privileged access to data the Carsten Koch Committee 
(2014) give total spending on Rehabilitation for 2013 (only, no other years are 
available) as DKK 2890m, split into DKK 850m on activation measures and DKK 1990m
on the allowance. For 2011 – the latest year available – OECD give Rehabilitation and 
Pre-Rehabiltation spending as DKK 2274m. It is therefore likely both allowance and 
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activation spending has been combined together but labelled as activation spending in
OECD SocEx. Considerable effort was made to get the activation-only figures for all 
years from the Carsten Koch Committee, the Ministry of Employment, CABI, SFI and 
Statistics Denmark, all to no avail. The best I can do, therefore, is to deduct 69% 
(1990m / 2890m) from each year's Rehabilitation and Pre-Rehabilitation figures from 
the activation data. Modification of the benefits data is not required, as Jobindsats 
rather than OECD data has been used.  Similarly, the Committee provide figures for 
activation of SB and Flex Benefit claimants but this is not included separately in the 
OECD data. As activation for these claimants are not separate programmes per se, a 
fair assumption is that they have been included in the general activation category. 
Therefore, again assuming they are the same for every year,  DKK 630m33 and DKK 
230m, respectively has been added to the total figure for specialist activation spending.
Combining spending on the four activation schemes for sick and disabled non-
employed benefit claimants – Flexjobs, Rehabilitation, Pre-rehabilitation and Lightjobs
– and activation for SB and Flex Benefit claimants shows that the activation spending 
increases very significantly over the period of interest, from DKK 5.4bn in 2007 to 
DKK 10.7bn in 2011, an increase of around 100% – see Graph 7/1, below.
33 Given the large increase in activation of SB claimants (see 8.4) post-2010, the 2013 figure is in fact 
likely to be a high point and earlier years – especially before 2010 – much lower. The overall 
spending figure, therefore, will be a slight overestimate for earlier years.
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Graph 7/1: Expenditure on ALMP for sick and disabled benefit claimants, individual schemes and total, 2004-2011
Sources: OECD. SocEx Detailed database. Options – Source: Public, Branch: Incapacity related, Type of Expenditure: Active Labour Market Programmes, Country: Denmark 
Programmes: Rehabilitation (208.10.6.0.5.1), Pre-rehabilitation (208.10.6.0.5.2), Flexjobs  (208.10.6.0.5.3) and Lightjobs  (208.10.6.0.5.4). Adjustments applied to Rehabilitation 
and Pre-Rehabilitation, as explained above. http://stats.oecd.org/BrandedView.aspx?oecd_bv_id=socx-data-en&doi=data-00167-en# 
       Data for Sickness Benefit and Flex Benefit activation: Carsten Koch Commitee (2014), p.29
127
It is important, however, to put these figures in a broader context.  Absolute spending 
figures do not tell us, for example, about the relation of active to 'passive' spending – a 
common measure of the level of activation – or how changes in specialist disability and 
sickness activation relates to trends in overall ALMP spending.   Expressed as a 
proportion of total spending on incapacity-related benefits (see Graph 7/2, below), the 
increase is noticeably more modest, from 15.5% in 2007 to 18%, in 2011, with one year-
on-year decrease between 2009 and 2010.  
Graph 7/2: Total expenditure on Sick and Disabled Activation programmes as a percentage of expenditure on incapacity-related benefits, 2004-
2011 
Sources: Activation data –  ibid
Benefits data –  Jobindsats database. Forsørgelsesudgifter option of the Alle ydelser under ét data set, selecting Offentlige udgifter, løbende priser under måling and selecting 
Revalidering, Forrevalidering, Sygedagpenge, Ressourceforløb, Ledighedsydelse and Førtidspension under Ydelsesgrupper.
129
Looked at in the context of ALMP spending overall, spending on activation 
programmes for sick and disabled claimants as a proportion of total spending falls 
sharply over the period of interest, following a steady increase in the earlier part of the 
decade – see Graph 7/3, below.  This is unsurprising given the increase in total ALMP 
spending driven by Denmark's robust response to the economic downturn and by the 
automatic uprating of ALMP spending with rising unemployment (Mploy, 2011) 
However, whilst the relative decrease does not per se indicate a decline in political will, 
it perhaps does show that during the downturn period activation for these groups has 
been somewhat deprioritised relative to other groups. There is a case to be made that as
sick and disabled workless benefit claimants are facing the same tougher labour market 
conditions as newly unemployment claimants, spending on the former should at least 
keep pace with spending increases on the latter.
Graph 7/3: Total expenditure on Sick and Disabled Activation programmes as a percentage of total expenditure on ALMP, 2004-2011
Sources: Specialist activation – ibid 
Total ALMP –  OECD. SocEx Detailed database. Options – Source: Public, Branch: Active Labour Market Programmes, data point 208.10.6.0.0.0 Country: Denmark
http://stats.oecd.org/BrandedView.aspx?oecd_bv_id=socx-data-en&doi=data-00167-en# 
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To account for caseload changes, it is also worth calculating per head spending, and 
Graph 7/4 does this for the schemes for which data is available. This shows that for 
the period of interest funding per head is steady for the Rehabilitation schemes and 
significantly increasing for Flexjobs.
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Graph 7/4: Expenditure per head on Sick and Disabled Activation programmes, 2004-
2011
Sources: Expenditure data – ibid  
Caseload data –  Jobindsats database. Antal aktiverede option of the Forrevalidering  and Revalidering  
data sets; Antal personer option of the Flexjobs dataset
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As well as regular programme spending, the Ministry of Employment's endows The 
Prevention Fund and The Development Fund, which spend further money on smaller 
projects and supplements to existing programmes. Neither spend exclusively on 
activation and so it is difficult to calculate with precision what they contribute to total 
activation spending and how this changes over time, and so some indicative figures 
will have to suffice. The Prevention Fund spends around DKK 30m annually on Flexjob
bonuses – funding for Flexjob positions of less than 10 hours a week – and a 
proportion of its DKK 484m labour market retention budget on supporting municipal 
rehabilitation teams (The Prevention Fund, 2014), as well as co-funding the TTA 
Project during the period of its operation. Initiatives to assist sick and disabled people 
into employment receive a share of the DKK 500m Development Fund each year, but it
can vary considerably, from, for example, DKK 41.6m in 2010  (Danish Finance 
Ministry, 2010) to DKK 7.9m in 2011 (Danish Ministry of Employment, 2011a)
Taking together this regular and ad hoc spending, the central government resource 
commitment appears to be relatively significant, and certainly in-line with 
traditionally high spending on ALMP in Denmark. The increase in spending is large, 
even if it appears much more modest relative to benefit spending, and as a decrease 
relative to overall spending. However, there are some caveats that need to be added to 
this conclusion. 
Firstly, the spending increase is accounted for almost entirely by increases in 
the Flexjobs subsidised employment programme. Other than the participant's stated 
reduced capacity due to disability or health reasons, Flexjobs assumes no other 
employment barriers. Therefore, the spending increases cover only the work-ready 
part of the sickness and disability benefit claimant pool outlined in Chapter 3, and not 
claimants who might have additional employment barriers arising from their time out 
of work – outdated skills, low confidence, and so on. This is supported by the fact that 
Flexjobs has not, as was intended, made significant inroads into the Førtidspension 
claimant population  (Danish Government, 2012), claimants of which tend to have 
multiple and complex employment barriers. 
Secondly, the central government at various points since the inception of 
Flexjobs has sought to curb the cost of the scheme, alarmed at its high cost, increasing
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cost per subsidy holder (see Graph 7/4, above) and apparent marginal net 
effectiveness. Moves since 2010 in particular do appear to signal a growing reluctance 
to continue to fund such resource intensive open-ended commitments. The cost of 
funding the job subsidies and FJ was by the end of the last decade such that 
policymakers were discussing the problems of FJ in the same way (in terms of long-
term dependence) – and often alongside – those about Disability Pension. 
Government reports often quote the combined cost of DP and Flex Jobs and the 
reforms to both have been presented as a single package (Danish Government, 2012). 
Since January 2013 Flex Jobs are no longer be permanent for the under 40s and require
reassessment after five years, subsidies are capped so a greater proportion of Flex Jobs 
will be reserved for low-wage workers and changed so people only able to work very 
limited hours can qualify for one. The Flex unemployment benefit has since 2013 been 
limited to those who are members of an insurance fund – with uninsured claimants 
getting an alternative benefit at a reduced rate – and beneficiaries will be required to 
be actively seeking work, as is already the case for other benefits (ibid). The 
government calculated that reform could save DKK 2.62 bn between 2013 and 2032 
(Herløv Lund, 2012). These reforms were highly controversial – the Danish National 
Disability Council, for example, argued that the reform was essentially a savings 
exercise and warned that the reforms would push some Flex Job holders into poverty 
(Danish Disability Organisations, 2012). 
This comes in the much broader context of concerns about the costs of 
activation generally, and, as with benefits, the 2000s saw successive governments seek 
to put downward pressure on the costs of activation by passing on more of the burden
to local government in the form of tighter rules on what can be refunded, and to what 
extent. The impact of this on service provision for sick and disabled claimants is dealt 
with later on in this chapter, but the relevant point here is that it has had an impact on
central government funding for some schemes. In the case of Rehabilitation, for 
example, has reduced central refunds year-on-year, resulting in a sharp decrease of 
central financing and overall expenditure in the six years from 2005 (see Graph 7/5, 
below). 
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Graph 7/5: Rehabilitation expenditure 2005-2011: total government, local and central
Source: Adapted from data in Centre for Active Employment (2012,p.6)
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Though it is a relatively recent scheme that is still be rolled out, it is worth 
highlighting the political debate around the funding of the new Resource Scheme, as it
is a good illustration of how an apparently extensive resource commitment can be 
relatively limited when looked at in per head terms. By 2032, the government is 
expecting to spend just over DKK 1.4 bn on support for RS participants, all of whom 
would otherwise be claiming long-term disability benefit (Information Request to 
Danish Labour Market Authority, see Appendix B2). However, given that this is 
planned to support 44,000 participants (ibid), the annual central funding per claimant 
is actually a modest DKK 32,000, and half the amount recommended by the Labour 
Market Commission for a similar scheme in 2009 (Labour Market Commission, 2009) It
is also worth noting that the start-up costs of the programme are borne by reallocating
over 85% of the Development Fund for four years from 2013 – DKK 486m of DKK 
563m (Danish Ministry of Employment, 2009). It is not, as the party political left and 
disability groups have pointed out, new money – they argue that it is being taken 
away from small, successful projects that help people into work and being wasted on a
central government politico-fiscal project designed to push people out of DP (Regning 
for ny reform havner hos udsatte [Vulnerable get bill for new reform], 3 July 2012, 
Politiken.dk). 
As with the Flexjobs reform, there is some justification in the claim that RS is 
primarily a benefit savings exercise – the Labour Market Authority's own figures 
show that the majority of the projected savings come from moving participants on to 
lower-rate benefits, rather than into the labour market (Information Request to Danish
Labour Market Authority, see Appendix B1). Taken together with the new Flexjobs 
scheme and trends in the funding of Rehabilitation, it appears Danish central 
government is moving to more limited and more closed-ended funding of specialist 
employment-related services for sick and disabled benefit claimants. 
7.1.6 Conclusions 
Government political commitment to strengthening activation for sick and disabled 
non-employed, then, appears to have been relatively strong. The flow of new 
initiatives and programmes over the last decade has been significant and consistent, 
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and much effort has been put into trialling new multi-disciplinary approaches to help 
the most disadvantaged sick and disabled non-employed. There is starting to emerge 
from a fairly intensive but narrow system one that, at least in theory, has something to
offer for the full range of non-employed, from those needing relatively standardised 
support to generous job subsidies and multi-service approaches for those with severe 
capacity reductions. Notable also is the effort put into promoting best practice 
throughout the Jobcenter network and the extent to which government has sought to 
change the incentives that municipalities have to provide activation. The ambition of 
government, it seems, has increased consistently over the period. However, there are 
some important caveats to add here. Whilst central commitment may have been 
strong and increasing, the later part of the period does show the development of a 
reluctance to fund existing types of activation as generously as generously in the past. 
As the later sections of this chapter explore in more detail, the surface enthusiasm for 
more intensive and extensive activation of sick and disabled non-employed has not 
necessarily been underpinned by concomitant commitment to and tolerance of the 
time and resource-intensive measures that are required when seeking to activate a 
larger proportion of people out-of-work for reasons of ill-health or disability.
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7.2 The Activation offer: activation services offered to sick and 
disabled benefit claimants
Denmark largely does not have employment programmes in the sense of nationally-
organised schemes targeted at a specific groups of non-employed people and with 
specified intervention regimes, as has historically been the case in the UK. Instead, 
title 4 of the Active Employment Efforts Act34 35 (AEEA) – which governs most 
activation policy – specifies a range of interventions falling under three broad 
headings – Guidance and Upgrading (Vejledning og opkvalificering), Subsidised 
Employment (Job med løntilskud) and job training (Virksomhedspraktik) (AEEA §22) – 
and municipalities can provide these to any claimant out of work for whatever reason,
or at risk of leaving the labour market. 
Guidance and upgrading comprises a broad set of measures from basic services
such as assistance with job applications; producing CVs, improvement of basic skills 
such as reading and writing, and a skills assessment – usually referred to as a Short 
guidance and clarification course (Korte vejilednings og Afklaringsforlob); enrolment in 
a Specially Adapted Project (Særligt tilrettelagte projekter) – municipal projects usually
focused on a specific group and often with a community service element, or support 
with improving the claimant's formal education.  Given their lower cost, the former 
two, and especially the first, tend to be the mostly widely used Guidance and 
Upgrading options.  Within Guidance and Upgrading, municipalities will often also 
investigate the claimant's medical-related needs and can provide health-related 
support, but this tends to of an ancillary nature – exercise classes; dietary and 
nutrition services, drug addiction-related support – rather than direct health treatment
or therapy (Ramboll, 2008). 
Most claimants can be offered a subsidised job in the public or private sector 
for the purposes of improving their skills and work experience, in most cases once the 
claimant has been on benefit for six months. The maximum subsidy is DKK 74.05/hr 
for private sector positions and DDK 121.4736/hr for public, paid for a maximum of one
year (Danish Labour Market and Recruitment Agency, 2015). Special rules providing a 
higher subsidy (up to 50%) and longer duration of subsidy exist for disabled people 




who are unemployed for two years having completed 18 months of further education 
– the Icebreaker scheme (Høgelund & Pedersen, 2002). 
Training hosted by a public or private employer aimed at improving their skills
such they can move into employment is available to most claimants for 4 weeks and 
for 13 weeks for people with reduced work capacity, with the possibility of an 
extension to 26 weeks. (AEEA §44) The claimant continues to claim their benefit, 
though they can be awarded a training and transport allowance. 
As data on which activation offers are made to benefit claimants across all working-
age benefits and across the various schemes is recorded, it is possible to compare how 
sick and disabled claimants are activated against other groups. Graph 7/6, below, 
compares the use of the three main types of activation (with Guidance and Upgrading 
split between education-related measures and all other G-U measures) for claimants of
Sickness Benefit and Flex Benefit37, with the two general workless benefits alongside 
for comparison. The data for the Rehabilitation and Pre-Rehabilitation schemes will be
referred to in the next section.  From this data, it appears that claimants with health or
disability-related capacity reductions appear to be activated appropriately distinctly 
from other groups, with most activation being through Guidance and Upgrading or 
Job Training, with subsidised jobs being used mainly for UI and SA claimants.
37 Disability Pension claimants by definition cannot be activated, and so DP is not included. If DP 
claimants wish to accept an activation offer, they must transfer to another benefit.
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Graph 7/6: Activation offers by type as a proportion of total offers, for each benefit/programme and year, 2007; 2010 and 2013
Source: Jobindsats database. Antal aktiverede, gnsn. varighed og fuldtidsaktiverede option of the A-Dagpenge; Revalidering; Kontanthjaelp; Forrevalidering; Sygdagpenge and 
Ledighedsydelse data sets, and selecting Vejledning og opkvalificering, Uddannelse; Virksomhedspraktik and Job med løntilskud options under Tilbud
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Whilst sick and disabled claimants of any non-employment benefit can be made an 
activation offer of any one of these types, they can also be made subject to four 
distinct activation regimes aimed primarily at people with reduced working capacity.  
Claimants of Sickness Benefits are subject to a specific set of interventions designed to
prevent a permanent deterioration in their working capacity and to return them to 
work as soon as possible.  SB claimants for whom this has not worked – or claimants 
of other benefits who need greater support than is available under the AEEA – have 
three further options.  Vocational Rehabilitation (Revalidering38 [VR]) – which has an 
introductory element called Pre-Rehabilitation (Forrevalidering) that is 
administratively distinct; Resource Scheme (Ressourceforlob [RS]) and Flex Jobs 
(Fleksjobs [FJ]). These are not separate programmes per se, as they may use many of 
the same interventions – and indeed, some of the same types of activation offered 
under AEEA – and are run in the municipalities alongside support for other groups 
claimants, but they have different rules than for the rest of the activation system – 
governed instead by the Active Social Policy Act (ASPA) or Act on Sickness Benefits – 
and are treated separately administratively.   
As shown in Chart 7/1, below, these schemes are organised sequentially, each 
one offering more intensive and extensive (and, therefore, usually, expensive) support 
than the last.  Table 7/2, below, gives per head spending for 2013 for all activation 
programmes and activation measures for benefit claimants. Municipalities considering
referring a claimant to Rehabilitation, for example, must demonstrate that the 
claimant cannot be assisted by some of the general measures offered to all by the 
AEEA and, likewise, claimants should not be considered for a Flexjob until it can be 
shown that VR has failed or that the claimant has capacity reduction to the extent that
VR will not be effective.  Claimants assessed as eligible for a Flexjob but who cannot 
find Flex employment or who lose their Flexjob go onto Flex Benefit and are activated 
through AEEA measures. Those who have greater incapacity than can be 
accommodated within a Flexjob – from 2013 – are sent on to Resource Scheme if they 
are under 40 years of age or can claim DP if older than 40.
The next sections of the chapter look at these programmes in detail.
38 Rehabilitation has two translations in Danish, both of which are used in discussions around 
activation.  Although they are (wrongly) used interchangeably, Rehabilitering means a restoration of
a person's health whilst Revalidering has a more specific meaning around returning someone to 
their former socio-economic position, and is also the name of the scheme referred to here in 
English as Vocational Rehabilitation or Rehabilitation. 
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(DKK m, current prices)
Activation spending per
head, 2013 (DKK, 
current prices)
Sickness Benefit 51,228 630 12,636
Flex Benefit 18,048 230 12,548











Social Assistance 146,914 3180 21,645
Sources: Expenditure – All Carsten Koch Commitee (2014), p.29 except Flexjobs. Flexjobs: OECD SocEx 
detailed data. Options – Source: Public, Branch: Incapacity related, Type of Expenditure: Active Labour 
Market Programmes, Country: Denmark Programmes: Flexjobs  (208.10.6.0.5.3). 
http://stats.oecd.org/BrandedView.aspx?oecd_bv_id=socx-data-en&doi=data-00167-en# 
Number activated – Jobindsats database. Antal aktiverde option of the Alle ydelser under ét data set, 
selcting 2013 under Periode and selecting Revalidering, Forrevalidering, Sygedagpenge, Ressourceforløb, 
Ledighedsydelse and Førtidspension under Ydelsesgrupper.
39 Figures are projections.
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 Chart 7/1: Claimant journey through Danish activation measures
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7.2.1 Sickness Benefit follow-up
Sickness Benefit is the main gateway to long-term DP receipt, and so central 
government has been anxious to ensure that SB recipients are targeted early on in 
their claim so they can be helped back into employment as soon as possible. The 
period of interest covers two distinct sickness absence intervention regimes.  From 
2006 until 2014, municipalities were obliged within 8 weeks of being notified of the 
intention to claim to categorise the claimant into one of 3 target groups: Category 1 
('Smooth' cases [Glatte sager]) in which the claimant is likely to return to work 
imminently; Category 2 (Risk cases [Risikosager]) where there is a risk of a permanent 
reduction in working capacity, and Category 3 ('long standing' cases [Langvarige 
sager]) where the sickness absence is likely to be lengthy (Danish Institute of Social 
Research, 2006a). Following-up on the recipient's recovery was obligatory every 8 
weeks in Category 1 and 3 cases, and every 4 weeks for Category 2. Municipalities 
could make offers of support from the three main groups of services from the AEEA 
and had incentives to do so as central government reimbursement of SB ceased after 
52 weeks (ibid) (Danish Institute of Social Research, 2006b).
Alongside with changes to the payment of SB, this system was made seemingly
more intensive and prescriptive in 2014.  Three categories were retained, but the 
criteria made more detailed and the activation requirements increased for Category 2. 
Claimants identified as Category 1 are expected to return to work within 8 weeks and 
municipalities are no longer obliged to interview the claimant and generally are not 
expected to be made AEEA offers.  Category 2 claimants are expected to take longer 
than 8 weeks to return to work, but their prognosis is generally clear.  Municipalities 
are required to ensure the claimant has approached a doctor for treatment, arrange an 
in-person interview within 8 weeks (or earlier if the employer and employee request 
an earlier intervention under 'Fast Track' provisions) and repeat interviews (in-person 
or over the telephone) every 4 weeks thereafter (CABI, 2013a). In these interviews and 
in conjunction with the employer, the caseworker needs to establish one of four TTA 
(Tilbage Til Arbejdet – Return to Work) actions.  In order of connection to employment
and thus preference, these are; an agreement between all three parties on a gradual re-
entry into employment if this is deemed possible; a subsidised traineeship to 
reintroduce the claimant into their job; job training, or one of the first three options 
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with the added support of an employment mentor, work aids and workplace 
adaptations (CABI, 2013b). Category 3 claimants will either have a long-term health 
condition or a health issues compounded by other employment-related barriers.  The 
same 8 and 4 weeks as for Category 2 claimants apply and in addition, municipalities 
must refer the claimant to an inter-disciplinary rehabilitation team (see, Resource 
Scheme below) for the preparation of a rehabilitation plan, which can bring together a 
range of employment, health, social and educational interventions.  Claimants also 
have the right to access Lær at tackle (Learn to Tackle), a suite of health condition 
management programmes focusing on chronic illness, chronic pain and stress and 
depression (ibid). Category 2 claimants can also access the inter-disciplinary 
rehabilitation support if they are not eligible for an SB extension beyond 22 weeks. 
This comes with a benefit at the same rate as Social Assistance and is known as 
Jobafklaringsforløb [Job Clarification Scheme]. The new SB regime is presented 
graphically below, in Chart 7/2.
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Chart 7/2:  Sickness Benefit intervention regime, 2013-
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7.2.2 Vocational Rehabilitation
One of the longest-established activation programmes – established in 1960 and 
operating in its current form from 1990 – Vocational Rehabilitation is aimed at 
employment on the ordinary labour market40 or in employment on special terms 
(subsidised employment, Flex Jobs) for claimants with significantly reduced capacity 
to work. This is typically capacity reduction due to ill health or disability, though 
capacity reduction due to severe social problems (poor education and social skills, for 
example) are also considered when making a decision to accept a participant onto VR. 
As is common in Danish benefits and activation policy, the guidance on what grounds 
justify a referral to VR are vague, elastic and open to interpretation (Ramboll, 2015) – 
there is certainly no nationally-standardised test of capacity reduction – and so there 
is considerable variation in referral practices.  
It begins with a Rehabilitation Plan that must specify the course of action and 
a specific area of employment for which there is a local demand, as well as estimate 
when the claimant should be ready for employment. It uses many of the standard 
employment measures – an examination of work capacity, skills and education 
courses, job training with a wage subsidy – but there is a much longer maximum 
period – up to five years – and the claimant receives a special Rehabilitation Benefit 
or, in the case of Job Training, the minimum wage as per the collective agreement 
covering the workplace in which they are receiving training. The claimant can also get
help to become self-employed, including a low-interest business loan.  
Rehabilitation is a very intensive scheme: the Jobindsats database records the 
proportion of the overall maximum time – 37 hours a week – that claimants are 
activated for and this shows that Rehabilitation participants spent at least 50% of the 
time (18.5 hours a week) in activation over the period, and almost 75% (28 hours) by 
the end of the period in 2013.  This is far more than for any other benefit or scheme for
which this data is recorded.  Similarly, the majority of participants are enrolled on the 
scheme for 52 weeks or more for most years within the period of interest and the 
40 As a result of several decisions by the Social Appeals Board in 2009, participants do not have right to 
rehabilitation aimed at the same level of employment at which the participant gave up.  Rehabilitation 
can therefore be refused to a skilled person on the grounds that they still have capacity for semi-skilled 
or unskilled work (FTF 2010)
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average time spent activated was above 35 weeks for every year, and 49 weeks by 
201341.  As such, although work participants may have a reduction in work capacity, 
Rehabilitation assumes a relatively high readiness for work: participants are not 
expected to have any other significant barriers – people classed as Match 3 are not 
eligible – and a national survey of Jobcenter Rehabilitation managers indicate fairly 
high expectations in participants' attitudes towards employment, confidence and 
readiness to engage with the support offered (Ramboll, 2015).
Most activation offers made to Rehabilitation participants are in the workplace 
training and training and education categories, with the trend over time being towards
these measures and away from guidance and upskilling offers (see Graph 7/7, below).  
As one would expect given the different challenges facing the claimants, this contrasts
with Unemployment Insurance and Social Assistance claimants, who are more likely 
to be referred to the less intensive guidance and upskilling courses, and to subsidised 
jobs42. Most offers (around 60%) within the training and education category are 
vocational in nature (Ramboll, 2015). Notably also, the proportion of participants not 
being activated has dropped significantly over the period of interest.    
41 Jobindsats Revalidering database, selecting Antal og varighed af afsluttede aktiveringsforløb 
42 The trend towards more resource-intensive measures on Rehabilitation over time is unlikely to have
a specific policy decision cause, but rather a result of the declining size of the programme (see 
below), with a smaller and therefore more demanding participant pool.
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 Graph 7/7:  Rehabilitation measures as share of total, 2007-2013
Source: Jobindsats database. Antal aktiverede, gnsn. varighed og fuldtidsaktiverede option of the 
Revalidering data set, and selecting Vejledning og opkvalificering, Uddannelse and Virksomhedspraktik 
options under Tilbud 
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As a result of the focus on more resource-intensive activation offers and the intensity 
of the activation in terms of hours spent in active measures, Rehabilitation is a 
relatively expensive scheme, with the average cost being around DKK 120,000 in 2012. 
This, however, masks very significant variation between municipalities: in the same 
year, the highest spending municipality spent 3.4 times as much as the lowest 
spending (Ramboll 2015).
Perhaps surprisingly, given that it is primarily used by claimants of sickness benefit – 
representing about at least 50% of all participants during the period of interest, and as 
high as 65% in 2010 (ibid, p.42) and that is focused on people with reduced working 
capacity, VR does not contain a statutory health or disability-related component.  The 
relatively long periods for which participants are enrolled on VR does mean that they 
have time to recover and to seek medical treatment and this may well be specified in 
the Rehabilitation plan, but employment-focused health-related interventions are not 
offered as part of VR.  This appears to be because Rehabilitation is focused on helping 
the participant adapt to their loss of capacity – by, for example, retraining them for a 
job with which their reduced capacity is compatible – rather than seeking to restore it.
Until recently, if a person's capacity reduction was such that it could not be adapted to
in this way, then welfare-to-work policy did not appear to have anything further to 
offer and claiming DP would usually have been the next step.  The integration of 
health treatment into welfare-to-work policy for vulnerable groups has only come 
onto the agenda in the past few years and it was not until 2013 as part of the Resource 
Scheme that municipalities were obliged to provide such an integrated approach.
Rehabilitation is a remarkably successful scheme. Twelve months after leaving the 
scheme, between 35% and 45% of claimants are in non-subsidised employment (see 
Table 7/3, below), with a similarly impressive outcome even for claimants considered 
to be distant from the labour market.  That being the case, the noticeable decline in the
use of Rehabilitation (see Graph 7/8, below) seems counter-intuitive. Indeed, it has 
been the subject of discussion in both the specialist and general national press in 
Denmark (Kommuner dropper dyr hjaelp til udsatte [Municipalities cut expensive help
to the vulnerable], 6 June 2012,  Ugebreveta A4,).  Explaining this apparent 
contradiction –that a successful and long-running scheme is becoming seemingly 
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deinstitutionalised will tell us a lot about the dynamics of the institutionalisation of 
activation. This requires an examination of the interplay between funding, regulation 
and the central-local relations, and is discussed at length in the section 7.4.
Table 7/3: Percentage of overall Rehabilitation caseload in employment 12 months 
after leaving scheme, by total, Match 1 only and Match 2 only
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Total 46 41.7 36.7 35 36.1 37.5 45.4
Match 1 39.1 42.3 45.8 55.8
Match 2 30.5 32.6 34 40.3
Source: Jobindsats databse. Revalidering database, choosing Status 1, 3, 6 og 12 mdr. efter afsluttet forløb  
and then  Match 1 and Match 2 from Matchkategori 
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Graph 7/8:  Number of participants on Danish activation schemes/Number of activated benefit claimants, by scheme/benefit, 2004-2014




Since January 2013, Disability Pension is for claimants under the age of 40 has in effect
been abolished43.  Instead of claiming DP, prospective claimants must instead be 
enrolled on a municipal Resource Scheme (Ressourceforløb). Claimants over 40 can 
refer themselves voluntarily.  This is designed to be a multi-disciplinary, multi-actor 
development process that marshals a range of employment, education, social, and 
physical and mental health services to enable participants to move towards and 
eventually into employment.  Participants can be enrolled for five years, with the 
possibility of a two year extension, and can enroll twice (Danish Government, 2012).  
As the grounds for DP have been that the claimant cannot be expected to work nor 
make movements towards employment, the target group for Resource Schemes are 
those very far from the labour market and are likely to have multiple and complex 
barriers to employment.  Municipalities can draw on measures from both AEEA; the 
Social Services Act and the Health Act, and so the potential range of services on offer 
is very wide: training, education, psychotherapy, stress-management courses, 
assistance with housing problems, drug abuse treatment, voluntary and community 
work, and food and exercise courses. Though practice across municipalities varies, 
these seem mostly to be organised into different modules that the participant 
progresses through, each representing a step closer to employment.   Some examples 
of the types of support available from a sample course catalogue published by the 
Southern Denmark Employment region to assist municipalities in setting up their 
Resource Schemes are given below in Table 7/4, along with details of their duration 
and cost.
43 To grant DP, the municipality must now demonstrate that no amount of support will help the 
claimant back into work, and the political expectation is that DP will only be granted to people 
under 40 in exceptional cases.
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Table 7/4:  Examples of Resource Scheme courses, with details of services offered, 
duration and cost 
Course 
name









Participant develops social skills 
through work in a sheltered 
workshop.
7 26  1250
Financial 
advice
Participant gets advice on 




Talk therapy, Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy, Mindfulness





Classes at adult education centre 
in  IT, Danish, English, 
Mathematics, and classes for 
participants with special 
educational needs
25 26 1450
Source: Southern Denmark Employment Region (2012)
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The Resource Schemes are an important development in Danish ALMP for sick and 
disabled people for several reasons. Firstly, they deal with a claimant population who 
until recently have been considered to be out of bounds for activation, partly because 
it was not considered reasonable for claimants with such extensive labour market 
barriers to be activated and partly because the appropriate measures or structures 
were deemed not to be available.  The success of the pilot projects mentioned in 
section 7.1.4 appear to have changed these perceptions.  Secondly, no previous scheme
has brought together employment, health and other relevant areas in this way. Thirdly,
it is a move away from the 'quickest route to employment' approach introduced by the
More in Work reforms of 2002 in that it accepts that only relatively long interventions 
are likely to work for this group of people.  Finally, the amount of government 
prescription and pressure for Resource Scheme to be used is unprecedented.  Although
municipalities can decide on the content and mix of services, the management of the 
schemes is prescribed: municipalities are legally obliged to establish a Rehabilitation 
Team formed of representatives from each of the relevant sectors (health, education, 
employment, social work). Again, by law, one of these becomes the participant's sole 
caseworker, an apparent reaction to complaints that vulnerable citizens were having 
to deal with multiple caseworkers, to the detriment of their progress to employment.  
Municipalities deemed not to be implementing schemes adequately have been rebuked
by the Minister of Employment and set targets for enrolments onto RS, again an 
unprecedented move. (see, for example, (‘Letter from Employment Minister to Rebild 
Municipality’, 2013)As yet incomplete evaluations of Resource Scheme will show 
whether the schemes have been as intensive as the government originally envisaged. 
As the previous section noted, however, the municipal budgets for RS are around DKK
30,000 – about half that of Rehabilitation, but apparently considerably more intensive 
in terms of the range of services provided.   Further – as section 7.4 shows – central 
government has previously found it difficult to incentivise municipalities to help sick 
and disabled claimants with multiple employment barriers, and RS will have to 
overcome the difficulties that previous efforts have had in this regard.
7.2.4 Flexjobs
Flexjobs is perhaps the most notable of Danish efforts to integrate sick and disabled 
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people into the labour market given its size (around 60,000 participants in 2013) and 
the extent to which it has been fêted elsewhere as a successful programme. People 
assessed as having sufficient capacity reduction and who find employment – or if a 
position is found for them by their municipal Jobcenter, which is obligated to help the 
claimant find a willing employer – have the right to their job being subsidised at a rate
of 50% or 66%, depending on their level of capacity reduction.  Flexjobs is aimed at 
those likely to experience the greatest difficulty in accessing employment. To be 
eligible for a Flexjob, the claimant must have a significant and permanent reduction in 
their working capacity, be unable to find non-subsidised employment and have had 
been unsuccessfully activated. The claimant is paid for a 37 hour week at minimum 
wage according to the relevant collective agreement, but will generally work less than 
this and/or in less stressful or less demanding roles. The cost incurred by the 
municipality is refunded at a rate of 65% from central government, previously 100% 
(1998-2003) (Høgelund & Pedersen, 2002) If there is no job available, or if they have 
left a job or been dismissed, the claimant receives Flex Unemployment Benefit. The 
Flex Benefit rolls have grown significantly over the period as the demand for Flex Jobs
has outstripped supply. A similar scheme – Lightjobs (Skånejobs) – matches claimants 
of DP only to limited-hours (typically 5-10 hours per week) job opportunities, 
subsidised fully by the municipality (ibid).
As with Rehabilitation, whilst Flexjobs is designed to help people with capacity 
reductions than would otherwise mean employment on the open labour market would
be very difficult, it, albeit implicitly, makes a distinction between a reduction in 
capacity and a reduction in readiness for work. Flexjobs offers no pre-employment 
support with training, skills, education, and so on, as applicants are expected to have 
made use of these services.  Other than the health condition or disability that reduces 
their working capacity, their employability aside from this is assumed to be of a 
normal level.
As a large and long-running scheme, Flexjobs has been subject to extensive evaluation
and there is some debate around the scheme's organisation and targeting, a short 
overview of which is worth giving here. Whilst qualitative analyses of participating 
claimants and employers report a good level of satisfaction with the scheme (Hohnen, 
2000), wide variations in employer practice have been problematic: concern has been 
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raised that Flexjob holders are given peripheral roles and thus are not properly 
reintegrated into the ordinary practices of the workplace (ibid).   There has long been 
a suspicion on the part of central government that municipalities are not targeting the 
scheme sufficiently at people who would otherwise have difficulty being employed, 
leading to high deadweight, and there does appear to be some good evidence for this.  
Given that Flexjobs are only supposed to be granted to people with significant and 
permanent reduction in working capacity, the outflow into the open labour market 
should be far lower than it actually is, around 45% (Danish Ministry of Finance et al, 
2005).   This has prompted concerns that the most in need of Flexjobs are either not 
being accepted into the scheme, or suffer from competition for employment from 
Flexjob subsidy holders who have greater capacity.  This is supported by the fact that 
there has been concern about the high rate of unemployment amongst those assessed 
as being eligible for a Flexjob and the high level of additional employment barriers – 
low education and commitment to taking employment –  amongst Flex Benefit 
claimants (Discus, 2005). Taken together, these appear to point towards flaws in the 
assessment and referral procedure for the scheme (Danish Ministry of Finance et al, 
2005). Indeed, central government has come to suspect that there has been 
considerable gaming of the system by municipalities. Flexjobs are refunded more 
generously than the various non-employment benefits, for which there are also 
varying commitments to activate the claimants (ibid).  This means that referring a 
claimant to a Flexjob is considerably less of a financial burden to the municipality than
most other options.  This is particularly acute in the case of SB claimants after 52 
weeks, when the state reimbursement drops to 0%.  
The large increases in the number of Flexjob holders and Flex Benefit recipients has 
been of increasing concern to policymakers, especially has it appears to have 
negligible impact on inflow in DP, a significant reduction in the number of DP claims 
being the principle aim of the policy (Danish Government, 2012).  A series of 
incremental reforms in the 2000s preceded a major reform in 2013, whereby the hours 
floor was removed, so as to encourage the creation of Flexjobs for people for limited 
capacity; the subsidy period decreased from indefinite to 5 years – at which there is an
eligibility re-assessment; the subsidy paid directly into the Flexjob holder's salary 
rather than to the employer, and restrictions on the payment of Flexjob subsidies to an
employer for whom the beneficiary is currently working (Confederation of Danish 
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Industry, 2012).  This latter provision is in response to the fact that around 50% of 
Flexjob awards go to people who are deemed to be at risk of leaving employment 
without a FJ subsidy, rather than those who are actually unemployed (Danish Ministry
of Finance et al, 2005). Whilst the provision of support to people in work but deemed 
at risk of unemployment is not unusual in Denmark (AEEA measures can be offered to
people in employment), this practice does appear to have been taken as evidence of 
bad targeting by central government policymakers.  This is also the reason why the 
later sections of this chapter do not deal as extensively with FJ as might be expected 
from the size of the scheme as it used at least as much as a way of keeping people in 
work than getting people into work – only the later is the focus of this study.
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7.2.5 Activation by right?: The legal and regulatory basis of a sick and disabled
claimant's right to activation 
The 'right and duty' (ret og pligt)  to activation is an important concept in Danish 
activation policy.  Most benefits confer a right to a minimum level of employment-
related support and a duty – enforced by benefit sanctions to varying extents, 
depending on the benefit – to accept such support.  The Act on Legal Security and 
Administration in Social Affairs (Lov om retssikkerhed og administration på det sociale 
område) is designed to ensure a citizen's rights when dealing with municipal social 
services and, to that end, establishes a series of general duties on municipalities to 
assist anyone who is –  or may, without help, be – at risk of requiring public financial 
help for their subsistence.  Any such person should have their employment-related 
needs assessed; an employment plan drawn-up in conjunction with the claimant 
themselves, along with other relevant stakeholders; and appropriate service providers.
Beyond this general commitment, the legislation governing the benefit claimed
lays out some minimum rights to follow-up interviews, what services the claimant can
access and how long services are provided for.  Table 7/5, below, summarises these 
first two for SB and Flex Benefit with Unemployment Insurance and Social Assistance 
for comparison.  Claimants of benefits which identify the claimant as having 
additional barriers generally provide longer access to activation than for UI and SA. 
For example, job training is offered for 4 weeks at a time for UI claimants, but for 13 
weeks for most other groups, including SB claimants and participants of Vocational 
Rehabilitation, Resource Scheme and Job Clarification Scheme (AEEA § 44).
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Table 7/5: Rights to follow-up and activation services by benefit
Benefit Rights to follow-up and services
Sickness Benefit 2006-2013
Category 1 and 3: Follow-up interview every 8 weeks
Category 2: Follow-up interview 4 weeks 
2013
Category 1: No compulsory follow-up.
Category 2: Follow-up interview within 8 weeks, repeated every 4 weeks. 
One TTA offer.





Follow-up interview every 3 months and 6 weeks of training (from 2013. 
Previously follow-up only every 2.5 years)44.
Unemployment 
Insurance
Standard offer after 13 weeks (<30 years old), 9 months (30+) or 6 months 
(60+) (AEEA §85, §87, §88). Further offers every 6 months after the 
completion of the previous offer (§89)
Social Assistance Standard offer after 3 months, including literacy and numeracy support if 
needed (AEEA §92) Further offers every 6 months after the completion of 
the previous offer (§96). Claimant cannot go more than 12 months 
without participating in an activation offer.
44 (DUKH, n.d. )
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The table above is a good illustration of how the benefit claimed can confer quite 
different rights to activation.  Before (and after, to a lesser extent) changes in 2013, 
Flex Benefit claimants were entitled to far fewer follow-up interviews that UI, SA and 
SB claimants, and no activation offers.  
The presence and widespread use of a complaints process is a good indicator of the 
extent to which there exists a right to activation.  Claimants unsatisfied with the 
support they receive – either benefits or activation – can complain to their 
municipality and then refer their complaints to the National Social Appeals Board 
[Ankestyrelsen] for decision, and these are recorded for 2007-2012 and 201445 in Table 
7/6, below.  The picture is somewhat mixed. Rehabilitation in particular is the focus of 
a large number of appeals.  Complaints about services due to Flex Benefit and SB 
claimants are low – between 27 and 41 out of between 20,000 and 70,000 activated SB 
claimants – 
but this likely to be due to the fact that complaints about specific services SB, Flex 
Benefit and Rehabilitation claimants/participants receive – guidance and upgrading 
etc – appear in the data as complaints against AEEA services as a whole, where they 
are indistinct from all other complainants.  The 2014 figures for Resource Scheme are 
reflect the level of controversy there has been about the launch of the programme; the 
inadequacies of services and the implementation of sanctions against RS participants: 
456 complaints out of around 4000 participants.  
Whilst on the whole the recorded rate of complaints is quite variable, it is 
worth noting that only complaints that are not resolved at the municipal level are 
referred to the Social Appeals Board. Relevant here is that a large number of appeals 
against municipalities to the Social Appeals Board by disabled people are upheld, 
much to the consternation of municipal leaders (Formand for Kommunernes 
Landsforening: Borgerne får for tit ret i klagesystemet [Chairman of the Local 
Government: Citizens can appeal too easily in the complaints system], 15 April 2011, 
Politiken.dk,) Taking these into account, the complaints service appears to be 
relatively well-used and robust. 
45 2013 data is incomplete
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Table 7/6: Complaints to National Social Appeals Board by benefit/scheme, 2007-2012,
2014
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2014
Sickness Benefit 





























Flex Benefit (all issues)































Flexjob (all other issues)















Resource Scheme (Rehabilitation Team)
% of activated claimants
424
10.6%
Sources: Complaints data – Danish National Social Appeals Historical Decisions database 2007-2009 
[http://ast.dk/tal-og-undersogelser/nogletal-for-ankestyrelsens-afgorelser-pa-social-og-
beskaeftigelsesomradet/historiske-tal] and 2010-2012 [http://ast.dk/tal-og-undersogelser/nogletal-for-
ankestyrelsens-afgorelser-pa-social-og-beskaeftigelsesomradet/historiske-tal ], selecting 2.2.3; 3.11; 3.13,
4.6 and 4.7 under Lovgrundlag and Afgjorte sager I alt under Afgørelsestype.   Danish National Social 
Appeals Current Decisions database 2013- [http://ast.dk/tal-og-undersogelser/nogletal-for-
ankestyrelsens-afgorelser-pa-social-og-beskaeftigelsesomradet/afgorelser], selecting 3.1.21; 3.1.23; 3.2.6; 
3.2.9 and 3.2.10 under Lovgrundlag and Afgjorte sager I alt under Afgørelsestype
Caseload data – As for Graph 7/8 
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Whilst it appears that there is a strong legal and regulatory basis for access to 
activation for sick and disabled claimants, there are some caveats to add. Though 
legislation conveys rights to access general support, access to specialist schemes is not
by right.  Access to Rehabilitation, and Flexjobs is essentially at the discretion of the 
municipality once it has made its own assessment of the severity of the claimant's 
reduction in work capacity and the likelihood of the claimant being able to return to 
work with the assistance on offer.  Further, this system of rights is overlaid by an 
activation management regime – the Match Category system referred to previously 
and examined in length at the start of the next section – in which the intensity of the 
activation provided is determined by an assessment of the claimant's distance from 
employment. While this can and does serve to reinforce vulnerable claimants' rights, it
is subject to gaming and serve to undermine them, as the next few sections of this 
chapter show.
7.2.6 Conclusions: scope of the activation offer
Until relatively recently, it can be argued that sick and disabled non-employed benefit 
claimants had access to an activation offer than was – albeit depending on how the 
claimant was categorised by the municipal authorities, an issue that is examined more 
closely in the next section –  fairly generous in the amount of support offered and the 
length of time it was offered for, though at the same time narrow in the terms of the 
employment barriers tackled and thus range of claimants who were usefully able to 
take advantage of them.
Especially if a claimant applies for Sickness Benefit, the activation offer is made
very soon after the benefit claim, and it is seemingly fairly service-rich.  As well as 
basic jobsearch support that would be expected, the claimant can be provided with re-
training for a new job better suited to their needs, acquire new qualifications and be 
re-introduced to employment via a job traineeship or subsidised employment. The 
activation offers are generally made for an appropriately long period of time given 
that sick claimants may need to take a gradual route back to work. The majority of 
Rehabilitation participants are on the scheme for more than 12 months and job 
subsidies can be offered for year, and Flexjob subsidies in practice were available for 
an indefinite period until recently. Notable also is the range of incapacity catered for. 
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In the guise of Lightjobs, for example, there is a strategy for even very small amounts 
of work capacity to be harnessed. Although access to most schemes is discretionary, 
access to employment assistance interviews and some support is enshrined in law and 
backed by a seemingly robust appeals process, although the legal guarantee does differ
notably between benefits.
Crucially, though, all these offers – cater to a range of capacity reductions as 
they might – still tackle a relatively narrow range of barriers and assume a relatively 
high level of work readiness and employability. The offers of retraining and re-
qualification only really help the claimant manage their health condition or disability 
by helping them access a different type of employment: they do not intrinsically 
provide support to the claimant for many of the other barriers we know such people 
develop when out of work. Further, they assume a relatively high level of functioning 
– i.e. the claimant's ability to engage what can be very demanding courses. Whilst job 
subsidies in the form of Flexjobs and Lightjobs might help ease the transition back 
into employment by helping shift employer incentives in the claimant's favour, they 
otherwise assume that the claimant is basically an attractive prospect to the employer:
with the requisite skills, experience, attitudes, and so on.  Most notably, health-related 
support has hitherto not played an important role. None of the activation offers 
provide support for the claimant to deal with their health conditions in an 
employment context and claimants with serious health issues are usually classed in 
the 'temporary passive' Category 3.
The changes from 2013 appear to signal a major shift in this regard and indeed were 
introduced partly due to concerns that activation was not sufficiently inclusive of the 
broadest range of sick and disabled workless people. The new Sickness Benefit regime 
is very clearly structured towards connecting claimants up with health support – 
albeit of a seemingly ancillary, complementary and health management nature – and a
range of additional services across the health, education, employment and social 
sectors.  This new multidisciplinary46 approach that focuses on all aspects of the 
claimant's disconnection from the labour market is most clearly reflected in Resource 
Scheme, which is explicitly focused on people who would otherwise receive Disability 
Pension – those most distant from the labour market and those who would appear to 
46 A term now used ad nauseum by seemingly all Danish activation stakeholders when discussing 
activation. 
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be the hardest to help.  
These two new schemes are too recent to make any meaningful examination of their 
institutionalisation. However, it is possible to look at the other policies discussed to 
look at how they have developed.  Whilst this section has drawn some initial 
conclusions about activation of the target group and found that – not withstanding 
the comments about the narrow focus of Danish approaches – they are relatively well-
developed, this has been mainly read off from formal statements of policy, which is as 
far as most other English-language analyses of Danish sick and disabled activation 
policy have gone. However, as per the discussion in Chapters 2 and 3, to get a fuller 
picture of institutionalisation, we need to examine a range of other sources of 
evidence and look at other factors: using activation register data and stakeholder 
interviews to look at how claimants are sorted and selected for activation; how it is 
funded; the incentives of the actors involved and how and how effectively it is steered 
from the centre. These issues are the purview of the next two sections.
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7.3 Sorting and selecting for activation 
7.3.1. Mainstreaming and the organisational reform
Starting in the early 2000s and running into the period of interest, there was a gradual 
movement in Denmark to deal with sick and disabled people increasingly in an 
employment context, rather than purely through social services.  The procedure for SB
claimants had been long established, but increasingly DP claimants were assessed for 
their employment chances by local employment officials so that nobody could claim 
long-term benefit for reasons of sickness or disability without being made to 
reconsider work:
One of the reasons to move it [assessment of DP applicants] from the social area to the 
employment sector was that you [the Jobcenter official] should be able to know something 
about the labour market and you should be able to come up with the right solutions for the 
right persons.  In a way we have not succeeded in that.   It was also about making sure that 
before you got your disability pension you should have been tested to see if you could 
maintain your, or gain a, position on the labour market through any of the existing support 
systems.  The collection of information about the person and their capabilities should be done 
close to the labour market and not in the social department away from the labour market 
because then there would be a lot of other issues taken into consideration instead of your 
ability to be employed and to work. So that was also one of the purposes of taking the 
responsibility of the social sector to the employment sector. 
Senior DPO Representative, interview May 2012
This was formalised in the structural reform process between 2007 and 2009, whereby 
all claimants of any benefit, regardless of their insurance status or reason for claim, 
are processed through a single municipal Jobcenter, replacing separate municipal and 
state institutions for non-insured and insured claimants, respectively.  This is known 
as the 'One string' or 'One track' system.  Several reasons explain this shift: that sick 
and disabled claimants' employment potential was being ignored in favour of a focus 
on their social needs (and, conversely, that supposedly work-ready groups had social, 
health or other barriers that were not being addressed), and also that the two tier 
system let to tiers of quality in terms of support, with insured clients of the state 
system getting a superior service (Carstensen & Pedersen 2008).  
Thus, from 2009 onwards (when the structural reforms were completed an all 
municipalities had a Jobcenter), sick and disabled claimants accessed support through 
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the same system and – in many cases – alongside one another, albeit subject to 
different rules.  Denmark has thus developed a hybrid system somewhere in between a
pure mainstream system where there are no distinctions between jobseekers and a 
purely specialised approach where different groups of non-employed are activated on 
separate programmes.  As such – and in in line with Mabbett (2003) – interviewees 
were generally positive about the chance for sick and disabled claimants to access a 
broader range of services than just specialist ones, but that it has not had the intended 
impact for the full range of claimants, a theme that emerged earlier in the discussion 
about the range of services, and one which will recur again in the next section.  
Claimants who had multiple employment barriers generally have not had good 
experiences, according to the stakeholders interviewed:
I think that the Danish approach to dealing with persons who are unemployed has changed 
from a twin track approach where you have persons with disabilities in one track and persons 
without disabilities in another track to being more common track where everyone should be 
dealt within the same system.  The perception that if we use the same ordinary system then 
we can tackle this because it is not about disability, it is about barriers, attitude, knowledge, 
but at the end of the day it has made no difference because the numbers of persons who are or
are becoming unemployed are still the same, you just move from one box to another.  From 
our perspective this approach has not benefited the rate of persons with disabilities in the 
labour market except for those who are become more so called 'normal', persons with physical
disabilities who are easy to deal with, if you have a good education and you are sitting in a 
wheelchair you can be put anywhere but if you are visually impaired or have a psycho-social 
disability you can definitely not be here. 
DPO Researcher, interview September 2012
In particular, respondents from the Danish disabled people's movement reported that 
there had been a hollowing-out of specialist services in the move towards the one-
string system, despite the opposite being the aim. The civil servant former head of the 
Jobcenter network confirmed as much in an interview:
Our idea was that with the municipal reform you got bigger and stronger municipalities that 
should have the capacity to have these special institutions with special job rehabilitation 
treatments. We discussed this with the municipalities at that time and some, for instance 
Copenhagen, said 'yes, we have the capacity to take over the counties' special institutions' 
whereas others said they didn’t have the capacity but would cooperate with others and 
establish a cooperative institution so that five or so municipalities supported these institutions
together. But it only happened in a very few cases and this has meant that the difference in 
access to these special institutions has increased, and in some municipalities they provide you 
with something because they have to but it is not high-standard specialist support. I think that
it is a problem that we have to deal with. 
Former Senior Jobcenter civil servant, Interview, September 2012
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This is very much in line with two surveys conducted by the Danish National Council 
of Disabled Persons' Organisations [Danske Handicaporganisationer, DH] and a Gallup 
poll by a consortium of trades union;, DH and the Danish social workers' association 
(Danskerne: Handicappede har fået det sværere efter kommunalreformen [Danes: 
Disabled people have had it more difficult since the municipal reform], Folkskolen.dk, 
16 April 2013).  Both the 2012 survey of DPOs (Handikappede dumper kommunerne 
[Disabled criticise municipalities], Politiken.dk, 13 September 2012) and the 2013 
survey of 800 disabled service users (Handicappede føler sig svigtet af 
kommunalreformen [Disabled people feel let down by the municipal structural 
reform], Folkskolen.dk, 13 May 2013) found that the restructured municipalities 
provided significantly poorer services and reduced capacity across a whole number of 
sectors, including employment services.  There was considerable agreement on the 
fact that specialist services that had been offered by the former counties or by the 
state had been hollowed-out in the movement towards the fully municipal, one-string 
system (ibid).
The mainstreaming v specialist perspective (Mabbett 2003; Evans 2001) suggests that 
mainstreaming organisational reforms like those implemented in Denmark risk 
increasing competition between sick and disabled claimants and other groups for 
services, and there does appear to be some evidence of this.  Claimants of any benefit 
can be considered for Flexjobs, Rehabilitation and other specialist schemes and so 
there is a possible risk. As described in the discussion of Flexjobs, there appears to be a
very wide divergence in referral procedures, whereby some municipalities refer people
to Flexjobs without a proper assessment of the severity of their needs, resulting in the 
squeezing out of people with severe capacity reduction, resulting in high Flex Benefit 
rolls, with that benefit offering fairly limited activation. Similarly, as the next section 
describes, the rules around SB mean that there is gaming around the removal of SB 
recipients to other schemes and benefits, at the cost of claimants with longer non-
employment histories.
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7.3.2 Sorting and selecting for activation
Given that Denmark generally does not use the benefit status of the potential 
participant to adjudicate access to activation or benefit status as a proxy for work 
readiness, the Match Category  [Matchkategorier] or Match Group [Matchgruppe] is 
used for these purposes.  It is a central aspect of the organisation and implementation 
of Danish labour market policy in general and also of the sorting and selecting of 
claimants for activation in particular, and so it is worth describing its design and 
operation in some detail.
Until 2007, claimants were classed into five categories based on their degree of 
'match' with the needs of the local labour market. This was based on their primarily on
an assessment of their skills,;qualifications; health; work attitudes and their financial 
situation (Danish Labour Market Authority, 2011) and claimants were graded from 
categories 1 (Immediate Match – Umiddelbar Match, meaning claimants could enter 
work immediately) to 5 (No Match – Ingen Match – claimants who had employment 
barriers such that they were not suited to work available in the local area and were 
unlikely to be able to do so).  This was scrapped as part of the 2007-2009 structural 
reforms, partly because it was too open to interpretation and produced nonsensical 
divergence47 between municipalities and also because it did not take into account the 
new groups of claimants who were now the responsibility of the municipalities 
(Danish Labour Market Authority, 2009b). 
47 Nonsensical in that municipalities with similar labour markets had very different match category 
distributions
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Table 7/7: Old Match Category System, 2004-2009
Match Category Description
1 – Immediate Match Jobseeker's  skills  and  resources  are
compatible  with  the  performance  of  job
functions  widely  existing  in  the  ordinary
labour  market.  Jobseeker  may  have
qualifications  and  skills  within  bottleneck
areas of the labour market.
2 – High Match Immediately matching the labour market 
requirements to a significant extent. The 
jobseeker's skills and resources are highly 
compatible with the performance of job 
functions widely existing in the ordinary 
labour market. There may, however, be a 
slight lack of match, such as missing specific 
qualifications or similar.
3 – Partial Match Only partially matching labour market 
requirements. However, the jobseeker will be 
able to perform job functions existing to a 
certain extent on the ordinary labour market.
4 – Low Match Limitations in skills and resources that are so 
significant that jobseeker will not 
immediately be able to perform job functions 
on the ordinary labour market. Ability to 
work is currently so reduced that there are 
few jobs that match the jobseeker's capacity 
and skills.
5 – No Match Limitations in skills and resources are so 
extensive that jobseeker does not currently 
have the ability to perform job functions on 
the ordinary labour market. 
Source: Danish Labour Market Authority (2011)
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Though the Match terminology remains, the new system instead categorises claimants
into three groups on an assessment of their time it will take to return to work and, if 
they are judged not likely to return to employment within three months, whether they
can usefully take advantage of activation.  The Match System has a whole number of 
uses in labour market policy. It determines the minimum support claimants are due 
and it is used by municipal benefits and activation staff as a guide to what and how 
much activation support should be provided beyond the legal minimum. It also 
dictates what extent and types of conditionality is to be applied.
Claimants assessed as being ready for work within three months are put in 
Match Group 1 and thus have applied to them the most stringent job-search 
requirements: they are required to be ready for and actively seeking employment and 
need to testify to that fact on a weekly basis, as well as attending a meeting with a 
caseworker at least every three months and taking part in employment-related 
support.  Unemployment Insurance and Social Assistance claimants with no major 
barriers are typically placed in Match 1, as well as disabled people waiting for a Flex 
Job and people temporarily out of work due to a straight-forward health condition 
with imminent recover expected. People not considered to be ready for work within 
three months but capable of participation in active measures are placed in Match 
Group 2, with requirements to take part in such programmes and meet an advisor 
every month. Claimants with substance abuse problems; moderate to serious mental 
health issues or other serious health conditions are typically placed in this group. 
Match Group 3 claimants receive interview-only courses of support meant to identify 
when in future the claimant could progress to the other two groups, and 
municipalities offer further employment support at their discretion, but there is no 
actual right to AEEA support. People assessed as being eligible for DP or those with 
serious, long-term health conditions are assessed into this third group. Table 7/6 
below, lays out the classification criteria, rights to activation and conditionality for 
each Match Group.
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Table 7/8: Match groups by classification criteria, example claimants, services due and obligations on claimants, 2009-2013
Match 1: Job-ready Match 2: Activation-ready Match 3: Temporarily passive
General 
classification criteria
• Likely to be able to return to open 
labour market within 3 months
• Unlikely to able to return to open 
labour market within 3 months, but 
capable of participating in 
employment-focused activities.
• Claimants at risk of long-term 
exclusion from the labour market
• Unable to return to open labour 




• UI: Can take work up to full normal
working hours
• SA: Can take within 3 months an 
ordinary job of sufficient hours that
they do not need public support.
• Flex Benefit: Can take a Flexjob 
within 3 months.
• SB48: Clear case – Expected to be in 
work within 3 months
• Rehabilitation: Registered in 
activation and likely to complete in 
3 months.
• UI: N/A. 
• SA/Flex Benefit: Claimant unlikely to 
return to return to work within 3 
months but capable of participating in 
activation.
• SB: Risk case – Likelihood of 
permanent reduction of work capacity
and/or there are uncertainty about 
diagnosis.
• Rehabilitation: Following the planned 
Rehabilitation plan but not likely to 
complete within 3 months.
• Disability Pension: DP applicants 
awaiting a decision. 
• UI: N/A. 
• SA and Flex Benefit: Claimants 
with sufficient employment 
barriers that they are not expected
to be able to work or take part in 
activation, though they can accept
activation offers.
• SB: Long-standing case – 
Seriously, long-term ill.
• Rehabilitation: N/A
• Disability Pension: DP eligible. 
Services/support 
typically due to 
claimant from 
• Contact interview every 3 months
• Creation of a Jobplan specifying 
employment goals and contribution
• As for Match 1 except Contact 
Interview is every 4 weeks for 
Sickness Benefit claimants. 
• Support under Active 
Employment Efforts Act – except 
contact interview every 3 months 
48 The Match system for Sickness Benefits is technically separate from the system for all other benefits/programmes. As from 2014, a new intervention regime separate for that 




of Activation offer to them.
• Right to independent advice and to 
complain
• Activation offer under Active 
Employment Efforts Act (AEEA) 
lasting at least 25 hours a week/5 
hours a day for at least 4 weeks, 
recurring every 6 months:
◦ Guidance and qualification 
upgrading
◦ On-the-job the training 
◦ Subsidised job
Additionally;
• Rehabilitation offer under Active 
Social Policy Act (chiefly services 




• Under Social Services Act, 
municipalities must provide:
◦ Sheltered employment to 
claimants with significantly 
reduced physical or mental 
health.
◦ Physical and mental health 
treatment for claimants with 
serious health problems.




• Register for and have a current CV 
on Jobnet.dk.
• Confirm job seeking on Jobnet.dk 
every week.
• Accept offers made under Act of 
Active Employment.
• Participate in contact interview
• Accept offers made AEEA.
• Participate in contact interview
• Participate in contact interview
Source: Danish Labour Market Authority (2009; 2011)
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In terms of the institutionalisation of activation, the Match system appears to support 
this end to a significant extent. Firstly, splitting claimants into the three categories 
appears to create a relatively clear framework within which the municipality can 
apply measures to help claimants progress towards through each group and then into 
work.  Secondly, it clearly has been designed to produce a targetting of support on 
claimants most in need of it, with the most intensive efforts being made for Match 2 
claimants and to avoid creaming of the easier-to-help claimants. 
Thirdly whilst it is not stated anywhere explicitly, a motivation behind the 
change from the old to the current system in addition to those already mentioned is 
likely a desire to increase the total proportion of claimants subject to some kind of 
activation. The threshold for being subject to some programme participation – i.e. in at
least Match 2 – is only that the claimant can take part in at least some support (this is 
kept vague and, interestingly and perhaps surprisingly, the municipality does not even
have to have appropriate services available49) and thus appears to be much lower than 
in the old system. Indeed, at least 84% of all claimants of the active sick and disability 
benefits are in Match 1 or Match 2 and thus eligible for activation.  In 2013, 347,000;  
26,925 and 12,900 and 2,360 claimants/participants of SB; Flex Benefit; Rehabilitation 
and Pre-Rehabilitation (respectively), were eligible for activation, in addition to the 
60,000 holders of Flexjobs50.
49 Danish Labour Market Authority 2011, p.19: “It is not a decisive factor [for inclusion in Match 2] 
that the job centre currently has the right programme for the citizen but that the person has the 
necessary resources to take part in a programme”
50 Jobindsats Revalidering, Forrevalidering, Sygedagpenge and Ledighedsydelse databases, choosing 
Antal personer option. Then choosing Match 1 and Match 2 from Matchgruppe.
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2010 88.5 92.9 100 87.1
2011 90.2 94.5 100 84.4
2012 90.7 94.5 100 85.2
2013 91.5 96 100 88.4
Source:  Jobindsats database. Antal aktiverde option of the Revalidering, Forrevalidering, Sygedagpenge 
and Ledighedsydelse datasets, selecting all options under Matchkategori. Add Match 1 and Match 2, 
divide by Matchkategori i alt, then multiply by 100
Regarding the research question about whether there are mechanisms that channel 
different types of claimants towards different types of activation, there does appear to 
be an element of this, but is difficult to pin down precisely as data on the benefit 
background of programme participants is not routinely available.  As was noted 
previously, measures are organised rigidly in order of the intensity of support they 
offer and claimants must demonstrate that other measures offering less intensive and 
usually less costly support have not or will not work in order to access them. This 
should, in theory, ensure that claimants are channelled to the right type and intensity 
of support.  Whether this actually is the case is examined in the next section.
However, a paradox here – it has been noted several times before but it is 
worth re-emphasising – is that whilst very intensive support intended for those with 
extensive needs is available, this also is very demanding support in terms of the 
participant's involvement and often assumes fairly high skills; motivation; health, and 
so on. Claimants who have extensive employment barriers but not able to take part in 
such support are, by the Match rules, sorted into Match 3 and thus not selected for 
activation, with limited rights to support beyond interviews are nil, although 
municipalities can and some do provide activation efforts.  This is a small but 
significant group – around 5% - 10% of claimants depending on the benefit scheme, see
Chart 7/7, above.  It is important to remember, however, that until 2013 the same 
applied to all ~240,000 DP claimants, who could not access activation (except 
Lightjobs) whilst claiming DP, and were required to suspend their claim in order to do 
so.
51 Data as above, adding Match 1 and Match 2, dividing by total and multiplying by 100.
52 Match 3 claimants cannot access Rehabilitation 
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A final caveat to add is that this discussion has been in theoretical, ideal terms. 
Although the Match system described here in theory affords access to activation to a 
large group of claimants and the activation offer is potentially rich and generous, the 
account here does not tell us whether this is actually the case – whether such a large 
number of claimants do in fact get this support. This has a lot to do with the steering 
of municipalities by the centre and the operation of incentives and steering tools. 
These issues are the focus of the next section.
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7.4 Regulating and securing activation
This section moves the discussion on from a description of the activation mix and how
claimants are sorted and selected for activation to a more dynamic discussion of how 
these factors interact with the regulation and steering of activation by central 
government to produce the depth and security of activation. That can then be used to 
come to a final conclusion about the institutionalisation of activation for sick and 
disabled claimants in Denmark.
7.4.1 Steering tools and incentive systems
This section examines how successfully Danish central government has been able to 
secure the rights of sick and disabled benefit claimants to activation support that were
described in the previous section. As was intimated previously, the existence of a set 
of rights to activation is unlikely to be enough to ensure that claimants receive 
appropriate support.  The literature on the activation of marginalised groups suggests 
that a formal legal guarantee is not sufficient and this needs to be backed by the 
existence of one or more tools – financial incentives or sanctions, most notably – and 
the political will to use them.  The specific history of activation and central-local 
relations in Denmark – a flavour of which was given in Chapter 6 – also suggests that 
looking at how central government is able to influence local government is key to 
assessing how well Danish governments' employment and welfare policies are 
institutionalised.
The earlier section on political commitment established that Danish 
governments have generally been willing to use their various tools at their disposal to 
promote activation for sick and disabled non-employment benefit claimants.  This 
section examines in some detail53 whether it has been successful in doing so. On the 
whole, this does appear to the case. There are generally stronger incentives to have 
claimants in activation rather than not, and these incentives appear to be especially 
strong for Sickness Benefit claimants. However, the complexity of the system means 
that rules are sometimes not clear – denting their impact – and there is substantial 
evidence to suggest that the financial incentives work less well for sick and disabled 
53 Entirely necessary detail as the funding and monitoring of activation and benefits is notoriously 
complex.
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claimants considered the hardest to help.  Attempts to influence the type of activation 
– as well as the amount – towards measures which take place within workplaces 
appear to have had a significant – albeit unintentionally – negative impact on the 
activation of claimants considered further from the labour market.  On the whole, it 
appears Danish governments have found it difficult to govern active labour market 
policy in a way that promotes activation for the full range of sick and disabled 
claimants, in particular claimants with both capacity reductions and other 
employment barriers.
The funding of activation is the primary way for central governments to steer 
municipal implementation of ALMP. There are several elements to funding that allows
it to do this.  Firstly, costs incurred for spending on benefits and activation are 
refunded by central government and refunds are almost always more generous when 
the claimant is enrolled in an activation programme than not. Governments have also 
used the refund to encourage use of certain types of activation, discussed in more 
detail later in this section. Table 7/10 below, shows the difference in the refund of 
municipal costs for passive periods and for the two broad categories of activation.  An 
additional element to the refund system is that refunds are only made up to a given 
cost ceiling (driftsloft). This is calculated by adding together the total number of 
claimants of UI, SA, SB, Flex Benefit and Rehabilitation allowance and multiplying it 
by a fixed cost determined in each annual budget round (DKK 14,000 in 2013/14; 
KL.dk, 2013).  Municipalities are thus free to prioritise activation spending between 
target groups.  Certain costs are exempt from the ceiling – i.e refunds according to the
given rate is unlimited – and many of these are related to some kinds of spending on 
sick and disabled groups (Slotsholm for Danish Labour Market Authority, 2010).
Incentives are strengthened by reducing refunds over time and then ending 
refunds after a given period.  Refunds cease entirely for Sickness Benefit after 52 
weeks and after 18 months for Flex Benefit.
Statutory interventions usually attract a financial sanction if delivered late, or 
not at all.  The refund for the period drops to 0% if interviews are not provided for 
Sickness and Flex Benefit claimants but no sanction applies to activation services 
delivered late or not delivered. For comparison, 100% sanctions apply to interviews 
and other interventions for Social Assistance claimants and to other interventions 
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only for Unemployment Insurance claimants (Slotsholm for Danish Labour Market 
Authority, 2010).
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Table 7/10 Overview of reimbursement rates for benefit, activation and job subsidies  
Source: 

































Rehabilitation 30 50-65 30










Source: Carsten Koch Committee (2014), p.72-73
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Together, these appear to create a strong incentive for municipalities to provide 
activation. As table 7/9, below, shows, there is particularly strong incentive for 
successful interventions for SB claimants, second only to UI.  Further, and importantly
given the issue of creaming and parking, there is also a general principle54 that it is 
cheaper for the claimant to be registered in activation than not, regardless of whether 
those claimant will benefit from it such that they will gain employment.
However, these incentives are not universal or uniform. They are less strong 
for Flex Benefit and Disability Pension, see Table 7/11, below. Indeed, given that Flex 
Benefit claimants are expected to be actively seeking work and that DP claimants are 
by definition passive and not subject to activation, the fairly small difference between 
the two is surprising.  Relayed in detail in the next section, this is consistent with 
what interviewees said about the activation of claimants considered further from the 
labour market.  
Before moving on, it is also worth pointing out that all these figures are very 
much average figures.  They – and therefore their impact – will vary depending on the
activation needs and therefore the costs of activating the claimant.  
Table 7/11: Impact on public finances on of a claimant entering work, by main out-of-
work benefits in 2012 
Saving on benefits 
and activation











Sickness Benefit 105,100 170,000 275,000
Flex Benefit 105,100 125,000 230,000
Disability Pension 95,000 125,000 220,000
Source: Carsten Koch Committee (2014) p32
54 Not always fully realised (see below)
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7.4.2 Effectiveness of steering tools 
Most interviewees argued that the funding of benefits activation does generally 
provide a strong incentive to provide a minimum level of support.  There was 
particularly strong agreement that the refund sanctions for late or non-delivery of 
services ensured that most claimants got at least their basic rights to support as 
enshrined in legislation:
There is an obligation and a legal right to be in an active measure so nobody can be left out of 
an active programme.  That means you have to be out there in something – you cannot just go
home and claim – and if the municipalities do not provide these measures they lose part of 
their reimbursement.  If you don’t follow up on them the municipality loses part of their 
economic compensation from the state and that means they have to pay more for the benefits. 
They think they are punished and they are unhappy with the situation but we say well we are 
not paying you for not doing what you are supposed to do: you get the reimbursement 
because you are doing something. 
 We have a big quarrel with the municipalities over this. […] They are trying to make 
the minister and the government change this because they say that we all have the same 
interests in getting people out so why should there be this rigid system.  I am of the old school
and think if they don’t have to do it they won’t.   Especially those who have complicated 
problems then they will cream and offer support to those who can do something and those 
who have really complicated problems they will leave them alone.  So in my view it would be 
counterproductive if we eased up. […] We have to listen to their arguments but personally I 
think that we need to have some minimum criteria. It is also a way to secure the rights of the 
individuals.
Regional Labour Market Authority Director, interview, August 2012
This is corroborated by a review of economic steering of employment services done 
for the Ministry of Employment, which found that most Jobcenter staff saw it as a way
of securing support, especially for the most vulnerable claimants:
The financial penalties […]  act as a safety net. In the absence of rules, resources would 
probably be moved from employment effort to more high-profile municipal policy areas. The 
timeliness is a requirement for a certain minimum production. It may be tempting for local 
politicians to move money and employees from the less visible employment area to one of the 
areas that may affect the outcome of the next election. Punctuality requirements and the 
associated potential economic losses for non-compliance makes it costly to shift resources 
away from the Jobcenter. 
Slotsholm for Danish Labour Market Authority (2010), p.31
The is for the most part consistent by the data available on the percent of interviews 
not meeting the statutory standard (not delivered or delivered late). For Sickness 
Benefit55 over the period for which data is available, this has declined to 10% or less 
55 Data is not recorded for other groups
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overall and for all Match groups, with the exception of Match 2 claimants, which 
varies between around 20% and 12% (see Graph 7/9, below).
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Graph 7/9: Percent of Sickness Benefit interviews not meeting legal standard, by Match Group, July 2010 – November 2013
Source: Jobindsats Sygedagpenge, database, choosing Opfyldelse af minimumskrav til opfølgningssamtaler 
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The reduction of refund over the time of the claim was similarly regarded as very 
effective at encouraging municipalities to provide support. With regard Sickness 
Benefits, this is particularly strong because, until 2013, central refunding ceased after 
52 weeks.  All municipal representatives interviewed were very clear about the 
importance placed locally on getting SB claimants back to work:
[Regarding Sickness Benefits] The Jobcentre has an economic incentive to find a solution for 
me with[in]a year. In the past many jobcentres waited and when we were getting closer to the
year and then making all kind of measures. Now-a-days incentives have been created so the 
Jobcentre looks for measures before that. Generally people who are on sickness benefit are not
left alone – the Jobcentre is obliged call people for interviews very soon and as soon as it is 
possible to send people on a programme, they do. 
Jobcenter official, Copenhagen, interview September 2012
There are, however, two caveats to add to this positive picture.  Firstly, there was a 
consensus amongst the interviewees that the strength of the incentives to assist SB 
claimants had a crowding-out effect on sick and disabled claimants of other benefits. 
They said that they were frequently able to get more staff and resources for SB case 
management as they could easily make a business case for it because of the 
reimbursement system for SB, and that this came at the cost of other groups, for 
which as good as case was not possible to make. This is corroborated by the 
respondents in Svarer and Rosholm's similar study for the Danish Labour Market 
Authority and some of the evidence presented in the next section on support for the 
hardest-to-help:
Everywhere [all the municipalities in the study] there has been talk that the additional 
caseworkers have been hired within the Sickness Benefit area. The explanation is that they 
have been able to convince the municipality that it would be a good business for the 
municipality to make such an investment. The political and administrative focus is so unique 
for sickness means that work with other beneficiaries are more neglected. 
Slotsholm for Danish Labour Market Authority (2010), p.33
Secondly, there appears to be a strong element of gaming in transferring claimants 
who are unlikely to enter work soon to other benefits in order to get them off the SB 
register and avoid penalties:
It is easier to get a pension when the limit is approaching. In the same way, we put people on 
social assistance, or back on Unemployment Insurance when the duration limit is 
approaching. Or they will be granted flexible working arrangements [a Flexjob]. Our job is to 
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close cases. We do as the boss says. 'Out with them': they shouldn't show up in the [Sick 
Benefit] numbers.
Municipal Sickness Benefit Caseworker, quoted in Slotsholm for Danish Labour 
Market Authority (2010), p.34
Though this is obviously controversial in the sense that claimants may be transferred 
to a lower-rate benefit simply to protect the municipal budget, in terms of activation, 
the incentives to activate seem to be preserved. It is still better financially for the 
municipality to transfer the claimant to another benefit and provide them with 
activation than not, and transferring the claimant to Disability Pension – by 
definition, DP claimants are not activateable56 – is the least attractive solution 
financially (see table 7/12, below).
Table 7/12: Annual cost of benefits and savings compared to payment of Sickness 
Benefit beyond one year
Benefit cost (DKK) Saving
Sickness Benefit (53 weeks+) 196,000 N/A
Disability Pension 127,000 68,000
Flex Benefit (passive) 116,000 80,000
Social Assistance (passive) 85,000 111,000
Rehabilitation 68,000 127,000
Flex Benefit (active) 62,000 133,000
Social Assistance (active) 46,000 150,000
Source: (Carsten Koch Committee, 2014)
56 If I can be permitted to coin a phrase
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However, the benefit flow figures tell a different story (see table 7/13, below).  A very 
high proportion outflow to Disability Pension and to Social Assistance. The former 
certainly would  not be expected from simply reading-off from the table above.  Exit to
DP is even more prevalent at 52 weeks.  Of all claimants who left Sickness Benefit for 
another benefit after 52 weeks between 1999 and 2008, 43% exited to Disability 
Pension (Slotsholm for Danish Labour Market Authority, 2010).  As DP claimants do 
not have access to activation, this should be considered negatively when assessing the 
institutionalisation of activation. Even if claimants are moved to a benefit where they 
can be activated, the next section shows that the incentives to provide activation – 
especially if they are considered hard-to-help (which they likely will be if they have 
already been on benefits for 1 year) – are not as strong.















Source: AE-DK (2007), p.3
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Given the saving realised from moving SB claimants to SA, the high outflow to social 
assistance is not surprising. Whilst claimants can, unlike DP claimants, access 
activation, municipalities nonetheless do not seem to have a good track record in 
helping sick and disabled SA claimants:
Social Assistance should be a temporary benefit. The experience, however, is that people with 
different forms of disabilities are increasingly put on Social Assistance, and the municipalities 
do not follow up on these people or provide them with the necessary effort. Some live for 
decades on SA because the job center is not able to offer the right employment-oriented or 
rehabilitative efforts. With the weakening opportunities for early retirement and the change of
the flex job scheme, disabled people are parked on SA without the right effort. The cash 
benefit system differentiates following the latest reform (2014) draws an even sharper 
distinction between the different services and activities, and persons with disabilities can all 
too often receive a reduced performance and a wrong support. This is partly due to lack of 
knowledge of referral on disability, compensation, labor market and training opportunities, in 
particular lack of understanding of mental, cognitive impairments and invisible disabilities. 
Danish Disability Organisations (n.d.), p.1
The data available on how many claimants are activated and for how long reflects this 
mixed picture on the strength and success of the steering tools.  The national Labour 
Market statistics system (Jobindsats) records how long claimants are activated as a 
percentage of the total maximum time per week claimants can be activated  (37 hours)
– known in Danish Aktiveringsgrad and referred here as Activation Intensity. It also 
records data on how many claimants are activated as a percentage of the total possible
– known as Andel aktiveringsberørte and referred to here as Share Activated.  These 
are presented in Graphs 7/10 and 7/11, below, for the period of interest, with 
Unemployment Insurance and Social Assistance for comparison.
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Graph 7/10: Activation Intensity for all benefits and Rehabilitation, 2007-2013
Sources: Jobindsats Kontanthjælp, Revalidering, Sygedagpenge, Ressourceforløb, Ledighedsydelse and A-dagpenge databases, choosing Aktiveringsgrad from Aktiveringsgrad og andel
aktiveringsberørte.
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Graph 7/11: Share Activated for all benefits and Rehabilitation, 2007-2013
Source: Ibid, choosing Andel aktiveringsberørte from Aktiveringsgrad og andel aktiveringsberørte 
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As previously noted, activation for Rehabilitation claimants is very intensive and very 
widespread. Claimants were activated for 75% of the maximum possible time in 2013, 
equivalent to 27 hours per week – and this applied to 90% of claimants.  Whilst the 
proportion of Flex Benefit claimants activated increases very significantly over the 
period, by 2013 it is still only around the proportion of UI claimants, who are on the 
whole much closer to the labour market. Further the intensity of activation, however, 
is lower than both UI and Social Assistance claimants.  This is consistent with what 
interviewees said about the incentives to activate Flex Benefit claimants.
It should be immediately obvious that the figures for Sickness Benefits are not 
consistent with the account of the SB activation incentives so far. This is likely 
because the figures for SB include the large group of claimants who return to work 
quickly and for whom enrolment in an activation programme is not usually necessary,
and these claimants will drag down the average Share Activated and Activation 
Intensity figures.  Further, employers pay SB for the first month of absence, and so 
incentives for municipalities to activate do not kick in until the second month. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to exclude claimants that return to work within a 
month from the figures. However, if we take Match 1 claimants as a proxy (albeit an 
imprecise one) and exclude them, the Share Activated is comparable to Flex Benefit 
and Unemployment Insurance, and the increase in the former between 2007 and 2010 
is noticeably dramatic (See Graph 7/12, below).  Likewise, the Activation Intensity is 
around 12%, similar to that of Flex Benefit. 
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Graph 7/12: Activation Intensity and Share Activated (Match 2 and 3 only), Sickness Benefit, 2007-2013
Source: Jobindsats Sygedagpenge database, choosing Aktiveringsgrad og andel aktiveringsberørte and Match 2 and Match 3 from Match Kategorier. A weighted average was then 
produced using the data from the same database, choosing varighed og fuldtidsaktiverede and again selecting Match 2 and Match 3.
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Interpreting these figures requires some careful consideration of what values would 
represent more or less successful steering and therefore stronger or weaker 
institutionalisation.  Looking first at Share Activated, a failure to reach (or approach) 
100% should not necessarily be taken a sign of less than optimal success in terms of 
steering municipalities to activate. There will always be a certain proportion of 
claimants for whom enrolment in activation does not make sense because doing so 
would risk deadweight – i.e. the claimants would enter employment without help.  
Conversely, however, the proportion activated is likely to be dragged down by 
claimants at the bottom end of the claimant group because appropriate measures do 
not exist, and also because municipalities do not have to activate Match 3 claimants.  
Trying to reconcile these and come out an a benchmark figure is not a worthwhile 
exercise. It should, however, be relatively uncontroversial to suggest that the Share 
Activated for sick and disabled groups should be somewhere close to that for general 
non-employed groups, and that a figure significantly below that for those groups 
would indicate limited success in steering and thus some element of parking.  
Measured against that, the steering tools appear to be broadly successful: starting 
much lower than UI at the start of the period, the gap closes significantly for both Flex
Benefit and Sickness Benefit over the period of interest. Rehabilitation exceeded all 
other groups for the entire period.
Activation Intensity is again similarly difficult to interpret.  A 100% figure would 
indicate 37 hours of activation a week, something most governments would consider 
undesirable for most claimants because of deadweight and the crowding-out effect on 
jobsearch. Being equivalent to a full working week, it would be unreasonable to expect
most claimants with reduced working capacity to participate in that much activation.  
It is generally assumed that sick and disabled claimants need more intensive support, 
though this may come in the form of different types of activities that might not 
necessarily take up more time.  Again though, it should be acceptable to establish that 
activation of sick and disabled claimants in terms of hours per week should not be 
significantly less than for the general non-employed.  This being so, the picture is less 
positive than for Share Activated. For Flex Benefit and Sickness Benefit, it is about half
that for UI, and the steady increases seen for Share Activated and not in evidence here.
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This is consistent with a general pressure exerted from central government that the 
aim of activation should be to get the claimant towards work in the shortest amount 
of time:
We have for years been pumped with [the message of] our citizens have to work, the shortest 
way to work.  The shortest way always and our system then has been used to not thinking 
about rehabilitation and rehabilitation is often a little more expensive than normally offering 
within the companies for instance. [The refund system] regulates how you behave. There have
been a lot of signals from the political central level and the local level that now it’s up to you 
to get them a job and nothing else. They have a responsibility themselves to do so and so. The 
civil servants themselves they are listening and they are changing what they are supposed to 
do so it is penetrating the system from the top and down. We adjust our local strategies to the 
national. 
Jobcenter director, interview October 2012
One further substantive point is worth making before moving on to look at how well 
activation efforts are enforced for the full range of sick and disabled claimants. As 
expected given the amount of flexibility given to municipalities – there is substantial 
variation between them and, consequently, between municipalities and the national 
average.  The tables below show for SB, Flex Benefit and Rehabilitation the national 
average Activation Intensity and Share Activated alongside the highest and lowest 
three municipalities. For the sake of brevity, figures are offered for 2012 only and for 
all Match groups together.
For all three, the variation between municipalities is very substantial.  With 
regard Flex Benefit, for example, the average Activation Intensity for the lowest three 
municipalities is six times lower than the national average, and three times lower for 
Share Activated.  Whilst Rehabilitation on the whole is a very intensive scheme and 
one where activation is provided to a very high proportion of those registered, this is 
clearly not the case in certain municipalities, with some activating only around 1/3 of 
claimants (three times less than the average).  Again, some subtlety and caution is due 
when drawing conclusions about institutionalisation from these figures. Some of the 
municipalities – which are not equal in size – may have too few claimants to merit a 
fully-developed activation scheme for certain groups. In cases where the claimant 
group is very small, the characteristics of those few individuals – being particularly 
hard or easy to help – will skew the figures.  Nonetheless, these figures are consistent 
with what has been widely noted about local implementation of national policies in 
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Denmark – that some municipalities do diverge from intended national practice and 
that activation is applied in a much more limited way in some areas than central 
government prefers, and seemingly despite attempts to design incentives to encourage
activation.
While local flexibility to deliver activation is an established part of Danish 
labour market policy, the benefits and employment schemes examined in this chapter 
are still nationally regulated and municipalities are still ultimately responsible to 
national government for the implementation of activation.  Thus, the apparent 
difficulty national governments have had in ensuring activation for sick and disabled 
is adequately delivered across the country should be considered negatively when 
assessing institutionalisation.
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Table 7/14 Activation Intensity and Share Activated for Rehabilitation, Flex Benefit 
and Sickness Benefit – national average, highest 3 municipalities and lowest 3, 2012
Rehabilitation Activation Intensity Activation Share
National 75.1 National 90.2
Top 3 Top 3
Ballerup 91.7 Fanø 100
Høje-Tåstrup 90.7 Rudersal 100
Allerød 89.7 Mariagerfjord 99.4
Bottom 3 Bottom 3
Faxe 26.6 Faxe 40.5
Vejen 12.9 Vejen 25
Lemvig 12.8 Lemvig 21.8
Flex Benefit Activation Intensity Activation Share
National 17.4 National 59.2
Top 3 Top 3
Slagelse 30.5 Hillerød 81.5
Jammerbrugt 30.5 Lemvig 76.9
Favrskov 29.8 Næstved 74.4
Bottom 3 Bottom 3
Fanø 4.2 Frederiskberg 27.9
Frederikssund 2.5 Ærø 17.6
Laesø 0.8 Laesø 9.1
Sickness Benefit Activation Intensity Activation Share
National 7.5 National 13.4
Top 3 Top 3
Slagelse 19 Jammerbrugt 28.2
Jammerbrugt 18.3 Favrskov 28
Hedensted 18 Nyborg 25
Bottom 3 Bottom 3
Høje-Tåstrup 3.1 Allerød 5.5
Furesø 2.9 Halsnæs 5.3
Frederikssund 2.7 Frederikssund 3.6
Source: Jobindsats Revalidering, Sygedagpenge and Ledighedsydelse databases, choosing Aktiveringsgrad 
then Andel aktiveringsberørte from Aktiveringsgrad og andel aktiveringsberørte and then selecting 
Kommune from Omrade; then selecting all municipalities.
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7.4.3 Steering efforts for the hardest-to-help: Match 3 and parking
One of the hallmarks of a well-institutionalised regime is that support is offered to the 
full range of claimants.  This is possible to monitor in the Danish system because, as 
explained earlier in this chapter, claimants are categorised according to their distance 
from the labour market and data recorded accordingly. Again, the picture here is on 
the whole positive, but with some notable limitations.
As Match 1 claimants are considered closest to the labour market, an 
appropriately targeted activation regime should be activating Match 2 claimants such 
that their activation should be close to, if not exceeding that of Match 1. Indeed, this is
the case in all three of the graphs below. Match 1 and Match 2 track each other very 
closely with regard Rehabilitation and Flex Benefit. As expected given the previous 
discussion, a far greater proportion of Match 2 Sickness Benefit claimants are 
activated than Match 1, and this is increasingly the case as the period goes on. Match 2
claimants are also activated for about double the time as Match 1.
The picture for Match 3 is more mixed.  For the reasons discussed previously, a 
lower Share Activated and Activation Intensity is to be expected given the barriers to 
employment faced  by these claimants.  Given this and the fact there a very few 
obligations on municipalities to activate Match 3, a 50% rate at the start of the period 
for which data is available with respect to Flex Benefit is therefore quite impressive. 
However, there is a very noticeable decline after 2010.  This is very much consistent 
with what the study's interviewees said about the strength of activation incentives for 
claimants further from the labour market, especially since the change in the rules 
since 2010 which has made it less attractive for municipalities to activate claimants 
outside workplaces.
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Graph 7/13: Activation Intensity and Share Activated, Rehabilitation, 2007-2013
Source: Jobindsats Revalidering database, choosing Aktiveringsgrad og andel aktiveringsberørte and Match 1 and Match 2 from Match Kategorier 
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Graph 7/14: Activation Intensity and Share Activated, Pre-Rehabilitation, 2007-2013
Source: Jobindsats Forrerevalidering database, choosing Aktiveringsgrad og andel aktiveringsberørte and Match 1 and Match 2  from Match Kategorier 
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Graph 7/15 Activation Intensity and Share Activated, Flex Benefit, 2007-2013Source: Jobindsats Ledighedsydelse  database, choosing Aktiveringsgrad og andel 
aktiveringsberørte and Match 1, Match 2 and Match 3 from Match Kategorier
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Graph 7/16: Activation Intensity and Share Activated, Sickness Benefit, 2010-2013
Source: Jobindsats Sygdagpenge database, choosing Aktiveringsgrad og andel aktiveringsberørte and Match 1, Match 2 and Match 3 from Match Kategorier 
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While this system and its various incentives to activate that have been described in 
the previous section appear to work fairly well, it is not clear that it works for the full 
range of claimants. The average figures in the graphs above obscure this somewhat. 
Activation costs for the hardest-to-help are likely to be higher because of the length of
support and the resource-intensive nature of the support they require for a successful 
transition to employment.  This reduces the gap between the costs supporting a 
claimant during a passive and active period, and thus reduces the incentive to activate;
The reimbursements system is set up in a way that for people with complex issues with 
regards to their employment status, it’s not economically viable to do something about it.  The
Jobcenters are measured by if they have met with the unemployed person at three months, six
months and these kinds of detailed regulations and if they didn't live up to these demands 
they will be punished [by having a reduced reimbursement].  So that’s why it can be 
economically viable to put people in Match category 3 [where those regulations don't apply].
DPO Representative, interview October 2012
In some cases, the costs of achieving a successful job outcome are judged to be so high
that it is cheaper to keep the claimant in benefit and not activated. As the data above 
showed and as an interviewee reported, this even appears to be the case when the 
state refund of Flex Benefit runs out after 18 months:
We have a system called Flexjobs and if you are unemployed [but eligible] the municipality 
has an obligation to find you a job. If they still are unemployed after 18 months the costs of 
giving this person unemployment benefits are 100% the cost of the municipality but it is still 
cheaper to do that than it is to take initiatives to bring them closer to the labour market so 
they are kept unemployed because it is cheaper than doing something. In a way it shows that 
the system is always adapted to the challenges so that the really tough challenges are not 
really dealt with […] because you can always buy your way out of it.  You can always put 
someone in a Match Category or in a position where you really don’t have to do anything and
you can keep them there.
DPO regional representative, interview October 2012
In 2010, the refund for activation not considered to be directly relevant to the labour 
market was reduced from 65% to 30% (Carsten Koch Committee, 2014). Subsidised 
employment and job training attracted the higher rate whilst classroom-based training
and education initiatives attracted the lower rate.  This appears to have substantially 
reduced the incentives for municipalities to support claimants who have not been 
ready to participate in workplace activation measures.  For Flex Benefit claimants and 
Rehabilitation particpants, the refund for passive periods of benefit receipt and for 
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non-workplace activation are the same (see table 7/8, above), and so there is no 
incentive to activate claimants who cannot participate in employment-based 
activation.  This would help to explain the post-2010 declines in Activation Share for 
Flex Benefit.
Another consequence of this has been considerable gaming around the classification 
of claimants.
If claimants are not able to participate in activities that attract the highest refund 
municipalities thus have an incentive to place claimants in the lowest Match Group, 
where the claimant has no right to support beyond interviews and the municipalities 
no obligation to provide it:
A problem right now with an increase of people matched in category 3 because the 
municipalities don’t have an obligation to offer any services in that category.  There has been 
a change in the financial incentive so the municipalities no longer have the economy to 
establish some of the smaller specialised programmes that they could before because they 
don’t get the same funding from the state.  So what has happened is that an increasing 
number have been moved to category 3, whereas previously they would have been receiving 
an offer in category 2. This is no longer economically viable for municipalities so they move 
them to category 3.  Our suspicion is that more people who have more complex problems 
related to disability will be moved to Match category 3 instead of providing them with a 
service.
Senior officer, DPO, interview July 2012 
This was confirmed by a CABI representative: 
What Aarhus, for example, did was to overnight move 300 people from Match 2 to Match 3 
because it was too expensive for them to maintain their activation programmes for the 
weakest groups in Match 2 because they only got a refund of 30%.  By moving them they had 
no activation obligation any more toward these people and they could concentrate on work 
practice and employment support programmes for the strongest Match 2 and Match 1 where 
they got 50% refund.  So there is a very close connection to the activation programmes and the
refund system between the state and the municipalities.
CABI Representative, interview October 2012
Unfortunately, data for the transfers between Match groups is not available for 
Sickness, Flex Benefit and Rehabilitation, so it is not possible to demonstrate this 
quantitatively.  However, the switch is very noticeable in the data for Social Assistance
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(not an incapacity benefit, but many SA claimants do have health conditions), see 
graph 7/18, below.  The same new rules on the two rates for the two different types of 
activation apply to all benefits and so there is no good reason to believe that the same 
type of switching occurred for incapacity benefits. The very steep decrease in the 
Share Activated for Flex Benefit (see Graph 7/15, above) after 2010 is another reason to
feel confident is this assumption: this would be consistent with Match 1 and Match 2 
claimants being moved to Match 3 with the intention of not activating them.
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Graph 7/18: Transfers from Match 2 to Match 3, Social Assistance, Q4 2008 – Q3 2011
Source: Avisen DK (2011)
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Further, recent years have seen a rise in claimants moving from Match 3 straight into 
work, something which is generally not expected to happen – or at least not without 
assistance – given the complexity of the labour market disadvantage claimants in this 
group are perceived to face (Interview with CABI Representative, September 2012).  
This would seem to lend credence to the claim that claimants who have been seen as 
too hard to help have been placed in Match 3 so as to relieve municipalities of the 
financial and resource burden of assisting them.  
This appears to be a classic case of parking, whereby there are perverse incentives to 
provide a minimal level of support to those farther from the labour market, in this 
case because they cannot participate in higher refund measures and thus are at risk of 
damaging the municipal budget.  Clearly, there is an inherent incompatibility between 
insisting on activation measures that are more focused on the workplace and ensuring
support for the largest possible range of claimants.
It is worth noting, however, that the movement of claimants into Match 3 has not 
gone unchallenged by central government.  It has for some years had a number of 
pilot schemes focused specifically on Match 3 claimants and most recently it set up a 
DKK 150m scheme to fund municipalities to re-open their Match 3 cases and create 
new job plans for these claimants, with a small payment being made for each case re-
opened (ibid). 
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7.5 The form and strength of the institutionalisation of activation 
for sick and disabled claimants in Denmark
7.5.1 The Scope of Activation 
The scope of activation of sick and disabled claimants for most of the period of interest
has been paradoxical in the sense that it can and does cater for claimants with very 
severe reductions in capacity, yet otherwise assumes claimants do not have the 
complex employment barriers that policymakers have for some time known develop 
after extended periods out of work.  This appears to be because – another key feature 
of the regime – policy has mainly focused on re-entry of recent labour market leavers 
rather than the long-term sick and disabled non-employed. The political and 
administrative focus – around 60,000 activated claimants a year – has hitherto been on
stopping sickness absence becoming long-term non-employed, rather the dealing with
the stock of ~240,000 long-term non-employed DP claimants.  Much of the support 
offered appears to be aimed reconciling the capacity reduction with the labour market 
– retraining the person for a more suitable job and offering job-subsidies to 
compensate employers for taking on employees with reduced capacity –  and 
otherwise assumes relatively high employability.  This is not to deny or downplay the 
efforts and resources that are made to help these claimants – Rehabilitation, for 
example, can run for more than a year, involve expensive retraining and education 
courses and involve intensive efforts on the part of both municipality and claimant – 
but by that very nature, only already fairly highly functioning individuals can usefully
take part.
The lack of notable health-related support further illustrates this point. Even 
Vocational |Rehabilitation does not offer significant health interventions, and health 
condition management and recovery has been seen as the task of the health services 
rather than a problem to dealt with holistically through unified health and 
employment strategies. 
Successive strategy documents from the period of interest, however, show a 
gradual movement to a more inclusive strategy in the second half of the 2000s. 
Policymakers began to look into the possibility of activating DP claimants – hitherto 
seen as not desirable or legitimate candidates for support – and accordingly began to 
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test inter-disciplinary approaches bringing together health, employment, education 
and social perspectivess, and formally co-ordinating services, staff and resources. Also,
health interventions have been a bigger part of the SB activation regime since 2014.  It 
is still in its infancy, but Resource Scheme – the programme that came out of those 
trials and that began in 2013 – appears to signal a major expansion in the ambition 
and scope of activation for sick and disabled claimants.
7.5.2 Political commitment
According to the framework established, political commitment to the sickness and 
disability activation agenda has been strong and increasing over most of the period.  It
is a genuinely broad and detailed agenda, backed-up by a political determination in 
the middle of the 2000s that not enough was known about the employment support 
needs of sick and disabled people, and so a considerable effort was made to research 
and trial new approaches, with a range of institutions set up to carry out and fund 
those processes, and spread the knowledge that resulted.  Accordingly, a whole range 
of efforts have been made to increase the capacity – appropriately trained staff, for 
example – in both central and local government.  Further, the raft of new legal 
requirements as part of the new Ressourceforløb scheme – show an increasing desire 
on the part of central government to dispense with traditional local government 
autonomy and insist not only on greater activation in general for sick and disabled 
claimants, but on how this is done, relying on direct intervention and not just indirect 
steering by incentives.  This greater intervention in local ALMP has been a trend 
many years in the making (going further back than 2007) and applies to ALMP in 
generally – not just of sick and disabled claimants – but nonetheless it is a very 
important feature of the development of sickness and disability activation in Denmark
during this period.
In both absolute terms and relative to benefit expenditure, funding for 
activation has increased substantially over the period and accounts for a significant – 
if declining, due to spending increases for other groups – proportion of overall ALMP 
expenditure. That said, spending is highly uneven between programmes and groups, 
with Flexjobs accounting for most of the spending increase and being much more 
generous in terms of per head expenditure. Further, since the late 2000s, government –
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both centre-right and centre-left – have started to run out of patience with the 
scheme, which is very expensive and has almost no impact on outflows from DP, as 
was intended. Significantly, governments began to talk about it in the same way as 
benefits – that they should provide temporary support while the claimant returns to 
the ordinary labour market – and subsidised employment is less and less regarded by 
officialdom as an acceptable positive outcome of activation. A major reform in 2012 
removed made Flexjob subsidies time-limited and less generous. Similarly, though the 
Resource Scheme is a major, positive change in terms of institutionalisation in many 
ways, government does appear to be trying to activate this new and hard-to-help 
group on the cheap, with spending per-head about the same as existing schemes that 
deal with claimants with fewer employment barriers, and far less than what was 
recommended by the commission that first floated the idea. 
7.5.3 The institutional promotion and protection of the right to activation
In the period of interest governments of both centre-right (2001-2011) and centre-left 
(2011-) have sought fairly strongly to make institutional and operational reforms so as
to embed the activation of these groups more firmly in the every-day practice of 
municipalities. The introduction of the Match system and mainstreaming of all groups 
in unified Jobcenters in 2009 – which was meant to equalise the handling of claimants 
regardless of their benefit status – and a more prescriptive SB intervention regime in 
2013/14 are examples of this.  
The right to activation is a concept that very much exists and is recognised both in 
law and, consequently, in the design of ALMP intervention regimes that give effect to 
those laws – though whether these rights are always properly considered and 
respected at the street-level by municipal staff implementing those regimes is 
somewhat in doubt (see 7.5.4). Whilst there is a formal general legal right to support 
aimed at allowing a person to be able to support themselves, what and how much is 
offered rests on the claimant's categorisation – both their Match category – and their 
benefit.  Though this still means that the vast majority of all claimants of benefits 
apart from DP – around 90% – are eligible for activation, a small but significant 
210
proportion are not, and nor were the ~240,000 claimants of DP until 2013.
Regarding steering by incentives, there is a strong general incentive for sick and 
disabled benefits claimants to receive activation: there are some basic but strongly 
enforced rights to a minimum number of regular work-focused interviews, and 
interviewees said penalties for not delivering these interviews were effective.  In 
contrast to other benefits, such penalties do not exist for support beyond this but there
are a range of other incentive structures – more generous subsidies for active than 
benefit spending, the exemption of some sickness and disability-related activation 
from cost ceilings, for example – that do – at least when considered in isolation from 
other factors – appear to create fairly strong incentive to activate.  However, these 
incentives are not equally strong across all benefit groups. Due to the particular set-up
of incentives in the Sickness Benefit system – the ending of benefit refunds after 1 
year – incentives to support claimants appear to be very strong, but this is appears to 
be less so for other groups, Flex Benefit recipients in particular.  The splitting of the 
refund system in 2010 into directly and indirectly-employment related measures mean
that for claimants who cannot take part in activation within workplaces, there is no 
greater incentive to activate than not.  This does not appear to have been intentional, 
but is a good example of broader system-wide changes having a negative impact on 
the institutionalisation of activation for sick and disabled claimants. 
7.5.4 Security of the right to activation
This picture of the promotion of activation for sick and disabled claimants through 
government intervention and indirect steering by incentives – generally positive, but 
with some major exceptions – is on the whole supported by the quantitative data 
available on activation recorded by Jobindsats.  The proportion of claimants activated 
increases for most sick and disabled groups so as to be around the level of general 
unemployed groups, very sharply in the case of SB, and there appears largely to be an 
appropriate distribution efforts between Match 1, 2 and 3.  However, with the 
exception of the small Rehabilitation scheme, the length of interventions for these 
claimants is lower compared to general unemployed groups and this does not change 
over the period. This appears to be related to a broad – ALMP wide – political wish to 
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avoid prolonged interventions.
Further, central government does not appear to have been entirely successful 
in designing out of the steering system unwanted behaviour by municipalities. There 
is some extent of gaming around benefit categories whereby claimants are moved to 
other benefits or programmes where the incentives and the negative financial impact 
on municipalities is less severe.  This applies to the SB regime in particular, where 
several interviewees and other sources of data indicate the severity of the 52 week 
penalty means that claimants are transferred to other benefits where there are fewer 
activation requirements and penalties. This appears to have had a crowding-out 
impact on other claimants with more extensive sickness and disability-related barriers,
albeit a seemingly unintentional one. There is evidence, for example, those with the 
most severe capacity reductions cannot access Flexjobs because claimants from 
benefits with activation penalties are transferred to Flexjobs without proper 
assessment. As a result, they appear to end up on Flex Benefit, where incentives are 
the weakest. The size of this group has grown substantially over the period of interest.
Similarly, whilst the decision to split the refund system was not intentionally 
done by central government to marginalise sick and disabled claimants, it does, 
however, appear to have resulted in some entirely intentional gaming by 
municipalities around the Match Category system that has had this impact: claimants 
with higher support needs than can be accommodated are moved into Match 3 so that 
municipalities can avoid their duty to provide activation.
Further, though the incentives are generally very strong, these clearly do not 
work for all municipalities. There is significant subnational variation in both the Share
Activated and Activation Intensity between municipalities. Ultimately, a range of 
other factors – ideological influence of the ruling party locally; the size of the benefits 
population; the health of the local budget being some examples – will feed into a 
decision to make more or less intensive efforts to activate.  A qualitative case-study 




The Danish approach to activating sick and disabled claimants is a strongly 
institutionalised one if it is not looked at in the context of the size and diversity of the 
sickness and disability benefits claimant group. Significant political and actual capital 
is spent on services for sick and disabled jobseekers; these can serve claimants with 
limited, medium or severe capacity reduction and they can and are applied in 
generous amounts for very extended periods of time. The incentives to activate are 
generally strong, and very strong for claimants of Sickness Benefit, and the rate of 
activation – as one would expect from Denmark – is fairly high, and around that of 
general unemployed groups.  
However, when one moves from sick and disabled claimants overall to look at 
how well the full range of claimants are served – one of the major preoccupations of 
this research – the picture is much less positive. Until recently, the system has been 
very selective, being more intensive for Sickness Benefit claimants and gradually 
getting less so as the claimant is out of work for longer.  Accordingly, the strength of 
the activation incentives; the access to activation and the rate is weaker for other 
groups, Flex Benefit claimants in particular.  This is important because this is where 
the more disadvantaged claimants who are competed out of Flexjobs tend to end up.
A further point to make here is that the relatively weak institutional barriers 
between activation for these groups of claimants and others, especially since the 
introduction of the unified activation regime and unified Jobcenters for all benefit 
claimants. This means that work-first changes to the benefits and activation regime as 
a whole – changes to the refund system to prioritise directly employment-related 
activation and moves to curb the length of interventions –  have had negative 
consequences for the institutionalisation of activation for sick and disabled claimants, 
however unintentional this might have been.
With the opening up of activation for Disability Pensioners and a major new 
scheme with a new, multi-service, interdisciplinary approach, things are clearly 
beginning to change and becoming more inclusive. This is a relatively recent change, 
however, and one would need to return to look at Denmark again in 5-10 years to 
assess the influence of these changes.
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7.6  Epilogue: Carsten Koch proposals and beyond
The Carsten Koch proposals have triggered what looks like will be a major overhaul of
the organisation of activation policy. The reforms that emerged from Koch were 
agreed with the between the Thorning-Schmidt government and the opposition 
bourgeois bloc in June 2014 and they are due to come into force over the course of 
2015 and 2016 (Danish Ministry of Employment, 2015) Whilst this is beyond the 
period of interest, the extent to which the changes depart from the previous practice 
detailed in this chapter, the similarities with the UK approach and the importance they
would have in any future research mean that they are worth noting here. The main 
relevant changes are: funding municipalities more through block grants than refunds 
(about a 120% larger block grant and a correspondingly smaller refund system); a 
single system of refunds so that municipalities do not have different incentive across 
different claimant categories and which stop after one year, and the abolition of all 
process requirements and penalties for late or under-provision of services;   (“Her er 
detaljerne i beskæftigelsesreformen [Here are the details of the employment reform]”, 
30 April 2014, Ugebreveta A4).   Moving to a single refund system which makes no 
distinction between sick/disabled claimants would appear to remove some of the 
protection against parking that the current system gives them. Indeed, concern has 
been raised by the parliamentary left and disability groups that the unified refund 
system will encourage municipalities to cut back on benefits and activation for sick 
and disabled people (Finn Sorensen MF, Speech in the Danish Parliament, 14th April 
2015)57 – especially activation beyond a year (Danish Disability Organisations, 2014)– 
and that the new activation measures the reform package brings in are focused on UI 
claimants, while at the same time benefit sanctions are being increased for Flex 




8.1 Political commitment to the activation agenda for sick and 
disabled claimants
8.1.1 Nature and scope of the activation agenda
The beginning of the period of interest in 2007 saw the publication of the Freud Report 
on the Future of Welfare to Work (Freud, 2007) in the image of which much welfare-to-
work policy of both governments have been developed and implemented to a 
significant extent.  Taking as a starting point the fact that unemployment as usually 
understood had fallen “probably to near the frictional level” (p.51), Freud advocated a 
re-focusing of welfare-to-work policy from the frictionally unemployed towards three 
groups “facing multiple disadvantage and long term benefit dependency” (ibid) whose 
greater employment he said was necessary for the government to reach its recently 
adopted 80% employment target and who at that point represented 95% of people who 
had been claiming benefits for more than one year: older people; incapacity benefits 
claimants and lone parents. Despite representing 2/3 of the workless population, these 
groups, he argued, tended to have relatively poor access to work-focused support – 
just 14% of the welfare-to-work budget was spent on them. Further, what support was 
available was offered on what Freud referred to as a ‘client group’ basis, related to 
problems perceived to be common to all on a particular benefit rather than on a 
genuinely individual basis. 
Freud recommended that the DWP should free-up Jobcentre Plus to focus on 
the short-term unemployed whilst building a network of contracted provision to help 
long-term unemployed people, principally members of the those three groups and IB 
claimants in particular, representing as they did the largest group of workless people. 
He saw this as a necessary step in justifying the extension of some amount of benefit 
conditionality to all claimants of working-age benefits other than parents with very 
young children and people with seriously incapacitating illnesses or disabilities; “with 
the least advantaged in receipt of more individualised support, the rights and 
responsibilities of all benefit recipients should be brought more closely into line.” 
(2007, p.1).  As briefly outlined in Chapter 6, this extension of conditionality was 
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achieved through the move from IB to ESA and a stricter work capacity test, which 
increased the number of sick and disabled claimants expected to make moves towards 
work, though not as many as originally expected as a result of later changes to the 
WCA. 
Seemingly due to the emphasis on personalisation of employment support; 'Black Box'
provision; and the supposed underperformance of prescriptive schemes, a focus on 
providing or improving specific health or disability-related services has not been 
strongly part of the sickness and disability activation agenda in the UK, and 
particularly not in the later years of the period under study. Instead, the focus has 
been on ensuring the responsiveness of mainstream services to a broader array of 
claimants whilst maintaining some limited supported and some very few sheltered 
employment places, but again without a focus on specific types of services.
Similarly and likely relatedly, there also seems not to have been a stated, 
official58 desire to target specific types of sickness or disabled benefit claimants – for 
example, those with mental health conditions, or claimants with particularly severe 
and/or multiple disabilities. No specific sub-groups of the one million IB claimants 
were identified by Freud and there have not been targets for the labour market 
integration of claimants with specific types of illnesses or disabilities.
The caveat to this general impression of a relatively broad programme that has 
not had specific aims around the introduction or strengthening of specific services to 
help certain groups of claimants is that there was some limited indication of change in
this regard at the very end of the period.  The Disability, Health and Employment 
strategy in 2013 (Department for Work and Pensions, 2013d), for example, had a very 
prominent focus on mental health. There is an ambition to connect up National Health
Service (NHS) mental health support with employment support and it mentioned the 
trialling of several initiatives providing health support through the Work Programme, 
an advance on the DWP's previous position of letting providers develop such support 
on their own. This may be policy learning from the problems of the Work Programme 
that were experienced in the latter part of the period under study and that are 
described in the later sections of this chapter. 
 
58 As this chapter argues, though, DWP strategy does appear to have increasingly over the period 
focused, albeit not explicitly, on those ESA-WRAG claimants closer to the labour market 
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8.1.2 Building an institutional framework
Launching new programmes
The period of interest covers two major programmatic changes.  Jobcentre Plus led-
Pathways to Work was gradually rolled-out from 200559, and Provider-led Pathways 
from 2007, together reaching full UK coverage in 2008 (DWP Disability and Work 
Division, 2011b).  Launching the two Pathways programmes was a major undertaking 
for the Department, reflecting a high level of ambition and commitment: that the vast 
majority of the then 2.6m IB claimant pool could and should be engaged in some kind 
of support. All claimants except those with the most severe conditions or those 
identified as not needing help were required to participate in at least the 5 WFIs and 
then on a voluntary basis could go on to to a range of programmes – New Deal for 
Disabled People (NDDP) and Condition Management Programme (CMP) most notably 
– and claim Return to Work Credit (RTWC).  In terms of the number and range of 
claimantsl the targets – 37% into sustained employment (House of Commons 
Committee of Public Accounts, 2010) – as well the funds earmarked for it (see 8.1.5 for
a discussion of programme funding), Pathways was the most largest effort to integrate
sick and disabled claimants into employment.  The later merging of Pathways and 
most other general and specialist employment programmes into the mainstream Work
Programme was described by interviews as representing a move away from disability 
and sickness claimant-specific programmes and an apparent movement down the 
political agenda:
Pathways to Work was a really rigorous attempt to design a programme to meet the needs of 
people on IB and ESA and, by extension, people with health conditions and disabilities that 
limited their ability to work.  DWP were incredibly enthusiastic about it for a very long period
of time until they completed all their evaluations and found that unfortunately it didn’t appear
to have any impact.  Which then I think to some extent with the onset of the recession was an
important factor in them saying let's just package all this up in a single programme.  Let's 
actually worry less about people on IB and let the market sort it out and let's assume that any 
job entry is a bonus rather than what had really happened in the last 10 years or so, up until 2 
years ago, which was a real effort to improve the support for people on IB. 
Senior DWP official, interview May 2012
59 I consider Pathways to have started in October 2005 as that is when the national extension began. It
was, however, piloted from October 2003 until then. The start date is important later as the various 
DWP schemes are compared by contrasting their average yearly starts i.e the total number of starts
divided by the number of years the programme ran for. A table detailing the roll-out of Pathways 
can be found on p.9 of DWP Disability and Work Division (2011a).
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It was like a lightbulb moment when that evaluation hit the desks and showed that this 
flagship programme doesn’t actually work.  It was a bombshell, it wasn’t a gradual process.  
There were issues about programme management and performance but the realisation that we
were on the wrong track really did hit the department and ministers very hard so there was a 
rebound to find out, well if that doesn’t work then what does?!  From the middle of 2008 the 
ministerial focus shifted a lot towards jobseekers and people who had been on benefit 6-12 
months, so much focus went on to how to boost support for people who had been 
unemployed for a while but aren’t yet long term unemployed. The civil service are very 
responsive to what the ministers are focused on. If ministers aren’t cracking the whip on an 
issue then it can drift and I think IB/ESA support for people with health conditions did get a 
bit lost there from mid ’08 onwards. It certainly burnt DWP’s fingers in terms that they could 
design the perfect programme for the majority or entirety of the ESA group.  It definitely led 
to the talk of single programmes, flexibility, black box, and pay for outcomes. 
Former senior DWP official, interview July 2012
Setting up new institutions 
The UK does not have a set of specialist disability organisations operating within or on
behalf of government on disability employment and welfare-to-work issues. The only 
specialist government body is the Office for Disability Issues (ODI). ODI is part of the 
DWP and co-ordinates disability policy across government (Office for Disability 
Issues, 2014).  Representative organisations have only a fairly marginal advisory role, 
and one that has been much in flux over the period of interest.  The Disability 
Employment Advisory Committee (DEAC) provided strategic advice to ministers and 
officials on the employment of disabled people, but this was abolished in 2010 as part 
of a wider reduction of non-departmental public bodies (‘Bonfire of the quangos: the 
victims’;The Guardian, 22 August 2010) Responsibility to advise on disability 
employment issues was passed to Equality 2025,  an ODI-sponsored non-statutory 
advisory public body made up of disabled people advising across public policy, but it 
in turn was closed in 2013 (‘End of the road for Equality 2025’; Disability News Service, 
19 July 2013).  Equality 2025 was replaced by several bodies as part of the 
government's cross-departmental 'Fulfilling Potential' strategy, including a forum for 
Disabled People's User-led Organisations, (‘Low-key report details “progress” on 
disability strategy’; Disability News Service, 4 September 2014) but none of these focus 
on social security or employment issues.   The only statutory representation sick and 
disabled people have with regard welfare is one person representing their interests on 
the Social Security Advisory Committee (SSAC) (Social Security Advisory Committee, 
2015), but there is seemingly no requirement for this to be a disabled person or a 
representative from a disabled people's organisation.
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Building specialist capacity
Developing the capacity of welfare-to-work provision to understand and respond to 
sick and disabled claimants' needs through the provision of specialist advisers has 
been a consistent, if relatively low profile agenda over the past 15 years. Earlier 
programmes, most notably NDDP, were built around specialist personal advisers and 
this was taken forward within Jobcentre Plus over the next decade in the form of 
Disability Employment Advisors (DEAs), Work Psychologists and Incapacity Benefits 
Personal Advisers (IBPAs)/Employment Support Allowance Personal Advisers 
(ESAPAs). DEAs in particular are important because they are in practice the main way
claimants can access specialist services (Department for Work and Pensions, 2013a).  
Several of the interviewees reported that there was an undersupply60 of DEAs and, 
indeed, their numbers do decline sharply towards the end of the period61.
60 Given that there were 700-900* Jobcentre Plus offices during this period, there was much less than 
one per office for the whole period.|
*2007: 898 offices (Stephen Timms's answer to Chris Grayling Written Question on Jobcentre Plus 
offices. HC Deb 28 April 2008 vol 475 c46WS: http://bit.ly/1MTvukd)
 2013: 740 (National Audit Office, 2013, p6)
61 This is unlikely to be natural variation due to benefit caseloads and staffing variations. DWP at that 
time (2013/14) were trialling what it called the 'Unipod' system, whereby all advisers would deal 
with all claimants, with DEAs being phased out (“Concern over DWP plans to scrap specialist 
adviser roles”. Disability News Service, 29th December 2014). Although it is out of the period of 
interest, the number for DEAs drops very sharply in 2014/2015, to 297 (Scottish Trades Union 
Congress, 2015).
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Table 8/1: Number of JCP/DWP specialist advisers, 2006/7 – 2013/14
2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 20010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14
IB Personal Adviser 995 340
ESA Personal Adviser 50 641 702 562 804 890
Work Psychologists 76 69 60 62
Remploy Personal Caseworker 
Adviser
33
Disability Employment Adviser 496 467 452 451 501 565 520 444
Total number of Personal Advisers 
(all claimants)
9155 9235 9134 11,975 11,973 11,181
Source: FOI requests to DWP (Reproduced in Appendix A1)
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They also reported that the investment and time given to training specialist advisers, 
especially for Pathways, had been diluted in the later phases of the programme and 
subsequent programmes.  In the initial rollout of Pathways, JCP advisers training to be
specialist disability advisers were given 2 months off to re-train, but this was 
progressively scaled-back:
The original evaluation showed Pathways had a significant impact on moving people into 
work. The process evaluation part of that showed one of the things that helped with that was 
that we invested very heavily in adviser training. It was a really heavy investment. As time 
has gone on, that has been whittled down.  The later phases of Pathways were cheaper in this 
sense and then the performance went downhill- big surprise! 
DWP adviser on disability employment, interview September 2011
Evaluations of the DEA role have found much the same development:
The service we [DEAs] provide has been diluted so much over the previous five or six years 
that it bears no resemblance to what we used to do, in fact, in many cases now, the DEAs are 
being asked to do jobs which really don’t need our expertise. They are very basic adviser jobs 
[…] you are not really a specialis […] and it doesn’t look as a department that we give that 
service to the customers that we were always dedicated to give.
DEA, quoted in Department for Work and Pensions (2006), p.21
An important observation to make here – and one made by several interviewees – is 
that whilst the generation of specialist capacity for sick and disabled jobseekers has 
always been an aim, responsibility for this has been gradually ceded from government
to providers: the provision of specialist capacity is no longer something UK central 
government is committed to doing itself:
Part of the attraction of the whole contracting-out process is the extent to which it frees-up 
DWP from what it's been struggling to do. All the research and testing of approaches and 
making sure all the specialist structures are there is now really up to the providers to get on 
with it. We'll obviously help with that in terms of sharing our knowledge and some pump-
priming money, but the main onus is on the providers. That's the practical side, and there's 
also the ideological side – that you get that specialist innovation from market competition, not
from government doing it all.
DWP official, interview May 2012
The place of the activation of sick and disabled claimants in the national ALMP 
institutional structure appears to have weakened over time. The number of specialist 
programmes has been reduced from several to just one, and much of what was done 
for sick and disabled claimants has been subsumed into a general employment 
programme, characterised by several interviewees as a  dip in commitment for sick 
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and disabled claimant-specific strategies after the high-profile failure of Pathways. 
Alongside this, the agenda has never been anchored in specialist organisations, which 
do not exist for UK ALMP in the way they do in other countries.  Some caution is, 
though, due in drawing too direct a link between political commitment and the 
transfer of responsibility for the generation and operation of specialist support to 
external providers. After all, this shift is common to all employment services 
regardless of claimant group (and indeed a whole range of public services beyond 
welfare-to-work), and has been a long time coming – it would be a mistake to see it as 
part of a specific political decision at a given point in time to scale back commitment 
to activation for sick and disabled claimants.  However, especially when examined 
along with the shift from prescriptive programmes to overseeing policy mainly by 
outcome targets – the purview of the next sub-section – it does appear to be part of a 
shift in the nature of the political commitment, away from a direct commitment to a 
given (even if fairly limited) level and type of support specified and regulated by 
government and towards an indirect commitment to fostering a marketplace of 
specialist providers beyond the PES which provide specialist support.
8.1.3 Steering, monitoring and target-setting
UK outcome targets for raising the number of sick and disabled claimants of non-
employment benefits moving into employment have for the entire period of interests 
been ambitious. The headline target has been to reduce the number of claimants of 
incapacity benefits by 1m, a target argued to be achievable in the Freud Report (Freud, 
2007), adopted by the Labour government soon after and retained, though in a less 
high-profile manner, by the Coalition government.  As responsibility for the delivery 
of programmes has been passed increasingly to contracted providers, outcome targets 
have become more prominent.  Pathways to Work did not have any publicly-stated 
overall outcome targets – though the internal DWP ambition was around 37% of 
claimants into sustained employment (House of Commons Committee of Public 
Accounts, 2010)– but these are now major features of both Work Choice and the Work
Programme for new ESA claimants62.  For Work Choice these are 30% of all 
62 As part of the contracts it has with providers, DWP only sets a Minimum Performance Level (MPL) 
for three groups: JSA 25+, JSA 18-24 and new ESA claimants. Providers are still paid on outcomes 
for the other groups, but they are not monitored for the purposes of contract compliance.
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participants to achieve a non-supported job outcome and for 60% of those to stay in 
employment for 26 out of 30 weeks (Purvis et al, 2013). For the Work Programme the 
target is for 16.5%63 of new ESA claimants to be be employed for at least 13 weeks.
The emphasis now placed on job outcome targets appears to come from the 
fact that there has been a notable shift away from process targets and process 
requirements.  Previous programmes had a significant element of prescription from 
government.  Providers delivering PL-Pathways had to deliver a minimum and fairly 
closely-defined set of services: five work-focused interviews from the third to the 
eighth month of the claim, the Condition Management Programme for claimants who 
asked for it, and assistance for the participant to apply for RTWC.  However, as one of 
the former DWP advisor interviewees explained, providers were very critical of the 
level of prescription, which gave way to much more freedom for providers in later 
programmes:
Pathways was fairly prescribed: here was adviser support, regular interventions and 
interviews but that was supported with a personalised condition management programme 
that everyone had to go through and potentially wage subsidies and other support, so it was 
fairly prescribed from the centre and what that may get to is that providers felt that they were
spending more on stuff like condition management or training subsidies that were prescribed 
on the programme and didn’t have enough to spend on the personalised adviser led regular 
face to face interventions. There must have been some quite difficult conversations about why 
providers were consistently missing performance targets and job entries.  Usually when you 
have these conversations with providers they say it’s because we’re not allowed to do what 
we want to do, if it were more flexible we would deliver better results. 
Senior DWP and Treasury official, interview May 2012
A similar pattern can be observed with the DWP internally. Until 2011, DWP had a 
series of Interventions Delivery Targets (IDTs) which measured the extent to which 
JCP was delivering certain interventions (usually work-focused interviews) for given 
target groups (IB claimants for 2006-8) (Department for Work and Pensions, 2008d).  
Since 2011, however, DWP is only required to achieve two headline outcomes – 
reducing the monetary value of fraud and error, and getting 90% of new JSA claimants 
into work within 12 months (Nunn & Devins, 2012) – neither of which relate to sick 
and disabled jobseekers 
63 This figures relates to the majority of the programme, years 2-5. Years 1 and 7 are 5.5% and Year 6, 
11% (House of Commons Library 2015).
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The main point here regarding political commitment is that over the period of 
interest there has been a declining willingness, apparently borne out of provider 
criticisms about the over prescription of Pathways and previous programmes, to 
commit to specific types or levels of employment-related services.  Although there is 
still a broad expectation that sick and disabled claimants should be able to access a 
mix of specialist and more general support, UK governments are no longer willing to 
insist on this contractually and instead have been content to rely on outcome-based 
contracts to steer service providers.
8.1.4 Trialling, research and evaluation
DWP has historically invested much time, effort and funds in evaluating its 
programmes and policies and, as reducing incapacity benefits claims and moving sick 
and disabled claimants came on the agenda in the early-to-mid 2000s, DWP produced 
a large number of evaluations into its disability employment programmes and 
research into a whole range of issues around reintegrating sick and disabled claimants 
back into work.  Tables 8/2 and 8/3 below, present the results of a search of the DWP's
research database (Department for Work and Pensions, 2013c) for evaluation reports 
of programmes and pilots, and other research projects on topics around welfare-to-
work for this claimant group.  A large variety of methods were used, some very 
intensive and done over some time; from fieldwork with providers, participants and 
JCP/DWP staff; telephone and web surveys of the same; longitudinal and cohort 
studies of participants, and cost:benefit analyses.
It is clear from Table 8/2 that the two major pre-2010 programmes, New Deal 
for Disabled People and Pathways to Work, were very intensively studied. Most 
aspects of the programmes were studied separately, and some were studied several 
times over the lifetime of the programmes.  The picture is different for the two current
programmes: evaluation of Work Choice and Work Programme is much condensed64, 
with most aspects of the programmes being studied together in the same evaluation.  
With regard evaluations of the Work Programme, there are no specific evaluations of 
ESA/IB participants– they are dealt with alongside other claimant groups and there 
64 Whilst fairly limited research into experiences of IB/ESA claimants should be taken into account 
when looking at political commitment, it is worth bearing in mind that research budgets have been 
reduced and research projects cancelled or curtailed across most government departments (Tanner 
2011).
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are no specific sections looking at ESA/IB. 
A similar picture emerges when the piloting of programmes is examined.  New
Deal for Disabled People and JCP-led Pathways to Work were extensively piloted in 
test areas before being rolled out nationally and additions; refinements and extensions 
to both programmes were frequently tested, the Job Retention and Rehabilitation 
Pilots (JRRP), being the most notable. JRRP was a two year randomised control trial 
that offered around 3000 people on sick-leave a health intervention (principally 
physiotherapy, complementary therapy or referral to a medical specialist); a 
workplace intervention (an ergonomic assessment or mediation with the employer), or
a combination of both (Taylor et al., 2006). In contrast, neither Provider-led Pathways, 
Work Choice nor Work Programme were piloted.
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Table 8/2: DWP evaluations of disability/sickness employment programmes, with number of evaluations and aspects evaluated 





New Deal for Disabled 
People
15 Early implementation; long-term impacts; cost:benefit analysis; organisation, operation and impacts of 
the Job Broker service; surveys of eligible population; employer survey; evaluation of Personal Adviser 
Service Pilots; evaluation of Personal Innovative Schemes pilots
WorkSTEP 6 Customer survey; use of a distance-travelled approach; modernisation funds; design, delivery and 
performance; user and provider views of desirable outcomes
Pathways to Work 26 Participant experiences; influence of outcome-based contracting regime; impact of participation on 
employment, earnings and self-reported health; mental health; referral practices; JCP-provider liason; 
cost: benefit analysis; in-work support; sanctions regime; Job Preparation Premium; Return to Work 
Credit; impact of Pathways on under 25s
Job Retention and 
Rehabilitation Pilots
5 Impact; participant experiences; employment management of long-term sickness absence
Current programmes
Work Choice 2 General evaluation based on fieldwork with providers and JCP staff (but not participants) considering 
design; contracting; service provision; performance.
Work Programme – 
IB/ESA Groups
5 No specific evaluations of ESA/IB payment groups, but considered in several evaluations looking at: 
commissioning model; procurement; supply chain; financing; delivery; participant experienced based on 
two participant surveys
Source: Department for Work and Pensions (2013c)
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Table 8/3: DWP research projects on issues around return-to-work for sick and disabled people, 2006-2013
Research title (explanation) Year
Causes of lower satisfaction from DWP customers with a long-term illness or disability 2010
Programmes to promote employment for disabled people: Lessons from the United States 2008
Differential pricing in contracted out employment programmes: Review of international evidence 2009
Mental health and employment (Results of a survey with employers and people with experience of moving in and out of work from/to
IB).
2008
What works for whom? A review of evidence and meta-analysis for the Department for Work and Pensions 2007
 Economic and social costs and benefits to employers of retaining, recruiting and employing disabled people and/or people with health 
conditions or an injury: A review of the evidence 
2006
Disabled working age benefits claimants survey (General survey of disabled claimants of the principal working-age benefits) 2013
Mental health in context: the national study of work-search and wellbeing (Survey of needs of JSA claimants with mental health 
conditions) 
2012
Source:  (Department for Work and Pensions, 2013c)
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Recent UK government's enthusiasm for so-called evidence-based policy (EVP) has 
been a subject of frequent discussion and critique, not least in welfare-to-work policy, 
see, for example, Robinson (2000) on the mixing of evidence and pre-determined 
policy in the design of the New Deal for Young People and Davies (2008) on the 
ignoring of evidence of problems with outcome-based contracting by New Labour 
governments. Whilst this is not the place to outline these critiques, the evidence 
presented here seems to largely confirm these criticisms. UK governments seemed, in 
the earlier 2000s, to be genuinely open to the possibility of distinctive and innovative 
approaches to helping sick and disabled claimants. This is reflected in the trialling of a 
number of different designs of Pathways to Work, for example, and the range of 
different types of support within Pathways itself. An emergent theme throughout this 
chapter, however, is that over time there has been a subsuming of ALMP for sick and 
disabled claimants under a broader welfare-to-work agenda, and the same appears to 
apply to the use of evidence. Post Pathways policy, for example, has systematically 
ignored a range of positive outcomes of Pathways in the rush to implement the Work 
Programme, to the extent of misrepresenting the purpose of the Condition 
Management Programme in order to justify abolishing it (see section 8.2.1).
8.1.5 Resource commitment
Expenditure for the UK was obtained through a Freedom of Information request to the
DWP statistical division (see Table 8/4 below and Appendix A2 for full request). The 
reply provided data for all relevant programmes from 2007/8 to 2012/13. The spend per
year up until the advent of the current programmes shows no clear trend, but 
fluctuates between £357m and £456m. As expected, given that Work Programme does 
not take as many ESA claimants as Pathways and the stopping of funding to Remploy 
factories, expenditure tails off to below £300m65 after 2011. Considered alone, this 
seems like a significant commitment of resources.  The current government in 
particular has been at pains to emphasise its budgetary commitment to specialist 
services for the sick and disabled non-employed: specialist disability employment 
services were the only part of DWP expenditure to be ring-fenced from cuts. Spending
earmarked for Work Choice, Remploy, Access-to-Work and some smaller schemes to a 
total of £320m was protected for five years from 2010 (see Appendix A3 for FOI 
65 Expenditure dips below the ringfenced £320m as there are some items of expenditure within that 
which I do not include as they are not activation expenditure. 
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request regarding the specialist disability expenditure ringfence).
However, some context is needed here.  Firstly, it is important to remember that in the
period covered by the data, the introduction of the ESA-WRAG group and the re-
assessment of IB claimants onto ESA means that there were steep year-on-year 
increases in the number of claimants expected to ready themselves for and seek work. 
By the end of 2013/14, for example,  the ESA-WRAG group had grown to 533,49066 and
so expenditure does not appear to have increased with the number of claimants newly
expected to seek work.  Indeed, one would expect to see much higher spending on 
Work Choice given these potential new participants if referrals to Work Choice were 
not capped.  
Secondly, as with Denmark, it is possible to view spending on activation in the 
context of spending on incapacity benefits and on activation cross all groups.  Graph 
8/1 shows that spending on activation for sick and disabled claimants is only 2%-3% of 
spending on benefits for the same claimants.  Expressed as a percentage of total ALMP
spending across all groups, again specialist service and programme spending is low: 
below 10% for all of the period for which data is available.
66  DWP ESA Tabulation Tool, http://tabulation-tool.dwp.gov.uk/100pc/esa/tabtool_esa.html, 
Selections: Analysis – Caseload (thousands); Row – Time Series; Column – Phase of ESA claim; 
Susbet: None. Figure is for May 2014.
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Table 8/4: Expenditure (£) on UK specialist disability and sickness employment measures, 2007/8 – 2013/14
Programme 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/1467 2007-13
Residential Training Colleges 17,085,498 17,692,415 17,767,988 18,229,214 15,643,284 14,581,902 13,200,000 114,200,301
Blind Homeworker Scheme 1,416,280 407,763 278,356 532,580 117,027 381 200,000 2,952,387
Pathways-to-Work (Excl Provider-led) 59,661,742 90,973,521 93,356,258 94,531,980 37,687,611 28,233,863 25,200,000 429,644,975
Provider-led Pathways-to-Work 10,325,088 99,134,367 84,465,155 88,145,037 8,805,432 80,642 0 290,955,721
Disability Employment Advisors 91,558 50,940 46,262 44,609 2,988 1,082,800 1,400,000 2,719,157
WorkSTEP 66,270,544 66,567,121 66,788,812 40,772,051 2,363,327 -96,12268 0 242,665,733
Work Preparation 10,579,945 11,106,638 11,221,359 8,979,410 20,278 -15,063 0 41,892,567
Remploy Resource Grants 191,840,000 173,500,00 117,230,000 172,780,000 195,090,000 104,797,675 82,800,000 1,038,037,675
Work Choice 0 0 0 32,159,407 78,513,189 82,836,130 85,900,000 279,408,726
Work Programme (ESA Payment Groups only) 0 0 0 0 31,058,959 58,791,078 74,900,000 164,750,037
Flexible Support Fund (Sick/disabled customers only) 0 0 0 0 2,123,210 3,462,447 1,100,000 6,685,657
Total 357,270,655 459,432,765 391,154,190 456,174,288 371,425,305 293,755,733 284,700,000 2,613,912,936
Source:  FOI request to DWP (Reproduced in Appendix A2)
67 Non-rounded figures for 2013/14 were not provided.
68 Negative numbers indicate recovered expenditure after the closure of a programme
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Graph 8/1: Total UK expenditure on Specialist ALMP as a percentage of expenditure on incapacity-related benefits, 2007/8-2012/13
Source:  Specialist ALMP data – FOI request to DWP (Reproduced in Appendix A2). Benefits data –  Department for Work and Pensions (2015a), Incapacity Benefits tab, Row 54
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Graph 8/2: Total UK expenditure on Specialist ALMP as a percentage of total expenditure on ALMP, 2007/8-2011/1269
Source:  Specialist ALMP data – FOI request to DWP (Reproduced in Appendix A2).  Overall  ALMP data –  OECD. SocEx Detailed database. Options – Source: Public, Branch: 
Active Labour Market Programmes, item 826.10.6.0.0.0 Country: United Kingdom http://stats.oecd.org/BrandedView.aspx?oecd_bv_id=socx-data-en&doi=data-00167-en#  
69 Data for overall expenditure is not available for 2012/13 and 2013/14. Data has not yet been published by OECD SocEx or Eurostat's LMP database. Expenditure for these 
years is available in DWP's Annual Report and Accounts 2014/15 (DWP 2015b), but non-programme expenditure (e.g. JCP expenditure) is aggregated into the category of 
Operational Delivery. Desegregating ALMP expenditure from this is beyond the £600 limit set by the Freedom of Information Act 2000.
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This very much coincides with comments made by almost all of the current and 
former DWP interviewees on the nature of the department's financial commitment.  
Several argued that the DWP has been risk-averse in terms up-front investment on 
programmes for sick and disabled claimants:
If you are talking about a serious strategy to make inroads into the IB stock – about 100,000 
people – you're looking at about £500m, based on the £5000 per job70 figure we had for NDDP, 
and more really, as you move beyond the volunteers.  That scale of investment was never 
going to be there. There is tendency to look for transformational change for marginal 
investment. It's a bit optimistic to think you can spend a few hundred quid on a few 
interviews and get outcomes worth thousands of pounds. If you want to make these major 
changes, you need to think about investing huge amounts of money and giving it time.
DWP adviser on disability employment, interview September 2012
Comparing the programmes operating in the period of interest substantiates the idea 
that the commitment to fund programmes has declined over time, see Table 8/5, below.
NDDP, Work Preparation Programme and Pathways (assuming participation in all 
interviews and CMP) cost between £1200 and £2000 per referral, with substantially 
higher funding per referral on the supported and sheltered schemes.  For Work 
Programme, the figure is £789 per claimant71. Even accounting for the fact that 
spending this low was unlikely to have been the DWP's intention – Centre for Social 
and Economic Inclusion (2014) estimate that the WP Invitation to Tender was based 
on an assumption of £1170 – it is a notable decrease on previous schemes.  Regarding 
Supported Employment, the average cost of Work Choice is substantially lower than 
WorkSTEP, which gives credence to the claims made by interviewees presented later 
on in the chapter that there was an element of cost-control in the switch between the 
two programmes.  
70 The per referral figure is £1289 (see Table 8/5 below).
71   Calculated thus: All types of ESA/IB claimants represent 17% of total WP attachments (DWP 
tabulation tool) at December 2014. Total cost of WP to March 2014: £1.372bn (DWP 2014f). 17% of 
£1.372bn = 233,240,000. Total number of ESA/IB participants to March 2014: 233,290. 233,240,000 / 
233,290 = £789 per claimant. Although this may seem like a crude method, these figures are very close 
to those of Centre for Social and Economic Inclusion (2014), p.27; IPPR North (2014), p.12 and National 
Audit Office (2014), p.54. Similarly, whilst the method (dividing the total yearly cost by the number of 
referrals in that year) used to get the figures in Table 8/5, below, might seem rough-and-ready, they are 
in fact very close to other sources that have had privileged access to DWP accounts data. Compare, for 
example, the Provider-led Pathways to Work figure of £560 to that for the same in National Audit Office
(2014), p.54, of £600. The £40 difference is likely to stem from the fact that the former is for one year 
only and the latter is for the whole scheme.
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This hesitancy in committing large amounts of up-front funding appears to stem from 
a doubt, seemingly instilled by the failure of Pathways, that such programmes do not 
offer value for money, especially when compared to benefits reforms:
A […] perspective came from the Treasury which was always there below the surface, 
but never explicit, that ultimately there was no return for this investment.  There was a 
process called PVP, Public Value Programmes, where the Treasury asked departments to 
set out the costs and benefit of everything they spent their money on – it was part of the 
early stages of fiscal consolidation under the previous [Brown] government – and there 
was a very clear understanding that labour market policies for JSA clearly work, but the 
economic value of intervening for people on ESA/IB, people with health conditions, is 
not proven, so I think the Pathways stuff did massively undermine that. I think that in 
many ways it is more efficient to just try and reduce the amount of people on benefit in 
the first place […] If your objective is to reduce the number of people on benefit stop 
them getting in there, wait for them to leave of their own accord, or die and have a 
programme to support people on the margins, you’ll get the numbers down.  
Senior DWP official, interview May 2012
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Table 8/5: UK specialist employment programmes' cost per referral 
Programme Number referred/
participating72 
Total Expenditure (£) Cost per referred 
referral/participant   (£)
Data from year
Pre-210 Programmes
New Deal for Disabled People 242,000* 312,000,000 1289     2001-07
WorkSTEP 5700 66,788,812 11,717 2009/10
Work Preparation Programme 6900 11,221,359 1626 2009/10
Jobcentre Plus-led Pathways to Work 
[Condition Management only]
31,060 25,000,000 804 2008/09
Provider-led Pathways to Work 150,660 84,465,155 560 2009/10
Remploy Supported Enterprises 2800* 63,000,00073 22,500 2009/10
Residential Training Colleges 840 17,767,988 21,152 2009/10
Post-2010 Programmes
Work Choice 27,280 85,900,000 3148 2013/14
Work Programme 99,200 74,900,000 755 2012/13
Sources: Expenditure data from Table 8/4 above and referral data from Table 8/6 below, except: RTCs and Remploy Supported Enterprises – Sayce (2011), p.110 for Remploy 
and p.113 for RTCs). 
NDDP –  National Audit Office (2006), p.6
72 Figures are for number of referrals to the scheme, unless indicated by an asterisk. It was not possible to get a full set of referral nor enrollment figures, and so a mix has had 
to suffice. This is not ideal because, depending on the length of the scheme and outflow, they might be quite different. For schemes where participants stay for some time, e.g. 
Work Programme and Work Choice – using a referral figure is likely to overstate the average spent per person.
73 This figure does not match that in Table 8/4 as this is for the RSE budget only. The 8/4 figure is for all Remploy funding.
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At the same time, the increase in resources to deal with the impact of the 
economic downturn appears to have directed funding away for sick and disabled 
claimant schemes:
Nobody has actually said ‘this comes out at the expense of scrapping schemes for disabled people’
but you have to think that if we hadn’t been spending all that money introducing new initiatives 
on helping the short term, and particularly youth, unemployed, then there might have been more 
space.
DWP Official, Interview January 2012
8.1.6 Political commitment: conclusions
The individual stories about the scope of activation, building institutional and 
specialist capacity, steering activation and expenditure demonstrate broadly 
similar patterns about the UK central government's political commitment to 
activation for sick and disabled non-employment benefit claimants, a pattern 
which has two distinct phases.
The feeling amongst policymakers at the start of the period of interest in 
the middle of the last decade appears to have been that large numbers of 
claimants of incapacity benefits could and should be re-engaged in jobseeking by 
enforcing attendance at a set of interviews which would then act as gateway to a 
range of general and specialist support they could be encouraged to use on a 
voluntary basis, and that this would drive significant numbers of work entries. 
Alongside this would sit alternative arrangements for those requiring sheltered or
supported employment. This was backed by more investment than there there 
had ever been previously and, at least initially, investment in building the PES's 
specialist knowledge and capacity. 
The apparent failure of this approach appears to have led the UK 
government to revise downwards their expectations of what can be gained 
politically and fiscally from such an approach and thus what should be invested 
politically and financially in the first place. The shift from Pathways and the 
various smaller programmes that went alongside it to Work Programme and 
Work Choice was said by several DWP interviewees to represent a shift 
downwards in both the size and nature of the policy commitment, and in respect 
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of the latter, the subsuming of a specific effort to get sick and disabled claimants 
into active measures and then into employment within a broader activation 
strategy focused on job outcomes of any type of claimant.
As well as taking fewer participants – the issue of size and access is 
looked at in detail later – the investment per referral becomes substantially lower
over time. Parallel to this has been a shift in the nature of what government is 
prepared to do for this group of claimants: away from the development, design 
and operation of specialist support towards a commitment to provide incentives 
for these processes to develop beyond the aegis of the government and PES.  This 
is not easily characterised as stronger or weaker commitment, but it certainly 
does have an impact on the institutionalisation of activation in a number of ways,
as the later sections of this chapter explain.
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8.2 The Activation offer: activation services offered to sick and 
disabled benefit claimants
Unlike in the Danish case, where most of the activation programmes continue 
throughout the period of interest, the same period (2006/07-2013/14) spans the 
operation of two broads sets of programmes. New Deal for Disabled People, the Work 
Preparation Programme, WorkSTEP and Pathways to Work were all in operation by 
2007 and ended in 2010 or 2011. There were also sheltered training colleges funded by 
DWP but operated independently and sheltered employment places, operated 
indirectly by DWP through Remploy74. These were replaced by two successor 
contracted-out programmes, Work Choice (in 2010) and the Work Programme (2011), 
with non-contracted provision being delivered in-house as the Jobcentre Plus offer, 
with some provision being phased out entirely. It is therefore helpful to split the 
following discussion into two halves. This also provides a natural framework with 
which to assess if there has been a change over time in the type and scope of support 
that has been offered.
8.2.1 Pre 2010/2011:  Sheltered Employment, Residential Training Colleges, 
WorkSTEP, Work Preparation and Pathways to Work
Sheltered Employment and Training: Remploy Sheltered Enterprises and Residential 
Training Colleges
Starting from those with the greatest distance from the open labour market and 
needing sheltered employment or training, DWP funded Remploy factories and 
Residential Training colleges, with about 3000 and 800 places, respectively (see Table 
8/6, below).  Until 2013, Remploy operated a network of factories offering sheltered 
employment to people with severe disabilities. The employment offered was mainly 
manual and traditional in nature, including bookbinding and furniture manufacturing.
DWP funding supported 2800 places in 2009, at a cost of over £20,000 per place, per 
year (Sauce, 2011). Given that the factories did not make a profit and that employees 
often did not have sufficient work to do, the DWP were no longer willing to fund 
74 These continue to operate but DWP funding was ceased in 2015 and 2013, respectively. They are 
included in the former group as their funding was slated for elimination at the same time as the 
closure of previous programmes.
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them and, after a broadly negative account of their value in the Sayce Review of 
Specialist Disability Employment Support (Sayce, 2011) most were closed in 2012 and 
2013. There was also a broadly-shared (but not unanimous) opinion amongst DPOs 
that the Remploy factory model was outdated (it had emerged out of WWII as a 
source of employment for injured soldiers) and isolated disabled people from 
mainstream employment. 
 Similarly, Residential Training Colleges (RTCs) provide a range of vocational 
courses and personal support and care in a residential setting and DWP funded 840 
places at 9 colleges in 2009/10. As with the Remploy factories, however, the low 
outflow into jobs (230 jobs in 2009/10) and high cost – £18m in total and £78,00 per job
(Sayce, 2011) – was considered highly inefficient and the Sayce report recommended 
that direct funding should cease. A later Independent Advisory Panel report, however, 
recommended continuing to fund RTCs and at the end of the period of interest, they 
looked to have been given a reprieve75.
Supported Employment: WorkSTEP 
The UK's supported employment programme from 2001 to 2010 was WorkSTEP. 
Replacing the Supported Employment Programme (SEP). WorkSTEP providers had to 
aim to progress 10% of participants into mainstream employment within one year and 
30% within two years (Department for Work and Pensions, 2006).  It aimed to develop 
and improve employability; encourage personal development and promote 
independence; meet the needs of disabled people facing the most significant barriers 
to employment, and enable individuals to work effectively in a job and support them 
and their employers. Compared to SEP, which relied on job subsidies, there was an 
emphasis on moving away from subsidies to providing individual support.  Perhaps 
surprisingly, although WorkSTEP was marketed as a specialist programme for 
claimants with complex employment barriers, the criteria for WorkSTEP eligibility 
stated that participants should be 'job ready' and be able to enter employment within 8
75 Direct funding of RTCs will end in September 2015.  Instead, RTCs were invited in early 2015 to bid 
to provide a new Specialist Employability Support (SES) programme.  SES will get £13m funding per
year to help 1700 claimants, with 6 providers expected to source additional funding.  Four of these 
will support people with all kinds of disabilities, one for people with visual impairment and one for 
those with hearing impairment.  SES is split into two sub-programmes. SES is intensive, end-to-end 
provision for those most in need of support and SES Start Back is aimed at participants who can 
take part in Work Choice or Work Programme, but who need extra support first (DWP 2015b)
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weeks (ibid).  As a result, there appears to have considerable variation in the 
understanding of Jobcentre Plus advisers and providers in what kind of claimants was 
eligible for the programme, and thus in referral practice, an issue which recurred in 
the Work Choice successor programme.
General support: Pathways-to-Work
After the apparent success of the New Deal for Disabled People, the DWP began to 
look at extending a similar kind of support to the greater part of the IB population, 
and this resulted in Pathways to Work. Pathways consisted of a core of six usually 
compulsory work-focused interviews for new claimants of IB – and ESA WRAG 
claimants after the introduction of ESA. These were held over the first 12 – initially 
eight – months of the claim. Voluntarily, the claimant could then access additional 
support – including the Condition Management Programme (CMP), which was 
designed to help claimants manage their disability or health condition in an 
employment context – or a range of other programmes, and a £40 Return to Work 
Credit (RTWC) paid for the first 12 months of employment to programme leavers 
earning less than £16,000 annually. Existing IB claimants could also volunteer to take 
part in PtW.
Pathways was trialled in 2003/4 in 7 Jobcentre Plus districts and then extended to a 
further 14 in three waves in 2005 and 2006. From 2007 it was extended nationally but 
delivered by contracted providers76. Pathways was the biggest employment 
programme for sick and disabled claimants, with 2.39m going through the programme,
though around 500,000 of these took part more than once (see Table 8/9, section 8.3). 
Evaluations estimated that the programme could raise job entries by 25% but this 
projection was based on claimants who inquired about claiming IB, and not those who
claimed it and were actually registered on the programme (House of Commons 
Committee of Public Accounts, 2010). This led to overly optimistic expectations of the 
potential impact of Pathways, which appears to have been relatively minimal, at least 
in terms of job outcomes. Evaluations of the programme when fully rolled-out showed
that claimants on Pathways were not more likely to enter employment than those not 
76  Hence, most data exists for Provider-led Pathways and Jobcentre Plus-led separately and some 
caution must be exercised drawing conclusion about Pathways to Work as a whole, as it was 
operated in effect as two separate programmes. Due to the nature of the contracts, fairly limited 
data is available for the former.
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taking part (Knight, et al., 2013) 
Due to the 'Black Box' nature of the contracts, information on what services Provider-
led Pathways participants received in addition to WFIs is relatively limited.  Support 
offered appears to have been of a fairly generic nature, with an emphasis on help with 
job search, applications and CV writing, though there were some examples job-
specific training courses, such as on IT and health and safety (Tennant, Kotecha & 
Rahim, 2012)
The Condition Management Programme is worth looking at it more detail as it is the 
first example of health-related support being offered to claimants experiencing health 
issues as part of an employment programme in the UK. The UK is unusual in never 
having had a rehabilitation scheme, whereby employment services and health-focused
support are provided together.  It first tested this approach in the form of a 
randomised control trial between 2004 and 2006 – the Job Retention and 
Rehabilitation Pilots (Farrell et al 2006), whereby claimants were offered health 
treatment (including psychotherapy and physiotherapy) or a workplace intervention 
(an ergonomic assessment, for example), or a combination of both. 
          Whilst CMP was delivered in part by the NHS, it is important to point out here 
is that it was not a health treatment programme per se and did not, unlike JRRP, offer 
health services.  As the name suggests, participants were offered advice and guidance 
in becoming aware of their condition and being able to manage it in everyday life, 
including in the workplace.  Given that mental health conditions are the single biggest
health condition or disability experienced by IB claimants, it is somewhat surprising 
that measures focusing on helping claimants manage their mental health condition 
were largely absent for the period of interest, present in part in the form of CMP. 
Participants with mild to moderate mental health conditions were one of the three 
target groups, along with people with musculoskeletal and cardiovascular conditions, 
but mental health support appears to have been limited to behaviour-modification 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT)-type approaches, rather than more intensive 
treatment: typical courses offered support around breathing techniques and advice on 
improving personal and employment relationships (Nice & Davidson, 2010). Educating
claimants on how how to practically manage their physical problems and managing 
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their pain appear to be as far as CMP got in offering physical health support. Some 
providers offered general CMPs that did not focus specifically on one of the three 
groups of conditions (ibid): these were typically support around sleep and routine, 
healthy living and working practices, motivational strategies, and so on. There were 
not any requirements around the training of CMP staff. Some providers used primarily
clinically-qualified staff (community nurses and occupational therapists, for example) 
whilst others used both clinically-trained and untrained staff (ibid).
        The fate of CMP tells us a lot about the changing agenda around this time. A 
'lessons learned' summary of CMP produced by the DWP77 (Randall & Department for 
Work and Pensions, 2011)  argued that it represented poor value for money because it 
did not have an employment effect.  As the same document points out, however, CMP 
was meant as ancillary support alongside the main Pathways interventions, rather 
than being aimed at increasing inflows into employment specifically. See also Lindsay 
& Dutton (2013) for a fuller account of this. Another aspect of the demise of CMP is 
that it appears to have become lost in the move to the black box, provider-led system 
represented by the Work Programme and Work Choice:
CMP was just a toe in the water in terms of getting properly into the health side of the IB 
issue and it was really just an add-on to what DWP already doing around Pathways, but it 
was pretty promising all the same. It was assistance to help them manage their conditions 
rather than actually treat them, but the positive evaluations showed what you could achieve if
they kept going down that route.  The problem was that when the feedback came back from 
CMP they had already started to move into the whole single employment programme and 
black box process that eventually resulted in the Work Programme, and so a separate defined 
health component got lost in that.  Obviously we and probably the DWP would expect that 
providers with ambitions around the hardest to help would be having something like what we 
did with CMP, but that's up to them and it doesn't look like it is featuring in any big way.
Chief researcher, leading DPO, inteview December 2013
This is corroborated by the DWP 'lessons learned' report looking at CMP, which 
makes a similar point:
The decision about the future of CMP was initially tied up with the wider decision about the 
future of/replacement for Pathways to Work. It was then reviewed under the Coalition 
Government’s decision to fold existing provision into the Work Programme. As the Work 
Programme was to be delivered under the ‘Black Box’ model, providers could not be mandated
to provide specific support, so there was never a contractual obligation to deliver CMP  or 
similar within the Work Programme.
77 I am grateful to Colin Lindsay for facilitating access to this.
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Randall & Department for Work and Pensions (2011) p,13
Work Trials: Work Preparation Programme
Despite running for many years – from the mid-1990s until 2010 – not very much is 
known about the Work Preparation Programme (WPP) as it has only rarely been 
evaluated – indeed, many interviewees from both DWP and DPOs were not aware of 
it. WPP was meant to allow sick and disabled claimants to try employment through a 
work placement and support alongside it for 6 – 18 weeks without losing benefit 
eligibility (European Observatory of Working Life, 2009). Evaluations of WPP have 
been mixed to negative, with criticism directed at the low levels of additional support; 
work trials being too short in duration and poor effectiveness (Riddell, Banks, & 
Wilson, 2002). As with some of the other programmes running at the same time, there 
was a wide range of interpretations about the WPP's  audience and purpose, but over 
time it appears to have moved from being open to any sick or disabled claimant of any
benefit towards those most likely to enter employment within 13 weeks (Roulstone & 
Barnes, 2005), with 30% of participants expected to be in work within 13 weeks 
(European Observatory of Working Life, 2009). Accordingly – and as is case with 
Work Choice currently (see below) – there appeared to be an element of screening out 
of harder-to-help claimants (Roulstone & Barnes, 2005).  That would explain the steep 
drop-off of IB/IS/ESA/SDA participants and the increase of JSA claimants the WPP 
caseload figures show between 2006/07 to 2009/10– 32% to 17% and 35% to 50% of the 
total, respectively (Freedom of Information Request to DWP, reproduced in Appendix 
A6). Although there was official advice to the contrary, it appears to have been used as
a feeder programme to other programmes, including WorkSTEP and Access to Work78 
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2006). 'Rationalisation' of WPP (along with 
78 Access to Work (AtW) is the other main employment-related initiative for disabled people. It 
supports disabled people to take up and retain paid employment by helping with payments for aids,
adaptations and support so disabled people can work effectively. Support can include specialist 
equipment, help with travel, support workers and communication support. It is provided where the 
employee requires support or adaptations beyond those 'reasonable adjustments' which an 
employer is legally obliged to provide under the Equality Act 2010. Access to Work also provides 
advice to employers on reasonable adjustments. It was launched in June 1994 and is delivered by 
Jobcentre Plus. Access to Work is available to people in full-time work (16 or more hours a week), 
people undertaking permitted work (low hours work while still claiming out-of-work benefits), and 
to people undertaking apprenticeships or Work Trials arranged through Jobcentre Plus. Given that 
AtW is primarily about workplace accessibility, it is not considered an ALMP for the purposes of 
this research. It does, however, form part of the broader policy context for ALMP for disabled 
people – regarded as a successful programme, money saved from cutting funding to the sheltered 
and supported employment offered by Remploy and RTCs was redirected to AtW.
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WorkSTEP and others) appears to have been considered at several points in the 2000s 
(ibid), but this wasn't done until 2010, when WPP; WorkStep and the Job Introduction 
Scheme were merged in the formation of Work Choice.                                                   
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Table 8/6: Employment programmes for or accepting sick and disabled claimants, number of starts during last year or latest year, length and 
target group
Scheme Type Total yearly starts










~2800 N/A Long-term unemployed adults with moderate to severe disabilities and serious health 












Principally IB claimants with a disability who are not immediately ready for independent 
work and require sustained support   (Department for Work and Pensions, 2006).




40,010 8182 Typically 1-3 
months









Disabled people claiming any benefit likely to achieve an employment outcome within 13 





295,840 6 WFIs within
6 months. 
All IB/ESA applicants except those with severe conditions or identified as being able to 
return to work without assistance (Adam et al 2008)
79 Or other year, indicated in brackets
80 Sources as for Target Group, unless other indicated.
81 New Deal for Disabled People became part of Jobcentre Plus-led Pathways to Work in 2006 put continued to provide services until the end of Pathways in 2011.
82 No start figures available. This figure is the programme size in May 2007 minus size in May 2006.


























5 WFIs over 5 
months























Claimant of any benefit who needs cannot be met through mainstream support, 
workplace adjustments or mainstream programmes; who experience complex work-
related support needs arising primarily from disability; need support in work as well as 
help finding work, and who will be ready for supported employment within 6 months 
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2015c).
84 Figure is for penultimate year. DWP Disability and Work Division 2010
85 Choices data for Provider-led Pathways to Work was not made available. If Choices participation was of the same level as Jobcentre Plus-led Pathways (16% of all 
participants), it would have been ~7700















N/K Continual. 2 
offers per 
year.














~840 (2011) N/A Long-term unemployed adults with moderate to severe disabilities and serious health 
conditions who are unable to access suitable local training (Griffiths, Durkin, & Mitchell, 
2007)
Sources: Participant numbers. Mandatory FE and Training – Department for Work and Pensions & Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2015), p.13; Work Choice – 
Department for Work and Pensions (2014c), p.11; Provider-led Pathways – (Knight, et al., (2013), p.83 and DWP Disability and Work Division (2011b), p.13 and 17; Jobcentre Plus-
led Pathways and Choices DWP Disability and Work Division (2010a, 2011a), p. 9, 14/p.9,13; Work Preparation Programme – Freedom of Informatiom Request to DWP 
(Reproduced in Appendix A6); WorkSTEP – FOI Request to DWP (Reproduced in Appendix A.4 ); NDDP – NDDP Tabulation tool: http://tabulation-
tool.dwp.gov.uk/new_deals/nddp/live/dp_p/tabtool_dp_p.html; Work Programme –  As for Table 8/7, below.
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Graph 8/3: Referrals to UK programmes, 2006-7 – 2013/14
Sources: As for Table 8/4, above
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8.1.2 Post 2010/2011:  The Work Programme; Work Choice and the Jobcentre 
Plus Offer
The Work Programme
Upon taking office in May 2010, the new government decided to end Pathways in 
favour of rolling it into the new Work Programme, which occurred in June 2011.  The 
Work Programme is a unified employment programme accessible by claimants on any 
out-of-work benefit which replaced Pathways to Work, the remaining elements of the 
New Deals, and the Flexible New Deal programme for Jobseekers. The programme is 
delivered entirely on a contracted basis by external providers, with the Jobcentre Plus 
network providing only pre-Work Programme support in the first months of 
employment. Two to three Prime Providers (PPs) operating in 18 Contract Package 
Areas (CPAs) across Great Britain hold contracts for five years to provide employment
support to the claimants referred to it in return for an initial payment (an Attachment 
Fee) and further payments when claimants enter employment and, in contrast to 
previous programmes, retain it for a specified period of time. Claimants are assigned 
randomly between a CPA's set of providers on a random basis. Claimants can remain 
on WP for 24 months. 
When and on what conditions claimants access the programme and the 
payment they attract depends on the benefit they are paid. ESA-WRAG claimants are 
required to take part as a condition of their benefit. ESA-Support claimants can access 
the programme on a voluntary basis. Successful work with claimants with a current or
previous ESA/IB claim usually pays more than for JSA claimants (see section 8.4 for a 
fuller discussion of the payments system), with ESA claimants who have previously 
claimed IB and voluntarily accessing the programme attracting the highest potential 
payments. Within minimal other controls over providers, the payments system is the 
main way provider behaviour in terms of the engagement is managed. The Work 
Programme was commissioned according to the DWP's 2008 Commissioning Strategy 
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2008a) one of the main principles of which was 
that innovation and quality in employment service provision would benefit from 
minimal prescription from government, leaving providers to operate in a 'black box' to
offer employment support in the way they choose. As a result, providers are mainly 
accountable for their outcome targets – poorer performing providers can have their 
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flow of claimants reduced and eventually have their contract terminated for 
underperformance – and their self-designed Minimum Provision Levels (MPLs). 
Section 8.2.3 on what services are promised to claimants and the extent to 
which they constitute a right to support; 8.3 on access to WP and 8.4 on managing 
providers to help sick and disabled claimants go into more detail about how sick and 
disabled claimants have fared on the Work Programme in comparison to previous 
programmes.
Work Choice 
Work Choice is the UK's current supported employment programme. Given that it was
designed under the previous Labour government87, Work Choice operates outside the 
Work Programme framework (indeed, it is the only programme to do so), though it 
was contracted under the same 2008 Commissioning Framework.  It is aimed at 
“ensuring a greater focus on disabled people with the highest support needs who 
cannot best be served by Jobcentre Plus mainstream provision” and “people with 
learning disabilities and mental health conditions” in particular (Department for Work
and Pensions, 2009, cited in Department for Work and Pensions 2013a, p.41)
Accordingly, Work Choice is more closely specified than the Work Programme,
with four modules offering gradually increasing levels of support to move the 
claimant towards and then into supported and subsequently unsupported 
employment. Claimants at the supported employment stage may be employed either 
by a mainstream employer or in a supported business. The contracting arrangements 
differ somewhat from the Work Programme. Support is delivered on both a contracted
basis (by prime and sub-contracted providers in 28 CPAs, in a manner similar to WP) 
and a non-contracted basis, through Remploy, a long-standing non-departmental 
government body which operates a network of supported businesses. Providers are 
paid a 70% service fee and the remainder through outcome and sustained outcomes 
payments, with an emphasis on sustained unsupported employment (Department for 
Work and Pensions, 2009b).
Work Choice is also different to Work Programme in that the structure of the 
programme and the claimant's movement through it is determined more by DWP than
87 Work Choice had an intended launch date of March 2010, delayed by that year's general election 
(Interview, Work Choice official, July 2012). It was launched by the Coalition government in June 
2010.
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with Work Programme, where the 'Black Box' prevails. Regardless of provider, 
participants go through three stages of support – Work Entry Support; Short to 
Medium Term In Work Support and Longer Term In-Work Support – and, for the first 
two years of the programme, there were prescribed level sof service that providers had
to deliver: 8 hours a week; 8 hours a month and 4 hours a month, respectively 
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2013a).  The types of services to be delivered, 
however, at the discretion of the provider and though the DWP's provider guidance 
gives extensive lists of typical support in way it has not done for Work Programmes, 
these are suggestions only and no mention is made of health-related support. Further, 
the minimum support length requirements were removed in 2012 (Department for 
Work and Pensions, 2013a) and do not appear in the current version of the guidance 
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2015c)
Any unemployed person of working-age and defined as disabled by the 
Equality Act 2010 can be referred to the programme by a Jobcentre Plus Disability 
Employment Adviser (DEA) or a statutory referral organisation (SRO) – an 
organisation that provides a statutory service helping disabled people with high 
support needs consider work – commonly a local NHS service or local education 
authority organisation. 
As with WorkSTEP, there has been some confusion around the purpose and nature of 
the programme.  Whilst it is presented as the core part of the DWP's specialist 
disability employment support, participants were initially expected to be capable of 
the 8 hours activity and to be able to work for 16 hours in supported or unsupported 
employment within six months, later changed to 12 months. Both DPOs and DWP 
DEAs have said that Work Choice is not intended to help claimants with specialist 
needs:
DWP sell it [Work Choice] as a specialist programme, which is a bit misleading.  Yes, it has 
features that are different to the Work Programme that do make it more suitable for users 
with greater needs – the modular approach instead of wanting them in work straight away; 
the bigger service fee that weeds out creaming and parking and the caseloads are much lower.
So the attention you can pay users is a lot more intensive. But I don't think that it's specialist 
in the way that word has been understood historically in this [disability employment] sector.  
That says to me specialist support for users with needs around learning disabilities; around 
severe mental conditions and multiple disabilities. Work Choice isn't that. We have lots of 
member organisations who have experience with providing support around that and we know
251
from them that they aren't being involved in the programme: it's not for the kind of level of 
user need.
Deputy Chief Executive, National Disability Organisation, Interview January 2013
Initially I thought Work Choice was for anybody that needed a great deal of support but I’ve 
changed my mind over time. It’s not for people who need a great deal of support because the 
Work Choice providers don’t really want to work with those because they are going to take a 
lot longer to get into work and probably after six months they won’t have found a job […] I 
think it is aimed at people who are almost job ready, not anybody that’s too far away from the
job market.’
Disability Employment Adviser, quoted in Department for Work and Pensions 
(2013a), p.45
As section 8.3 shows, there is considerable difference between who is accessing Work 
Choice compared to WorkSTEP, which would appear to be consistent with the 
concerns expressed in these two quotes, above, about the nature of and target 
audience for Work Choice.
The Jobcentre Plus Offer 
ESA-WRAG claimants not enrolled on a programme can be offered – and mandated at 
the discretion of their Jobcentre Plus adviser – to support through the Jobcentre Plus 
Offer (JCPO), a PES-based intervention regime running from 2011. It consists of three 
parts: an initial New Joiner WFI with an adviser; ongoing support from the adviser 
and support from a 'Flexible Menu' of support, the different components being Work 
Experience; Skills and Training; Self-Employment advice; Volunteering opportunities 
and Health support. ESA WRAG claimants subject to conditionality must access at 
least two options from the menu every year (Department for Work and Pensions, 
2013e). 
The Flexible Menu of Support appears to be aimed more at JSA than ESA 
claimants – the DWP's own evaluation (ibid) noted that very few ESA claimants were 
offered skills training; work experience or self-employment support, and they appear 
to have been channelled to mainly volunteering opportunities and the health 
measures.  Little detail is available on what health-related support is available through
JCPO, but it appears to be largely advisory and signposting in nature and not access to
specific programmes, as with the case with CMP: “Jobcentre Plus advisers offer 
support and guidance to claimants with health conditions or disabilities […] This can 
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include advice around treatment for drug or alcohol dependencies or health service 
providers who can help with the claimant’s health condition, as well as more basic 
discussion and advice around what jobs claimants feel they can and cannot do.” 
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2013e), p.100
Given that JPO is meant for those not helped through other programmes, it is 
surprising there is not a clear focus on helping claimants improve their readiness for 
work such that they become eligible for them.  In the guidance issued to JCP advisers, 
there is no specific reference to readying claimants for WP participation or assisting 
them to improve their work readiness in order to access WP.  Consequently, the JCPO 
does not appear to have served ESA as well as JSA participants. The former were:
More likely to disagree that the support they received matched their personal needs and 
circumstances, and relatively few were satisfied with the level of contact they had with 
advisers or with the service that Jobcentre Plus offered in helping them find employment. This
is not to say that their needs were wholly overlooked; offers of financial assistance, for 
example, were more commonly received by this group than other ESA claimants. In general, 
however, further adviser support may be required to ensure they maintain confidence during 
their journey through the Offer, and are being signposted and referred to appropriate support 
to help them back into employment. 
Department for Work and Pensions (2013e), p.167
8.2.3 Activation by right?: The legal and regulatory basis of a sick and disabled
claimant's right to activation 
'Rights and responsibilities' has been a familiar refrain in British welfare to work since
the late 1990s (Dwyer, 2002).  In most cases, the 'right' is the right to benefit and the 
'responsibility' is the responsibility to seek work and demonstrate one is doing so by 
taking part in prescribed activities. Employment services thus figure in the 
'responsibilities' part of the equation – offered on the basis that participation in them 
is needed to maintain benefit eligibility – rather than being offered by right.  
Published at the beginning of the period of interest, The Freud Report, however, 
appeared to signal a change. Though it did not say the employment services were a 
right, they were framed as justification for the extension of benefit conditionality to 
incapacity benefits claimants, thus implicitly conceding that the legitimacy of 
conditionality for sick and disabled claimants depends on adequate employment 
support being provided: 
The Government has made a commitment to rights and responsibilities a central feature of 
policy. In return for more support in obtaining employment, it would seem appropriate for the
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state to expect more work-related activity from those on benefit. Recent evidence suggests 
that expecting more from those on incapacity and lone parent benefits, alongside the right 
support, can deliver greatly improved outcomes.
Freud (2007), p.8
The Choices element of Pathways to Work was a movement towards – though not a 
rights-based regime – at least a fairly diverse, clearly stated set of services that 
claimants could choose to access at any point during their participation in the 
programme. Whilst Personal Advisers could refuse to refer the claimant if they felt it 
was not appropriate for them, referrals to Choices were on the whole claimant-led, 
and this was a core value of the programme, recognised by personal advisers and 
claimants (Department for Work and Pensions, 2005).
It is worth noting, however, that the commitment that underpinned support provided 
directly by DWP through Pathways and other programmes is very limited, and does 
not make any mention of access to employment programmes. The DWP Customer 
Charter (Department for Work and Pensions, 2014a) lists some very basic entitlements
around the process of interacting with DWP – staff courtesy towards claimants; 
protection of personal data and access to accurate information – but nothing around 
employment support, something that was noted by a focus group of claimants 
conducted for DWP:
The charter makes no mention of what Jobcentre Plus is perceived to do – help customers find
work. It is included in the ‘sub-drivers’ under ‘Right outcomes reached (including finding 
employment)’ but not explicitly in the Charter itself. Although there is a reason for this – the 
Charter is for the DWP as a whole, not just Jobcentre Plus – to customers it was seen as an 
obvious omission. When compared against their ambitious aspirations for how the service 
could deliver, the feeling was that the Charter lacked specifics, or ‘teeth’ (something that 
would cut through the generalities, such as ‘enthusiastic staff who care and listen’ instead of 
‘staff who listen’). While it might do an acceptable job of supporting a basic level of customer 
service, the charter would find it difficult to improve it. 
Customer Focus (2010), p21
Later programmes appear to be a step back from the minimum support guaranteed, 
albeit apparently only de facto, by Pathways.  As part of their bid for Work 
Programme contracts, providers submitted sets of Minimum Service Delivery 
Standards (MSDS). Winning providers are then managed by DWP Performance 
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Managers on the basis of these, and inspectors check they are being adhered to. 
However, unlike Pathways Choices, which offered access to specific services, most 
MSDSs are very general in nature, and do not offer services relating to health or 
disability (see Box 8/1 and Table 8/7, below). Their vagueness appears to make it hard 
for DWP to hold providers to account and, importantly, providers can change their 
MSDSs mid-way through a contract:
However, Performance Managers felt that some minimum service delivery standards were 
insufficiently specific, measurable or meaningful to enable them to hold providers to account. 
Although it was always agreed that providers could change their minimum service delivery 
standards, the policy intent was that they still needed to be consistent with the delivery model
for which their bid was selected. In some cases, changes were made which, in the opinion of 
DWP officials, were not consistent with the provider’s delivery model. Furthermore, providers
did not always consult their Account Manager to agree changes. This may suggest a need in 
future procurement to provide clearer expectations or guidance before minimum service 
delivery standards are agreed. It also reinforces the need for urgent decisions on the extent to 
which ‘black box’ applies within live running and how flexible providers are permitted to be 
in their amendments to delivery.
Department for Work and Pensions (2013g), p.56
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Box 8/1 Typical Work Programme Minimum Service Delivery Statement 
Reed [CPA 13] 
“*Meet with your personal Employment Adviser within ten days 
*Receive a full assessment of your needs and skills 
*Review your progress with your Adviser at least once every four weeks 
*Receive support to develop a tailored CV and job goals  
*Receive financial advice and support to show how you will be better off working 
*Be able to access e-learning, job search support and vacancies through our online portal  
*Receive support once you are in work, and have access to an Employment Coach after 
your first ten weeks of work  
*Have the opportunity to let us know about your experiences on our programme through 
our      customer surveys  
*Receive a detailed history of your progress if you leave our programme before getting a 
job 
*Delivering Services”
Source: (Department for Work and Pensions, 2013b)
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Details (Health Assessment and Support Only)




Personal Plan 8 13
In-Work Support 11 16
Health/Disability 
Assessment 
2 7 A4E: “Health support: we will assess health as a barrier to working. Those identified as needing 
additional assessment/support will be referred to a specialised health assessment and support to 
develop a health-focused back to work plan.” (p.2)
Maximus: “All customers undertake an assessment with a dedicated […] Health Officer” (p.3)
88 Participants are randomly allocated to providers and several providers operate in each CPA, so all participants in a CPA will not get access to a service stated in the MSDS 
unless all providers in the CPA have it in their statement. Thus, 11/18 may at first sight suggest that 61% of participants have access to Health or Disability-related services, 
but it is likely to be much less than this. Only three CPAs were served entirely by providers offering health/disability support services and/or health/disability assessments: 
CPA 9 (Thames Valley, Hampshire and Isle of Wight – A4E and Maximus); CPA 17 (South Yorkshire – A4E and Serco) and CPA 18 (North East Yorkshire and the Humber – 




 4 11 Serco: “[Your provider will] refer you to one of our specialist providers if you have particular needs, 
such as a health condition or physical disability” (p.18)
G4S: “All Customers have access to specialist Knowledge Bank services. This includes a range of 
support including condition management, occupational health support.” (p.11)
NCG: “We will offer all customers a range of diagnostic interventions dependent upon the 
customers’ requirements, such as Infit psychological intervention.” (p.16)
A4E See above.
Source: Department for Work and Pensions (2013b)
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Crucially, the MSDSs are part of the contract between provider and DWP, not 
between provider and Work Programme participant. They are intended to allow the 
provider to be managed on a contract-wide basis, rather than for any individual 
participant to ensure that they get adequate support.  According to a civil servant 
involved in the design of Pathways, Work Programme participants do not have any 
rights to support, and this can mean that some will get very limited support:
I think a critical point is that there are no centralised minimum standards attached to the 
Work Programme so it entirely depends on what the providers offer.  They have to set their 
own minimum standards and those vary quite widely.  It’s entirely conceivable that somebody
could go through two years of the Work Programme and not really receive the meaningful 
intervention that addresses their barriers to work. Providers will say with justification that 
they can’t afford to do that, they have to get results or they’ll go bust. In employment 
programmes there are no rights: just responsibilities.
Interview, former DWP official, September 2012
A DPO representative made a similar point in the limited minimum standards being to
blame for parking of harder-to-help claimants:
There has been a lot of talk about the funding creaming and parking because of PBR [payment
by results], but you can actually avoid that with some serious minimum standards, whatever 
the funding rules are. If you have some minimum standards that give some basic services to 
everyone and then have DWP spot-checking and mystery shopper kind of checks like they do
with their in-house services, you would still get creaming, but it wouldn't matter as much 
because everyone is getting something.  Creaming isn't an inherently bad thing – it will 
always happen – Jobcentre even have always done it – but you need a basic floor of support 
for everyone so people don't lose out because of it.
Interview, DPO head of strategy, Interview, September 2013
Similar concerns were expressed by the House of Commons DWP Select Committee's 
investigation into Work Programme service standards:
Currently prime providers' Minimum Service Standards vary greatly in detail and 
measurability [sic]. Some Minimum Service Standards are so vague as to permit providers to 
virtually ignore some participants if they so choose. We understand the difficulties of 
establishing a single set of standards which could be applied by all providers but we believe it 
is achievable. For example, it would be perfectly possible for all providers to be required to 
have a face-to-face meeting to assess all participants' needs; to produce an employment action
plan within a certain timeframe; and to have a face-to-face follow-up meeting, also within a 
specific timeframe. We recommend that DWP develop a core set of basic minimum standards 
applicable to all providers, and to which all Work Programme participants are entitled. 
House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee (2013b), p.41, emphasis added
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The situation on Work Choice is more mixed. Whilst DWP does issue a fairly 
extensive list of services it recommends providers should deliver for Module 1, the 
provider guidance documents very explicitly say that these are recommended services
only and “there are no […] minimum levels of support stipulated” (Department for 
Work and Pensions, 2014b, p.4). Guidance for the other two modules does demand a 
minimum level of support in terms of hours (8 hours a month for Module 2 and 4 
hours a month for Modules 3) but again provides lists of recommended services only 
(ibid).  Similarly, whilst WorkSTEP providers were formally inspected for the quality 
of their services by OFSTED (Office for Standards in Education) – key to ensuring the 
quality and appropriateness of the services, according to the British Association for 
Supported Employment (British Association for Supported Employment, 2014) –  
initial plans to have similar external inspection of Work Choice were dropped by the 
time the programme was introduced (Department for Work and Pensions, 2013a). 
Instead, DWP Provider Assurance Teams89 would “extend [their] remit to cover, in a 
light-touch way, some of the quality issues that formed part of external inspections” 
British Association for Supported Employment (2010), p.1.  Although the Black Box 
does not operate in Work Choice as in Work Programme, there does appear to be 
evidence of a similar, parallel change from a monitored, prescribed approach to one 
which is significantly less so.
This seemingly fairly limited notion of participant rights to support is reflected in the 
DWP employment programmes complaints procedure.  There is no specific Work 
Programme or Work Choice complaints mechanism: there is no programme-wide 
sharing or analysis of complaints data and, as with MSDSs, whilst DWP do review 
complaints against providers, they do so on a contract-wide (i.e. not individual basis) 
and do not intervene in cases of poor provision (Department for Work and Pensions, 
2014e). Instead, participants can lodge a complaint with their provider's own internal 
complaints procedure and then escalate it to the Independent Case Examiner (ICE), 
which reviews complaints made against DWP, its agencies and external contractors. 
The highest stage of the complaints procedure is a referral to the Parliamentary and 
Health Ombudsman through the participant's Member of Parliament (Parliamentary 
89 The remit of PATs is primarily contract compliance and financial auditing. 
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and Health Ombudsman, 2014).
From the data extracted from ICE annual reports, it appears difficult for 
participants to complain to ICE90. Given the size of the caseloads the two schemes, the 
number of cases referred seems low – this is likely to have something to do with 
awareness, as only 2 of 18 WP prime providers, Maximus and Rehab Jobfit (Freedom 
of Information Request to DWP91) and 4 of 6 Work Choice providers for which there 
are published complaints procedures92 mention the possibility of complaining to ICE  
– and the majority of cases are not accepted for investigation, apparently because of 
poor understanding and communication by Jobcentre Plus and providers about how 
complaints should be made (Independent Case Examiner, 2013).
90 However, while it may be difficult, it is possible for a disabled participant to take to ICE a case 
against a provider regarding poor service.  The 2013/14 ICE report has a case study of a disabled 
WP participant who was refused a work coach. The participant funded one himself; took his 
complaint to ICE; won and was refunded the cost. 
91 Freedom of Information Request to DWP by What Do They Know? user Frank Zola: 
https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/work_programme_complaints_proced Accessed 
08/08/15. Permanently archived 25/08/15 at web.archive.org by author at: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20150825205830/https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/search/Work
%20Programme%20complaints%20procedures/all 
92 CDG-Wise Ability and Momentum skills refused to release their complaints procedures to me.
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Table 8/8: Complaints to ICE regarding DWP contracted provision, 2011/12-2013/14, 
by Total and Programme  
2011/12 2012/13 2013/14
Total93 Total WP WC Total WP WC
Received 98 316 215 3 277 140 4
Accepted 7 55 62 3 80 60 1
Investigated 1 27 55
Of investigated cases, 
number and % partially 
upheld
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (5.5%)
Of investigated cases, 
number and % fully 
upheld
0 (0%) 0 (0%)) 7 (12.7%)
Source: Independent Case Examiner (2013, 2014); Freedom of Information Request to ICE (Reproduced 
in Appendix A5)
Table 8/9 Complaints to the Parliamentary and Health Ombudsman regarding 
Jobcentre Plus, DWP and Remploy, 2009/10-2013/14
2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14
Received Jobcentre Plus 1274 1036 1083 1313 1094
Department for Work 
and Pensions
81 76 44 81 177
Remploy 0 0 2 2 1
Accepted for 
investigation
Jobcentre Plus 6 5 5 5 12
Source:  Freedom of Information Request to Parliamentary and Health Ombudsman (Reproduced in 
Appendix A7)
93 WP and WC may not sum to Total as the Total includes complaints about other schemes.
262
The question here was whether sick and disabled claimants have a right to activation 
support.  A right to employment services has never had much currency as an idea in 
the UK, despite some official pronouncements in the middle of the last decade linking 
the application of conditionality with the provision of specialist support. Accordingly, 
claimants do not have a right to support enshrined in law, though there are some 
limited elements of a right in UK programmes over the years.  The Choices element of 
Pathways offered claimants access to a wide range of services, some specialist, that 
they could – de facto, though not de jure – refer themselves to. Successor programmes 
appear to be a step back from this, however. Work Choice has some minimum hours 
guarantees, but no stated services. Work Programme providers do have statements of 
Minimum Service Delivery, but these are vague; changeable by the provider and 
difficult to enforce, with only a minority offering specific health or disability-related 
services. Similarly, whilst participants can and do complain about poor specialist 
services, the complaints process is poorly advertised by providers and only a small 
number of cases are formally investigated each year.
8.2.3 Conclusions: The scope and nature of the activation offer 
By way of concluding this chapter, several features of the UK activation offer for sick 
and disabled benefit claimants stand out and are worth highlighting.
Firstly, as is the case with almost all benefit claimants apart from those who 
recently leave prison, the activation offer does not kick-in until the claimant has spent
quite some time on benefit.  If the ESA claimant had previously claimed SSP, 26 weeks
may have already elapsed.  The claimant will then not likely access Work Programme 
until they are deemed ready for employment within 12 months, although they can 
self-refer to Work Choice.  This is a deterioration on Pathways to Work – a common 
theme throughout this chapter – on which an IB claimant was enrolled once their 
claim for IB was accepted. 
A related point here is the apparent lack of clear routes through different types
and levels of support back to employment for groups with different needs.  There is 
limited evidence of an intention to progress claimants who are far from employment 
through some initial introductory support to introduce the idea of returning to 
employment and help to allow them to engage with further support; that further 
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support to allow them to be able to engage with jobsearch activity; and then jobsearch
and labour market activity.  Even the schemes which do have an intention of 
beginning that process – WPP and WorkSTEP and, latterly, Work Choice – have 
paradoxically high bars to participation – requiring participants to be ready for 
employment within relatively short periods of time relative to claimants' employment 
barriers. As has been intimated in this chapter and as is explored in more detail in the 
next – this has appears to have an exclusionary effect that leads to a build-up of a 
large pool of claimants that have relatively limited access to support.
Connected to this is the issue of the narrow and narrowing scope of the ALMP 
offer – judging from the range of support on offer, and the range of claimants 
programme regulations envisage being treated. The mid-late 2000s saw a gradual 
broadening of the support on offer through statutory schemes and a gradual 
progression towards offering some, albeit seemingly fairly limited, health-related 
support to most claimants through CMP. However, with the closure of specialist 
programmes and the removing of the statutory status of programmes like CMP – 
versions of which still operate, but at the behest of providers – the scope of ALMP for 
sick and disabled claimants has clearly narrowed from around 2010 onwards, 
notwithstanding a modest increase in the number of support employment programme 
places. 
This narrowing of the scope of policy in terms of the range of claimants served was, 
according to several of the interviewees, a clear strategy to focus on those claimants 
who had the greatest chance of getting into work and reducing benefits costs:
One of the concerns [with closing specialist schemes] is that you are potentially diverting 
resources from people who are very far from the labour market, and would not get into work 
otherwise, and instead you are spending money on people who are on the cusp of getting a 
job.  The government strategy is that effectively – take money from Remploy factories and 
expand the Access to Work budget that is the trend over the next 3 or 4 years, for the 
foreseeable future.  There is a concern from some of our members – we have specialist 
disability charities such as Scope and Mencap who do a lot of campaigning for disabled people
– […] that resources are being diverted away from those hardest to help to those who are 
fairly easy to help.  DWP are quite frank that the aims of employment programmes are not 
necessarily to help people get into work, it’s to reduce the benefits bill and I have heard quite 
senior people at DWP be quite frank in saying just that.  So speaking from some of our 
members, the campaigning and specialist disability organisations, there is a legitimate concern
that money is being diverted away from very hard to help people.
Employment-related Services Association representative, interview April 2012
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This narrowing of the policy scope is all the more surprising – and relevant to the 
institutionalisation of activation – given that benefits reforms were designed to and 
have significantly increased the number of sick and disabled claimants who are 
expected to be actively seeking work, a significant proportion of them who will have 
very little engagement previously and thus are likely to have the most intractable 
barriers to work. This issue of limited access  – and especially relative to increasing 
conditionality imposed on claimants – is examined in more detail in section 8.4.
The last point to make here is that very limited support is available by right. Access to 
UK programmes have essentially been conditional, rather than rights based.  Access to
CMP and other Choices programmes were seemingly as close to rights-based access as
the UK has ever got as there were no qualifying conditions except having an active IB 
claim – but other schemes have had such requirements. Connected to this is what 
claimants are entitled to once they participate in a programme or scheme with a 
provider or DWP. In both cases, support that is explicitly stated is relatively limited 
and is seemingly difficult to enforce through a complaints process that is not 
seemingly promoted or advertised. 
265
8.3 Sorting and selecting for activation
8.3.1 Mainstreaming and programme integration 
As has been noted earlier in this chapter, one of the most notable changes in the 
approach to activating sick and disabled benefit claimants in the UK has been the 
move from separate specialist employment schemes to the accommodation of 
claimants with specialist support needs on mainstream programmes.  The idea of a 
single employment programme covering all out-of-work benefit claimants became 
steadily more prominent over the 2000s, and there was significant government interest
at the beginning of the period under study (2007-2010). There was an element of this 
thinking in the idea of 'flexible' menus of support proposed by the (never 
implemented) Building on the New Deal white paper (Department for Work and 
Pensions, 2004), and the Flexible New Deal (FND), which combined most existing New
Deal programmes (with the exception of NDDP) into a single scheme. Paul Gregg, the 
author of an independent report (Gregg, 2008) on personalisation in welfare to work 
championed what he called 'multi-client group' contracts for employment programmes
as a way of achieving personalised employment support. This was echoed by the 
suggestion of a single programme for JSA and ESA claimants trailed in DWP's No-one 
written off and Raising Expectations papers in the same year (Department for Work and
Pensions, 2008b, 2008c). This came to fruition as the Personalised Employment 
Programme94 – a rolling together of FND and Pathways – proposed in the Building 
bridges to work white paper (Department for Work and Pensions, 2010a) right at the 
end of Labour's time in government. PEP was meant to decouple the provision of 
activation support from the claimant's benefit status, requiring providers to “deliver 
94 It is worth making note of some of the key features of PEP. Whilst the general idea – a unified 
employment programme serving most long-term unemployed claimants regardless of benefit – is 
the same as the Work Programme, quite a considerable amount of the detail of the running and 
structure of the programme is different. Considering these features of PEP throws into relief some 
of the decisions that were made in designing the Work Programme. As was originally the intention 
with WP (Bivand 2011), PEP would have served all new ESA claimants, not just ESA WRAG 
claimants. There would have been some more specification than WP – four WFIs a year – and the 
regulation and monitoring regime looks like it would have been considerably more interventionist. 
While the 'Black Box' principle would have applied, DWP intended to have a set of Service Delivery
Standards against which providers would be judged by external inspectors according to the Ofsted 
Common Inspection Framework.  In terms of funding, participants would be grouped not by 
benefit, as in the WP, but into one of three groups; the Work Ready Group; the Progression to Work
Group and Volunteers. Payment was by an accelerator model, which provides greater payment as 
performance increases. 
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personalised support, tailored to an individual’s need, based upon their personal 
circumstances, difficulties, capability and capacity for working, and regardless of the 
benefit claimed” Department for Work and Pensions (2009a, p. 9).
Although the introduction of PEP was interrupted by the change of government in 
2010, this trend towards mainstreaming continued under the Work Programme, which
accepts all claimants of non-employment benefits. Work Choice is an exception to this,
but the decision not to roll it into the WP appears to have been because it had already 
been developed and was ready to be implemented by the time of changeover of 
governments (Interview with Work Choice official, September 2012).  In any case, 
Work Choice itself represents mainstreaming to a certain extent as it replaced several 
previous schemes and is open to a claimant of any benefit providing they meet the 
qualifying conditions.
Despite the difficulties that have arisen with the Work Programme and ESA groups, 
the strategy of dealing with specialist needs claimants within mainstream programmes
appears to have hardened. It was laid out more explicitly than ever before in the 
government's disability and health employment strategy published towards the end of 
the period of interest:
The majority of disabled people and people with health conditions who need employment 
support will receive our mainstream offer. We want to improve the support it provides for 
these claimants, by building our evidence base about what works to support them and feeding
this understanding into the design of our future mainstream offer. 
Department for Work and Pensions (2013d), p.52
As the literature review showed, this way of organising disability activation support 
has a number of potential implications for the institutionalisation of activation. Firstly,
it reduces the number of points through which claimants can access support. Moving 
from a large number of schemes to just two (and support through Jobcentre Plus) 
raises the stakes in terms of accessing support. If participants are not able to access 
them – or access them but not get the support they need – then there are few other 
sources of alternative support.  Secondly, it can create a crowding-out effect whereby 
more competitive jobseekers are given better access to support and increase 
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opportunities for 'creaming'-off such jobseekers and 'parking' those who are less 
competitive. The evidence presented in the later sections of this chapters shows that 
this has indeed been this case for the UK to a significant extent.
8.3.2 Sorting and selecting for activation 
Although, as the previous section has described, there has for some time been a 
general ambition that benefit status should not determine access to activation, 
this is still the case to some extent.  The ESA-WCA system described in Chapter 6 
has four functions. Firstly, it determines whether the applicant is eligible for ESA 
on the basis of a test of working capacity. Secondly, it decides whether a 
successful ESA claimant is eligible for the higher (Support) or lower (WRAG) rate,
which come with differing levels of conditionality. Thirdly, in the case of WRAG 
claimants and given the prognosis it delivers – usually 3, 6, 12, 18 or 24 months – 
it determines when such claimants are ready for work and thus how and when 
conditionality is applied.  It is then, somewhere half-way between a traditional 
benefit-determined system whereby benefit structures access to activation and 
the imposition of conditionality, and a Gregg-style 'personalised conditionality' 
system in which conditionality is entirely disconnected from the benefit claimed.
The ESA-WCA system creates a clear set of priorities in terms of the 
targeting of activation. Claimants failing the WCA usually go on to claim JSA 
instead and so are immediately required to seek work; ESA WRAG claimants are 
also expected to seek work, although the intensity of the requirements are likely 
to be dictated by the prognosis, and there is little formal impetus for claimants 
assessed into the ESA support group until such time as they are re-assessed into a
different group.  In terms of institutionalisation and compared to what went 
before, this appears to be a significant improvement. By dividing up a much 
larger group of claimants for whom there was no clear return-to-work trajectory 
into smaller groups and, for those who are assessed as capable of Work-Related 
Activity creating a time-frame for the return to work, there is at least a basic 
framework for the provision of activation.  
It is, however, a noticeably basic framework.  Alongside the rules for 
access to the Work Programme, it confers access to the WP at a given point in the
claimant's prognosis, but very little else. Although it provides a timeframe for 
268
returnng to employment, there appers to be little strategy to move claimants from
the greater distances from work to the point at which the can take up support to 
move into employment. The difficulties to DWP has experienced in moving 
claimants into the Work Programme is a good example of this. Discussed in more 
detail below, DWP found that the 3-month prognosis requirement was too 
exacting and restricted ESA-WRAG inflow into WP. However, rather than develop
interventions to help claimants get to the point where they would be ready for 
work within 3 months, DWP merely lifted the barrier to 12 months.
A final and related point to make here is that different categorisations do 
not link to different types – or at least broader mixes – of support. Whilst it 
might be expected that 12-month prognosis ESA-WRAG claimant might be 
channeled to a more specialist and intense form of support than a 3-month 
prognosis claimant, they are not. Nor does the UK system's proxy for different 
types of support – the WP payment groups. All new ESA-WRAG claimants attract
the same funding, regardless of their prognosis.
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8.4 Regulating and securing activation
8.4.1 Accessing programmes
This section looks at how widely claimants of sickness and disability benefits access 
schemes that offer employment support, as the later sections of the previous chapter 
did for Denmark.  It examines the four main schemes on offer during the period of 
interest – Pathways to Work; WorkSTEP; Work Choice and the Work Programme. In 
comparing Pathways to Work and the Work Programme, it looks at the extent of 
access relative to the benefits caseload and whether there are differences in the 
engagement of mandatory versus voluntary claimants.  Given that voluntary 
claimants will by definition tend to have greater barriers to work, this is a good way 
of looking at how far into the claimant pool the respective schemes reach. The two 
specialist schemes in the two halves of the period of interest – WorkSTEP and Work 
Choice – are examined to see whether access to specialist support has changed over 
time. This section also looks at the issue of whether sick and disabled benefit groups 
are 'crowded out' by other groups in access to activation. It can do this because 
Pathways to Work and WorkSTEP were only open to these groups, whereas Work 
Programme is open to most benefit groups, and Work Choice to claimants of most 
benefit claimants classed as disabled.
There is a necessary amount of asymmetry with the account of the same in 
Denmark. There, central government does not control access to activation and so 
much of the steering and incentive management work Danish central government is 
to encourage municipalities to provide activation appropriate activation and refer 
claimants to it. In the UK, referrals to both Jobcentre Plus and contracted employment 
programmes are under the direct control of DWP and so it can broaden or narrow 
access – at least of claimants who are subject some level of conditionality – easily by 
changing the access criteria and setting referral targets for Jobcentre Plus – as it has 
done notably on a number of occasions.  The engagement of voluntary participants is 
more akin to the situation in Denmark in that DWP does not have direct control over 
whether and how they access employment programmes. Thus, the issue of access to 
programmes, voluntary participants not withstanding, is less bound up with the issues
of steering and incentive management than in Denmark. In the UK, these issues come 
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later on – ensuring appropriate support is offered to claimants referred by programme
providers one the claimants are registered – and is the focus of the next major section 
of this chapter.
8.4.1.1 Pathways to Work
The two Pathways to Work schemes were large and long-running programmes.  There 
were 1.8m starts on Jobcentre Plus-led Pathways and just under 600,000 on the 
Provider-led version (see Table 8/9, below).  Such a high level of engagement is not 
surprising given that initial enrolment in Pathways and participation in WFIs was a 
condition of IB or ESA and, accordingly, a significant proportion of participants would
have left the scheme early in as they returned to work and/or, dropped their benefit 
claim. However, even if this element of the scheme is excluded in favour of just 
looking at the Choices phases, the level and scale of Pathways was still very 
significant.  Of the 766,300 claimants who got as far as the first element of the scheme 
– the compulsory initial WFI – almost 40% (303,130) continued on to the voluntary 
Choices phase. This looks particularly impressive in the light of the very limited 
engagement of voluntary participant by successor schemes. This is consistent with an 
evaluations of JCP-led Pathways' engagement of customers beyond the compulsory 
phase and by DWP officials interviewed as part of the research:
Participation in Pathways to Work continued over the long term for many incapacity benefits 
customers. About a quarter of those claiming incapacity benefits continued to meet with 
Incapacity Benefit Personal Adviser (IBPAs) at Jobcentre Plus during the second year after 
their start on the programme – well beyond the mandatory period intended for delivery of the
WFI sequence. […] Participation in the voluntary Choices package of services was also far 
from insignificant in the second year. Among new and repeat customers the level of take-up of
NDDP in the second year was 38 per cent of that in the first year (45 per cent among existing 
customers) and take-up of CMP was 51 per cent of the first year level (27 per cent among 
existing customers). At this later point, it might be supposed that most meetings at Jobcentre 
Plus would be voluntary. The fact that most of those people attending meetings in the second 
year had also attended in the first year indicates receptiveness to them.
Department for Work and Pensions (2010c) p.139
Pathways got a lot of flak for not working, but it was a really big ask as it engaged a 
huge group of claimants of the type that had never been talked to before. It actually got a
good chunk of the voluntary participants engaged long-term. Obviously that's not going 
to look good on a purely outcomes perspective because of the nature of their barriers to 
employment, but my estimation – it's just that because we didn't measure this – is that 
there were a lot of soft outcomes that can add up to an employment outcome if you give 
them enough time.
DWP official involved in the running of Pathways to work, September 2012
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Table 8/9: Provider-led and Jobcentre Plus-led Pathways to Work: Number of overall 
starts; Choices Starts (Jobcentre Plus only); Initial, Repeat and Voluntary WFIs 
(Jobcentre Plus only) and RTWC payments 
Provider-led Pathways





Overall Starts 1,805,730 (1,252,500 individuals)
Choices Starts. Of which; 303,130;
New Deal for Disabled People 142,180
Condition Management Programme 123,880
Other 95 42,070
RTWC Payments 159,550
Initial WFIs 766,300 






Voluntary Repeat WFIs 365,740
Sources: DWP Disability and Work Division (2011a, 2011b)
95 Includes Work Choice, Work Preparation, WorkSTEP, Programme Centres, Work Based Learning 
for Adults (England), Training for Work (Scotland), and Work Trials. 
96 Data for Repeat WFIs is for new participants only.
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In the last two full years of Jobcentre-Plus Pathways, there were around 70,000 
entrances into the Choices phase of the programme (DWP Disability and Work 
Division, 2010a, 2011a).  Choices did not exist for Provider-led Pathways, but 
given that every participant (there were 259,790 and 150,660 participants on the 
final and penultimate full years, respectively [DWP Disability and Work Division,
2010, 2011c]) had to be provided with at least CMP if they asked for it and 
assuming a similar proportion of claimants stayed on the programme long 
enough to take up further support, as on JCP-led Pathways – the combined 
number of participants accessing a Pathways Choice must be well in excess of 
100,000 participants in the full years of the programme.  This compares 
favourably to the Work Programme, with 58,600; 106,850 and 99,220 ESA/IB/IS 
referrals in Years 1, 2 and 3 (see Table 8/10, below).  This is consistent with the 
findings throughout this chapter so far that efforts to provide activation for sick 
and disabled benefit claimants have reduced post-Pathways.
Ideally, here the study would show over time how many participants Pathways 
and Choices had as a proportion of the total possible number of claimants 
eligible, as the Share Activated did for Denmark, and as it was possible to 
calculate for the Work Programme (see below). Unfortunately, this is not possible.
An accurate figure for the total programme and total Choices caseloads at any 
one point is not possible to calculate because offlow figures were not recorded. 
Furthermore, Choices data for Provider-led Pathways was not recorded. In the 
absence of the available data, the best it is possible to do is assume a figure 
around 25%-35% indicated by Table 8/9 and (Department for Work and Pensions, 
2010c). Given the size of the benefit caseload and that all Choices referrals were 
volunteers, this is impressive and compares favourably with other schemes. 
8.4.1.2 The Work Programme
The Work Programme was intended to be a large, multi-purpose programme aimed at 
all long-term non-employed claimants regardless of the benefit claimed and the reason
for being out of work, and so is a unique in the UK context. Accordingly, referrals to 
the Work Programme are highly diverse, covering almost all benefit groups, ranging 
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from recently-released prisoners claiming JSA; JSA claimants from 18 years of age to 
the pension age; ESA WRAG claimants of varying lengths of prognosis, and ESA 
Support and IB/IS claimants, all engaging with the programme on various kinds of 
terms – some voluntary, some mandated to the programme.
The first thing to do here is to look at here is the referrals to the Work 
Programme of ESA/IB/IS groups. These can be compared to the original forecasts and, 
with more difficulty, to Pathways to Work. Compared to previous programmes, rich 
and detailed data is recorded and is easy to access via the DWP's tabulation tool.
The first two years of the WP saw referrals of IB and ESA claimants running far below
what was originally expected. Although original plans to refer all ESA claimants 
assessed as being capable of work-related activity (those in ESA’s Work Related 
Activity Group) into the programme were shelved in favour of only those claimants 
considered ready for work within three months (Bivand, 2011) inflow into the 
programme by ESA claimants was low even according to the revised plans Centre for 
Social and Economic Inclusion (2012) – see Table 8/10 and Graphs 8/4 and 8/5, below. 
Forecasts for the participation of ESA claimants were then revised down, even though 
the overall forecast for flows into the programmes has been increased by 32% since 
tendering. The result, in the words of a DWP official involved in its design, is that it is 
becoming ‘largely a JSA programme’:
It has resulted in DWP revising down their forecasts at the same time as massively revising up
their forecasts for JSA.  Overall programme forecasts have been revised up 32% between when
the programme was tendered and last year.  So in the space of a year referral forecast volumes
were increased by a third and within that the IB/ESA volumes have fallen and the JSA have 
increased so the relative share we’re looking at is a much smaller proportion. It's largely a JSA
programme. 
Senior DWP official, interview May 2012
Compared to the original forecasts, ESA referrals by the end of the period of interest 
were 255,530  below what was expected (see Table 8/10, below). One of the principle 
explanations for this appears to be the relatively high access requirements relative to 
the target group, which had greater barriers to employment than expected:
The truth is is that DWP didn't really know much about this group. There was this assumption
that the WCA would show that all these IB people just had poorly backs and just needed a bit 
of tough love and so you would have a lot of people basically ready for work that would come 
out of IB onto WRAG and then get shoved onto Work Programme and out the other end into 
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work, but it didn't work out like that. They found out that many of them were years from 
work. That's why they kept increasing the prognosis requirements so they would actually get 
some referrals through. There's still a big 12 months or more group that they never expected 
to have in a big way – hence the 18-24 month pilots.
DPO Representative, Interview May 2014
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Table 8/10: Work Programme Referrals, November 2010 DWP Forecast v Actual Referrals 
2011/12 (Year 
1)
2012/13 (Year 2) 2013/14 (Year 3)
JSA 18-24 Forecast 90,000 77,000 65,000
JSA 18-24 Actual 131,010 92,330 49,450
JSA 25+ Forecast 308,000 252,000 231,000
JSA 25+ Actual 315,970 203,630 140,250
JSA Ex-IB Forecast 20,000 29,000 29,000
JSA Ex-IB Actual 3,230 11,590 12,830
JSA Early Access and Prison Leavers 
Forecast
40,000 39,000 36,000
JSA Early Access and Prison Actual 178,390 97,800 45,270
JSA Total Forecast 418,000 358,000 325,000
JSA Total Actual 628,600 405,350 247,800
JSA Total Actual Compared to Forecast 210,600 47,350 -77,200
ESA Volunteer Forecast 59,000 63,000 46,000
ESA Volunteer Actual 10,430 27,490 21,750
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ESA New Forecast 43,000 43,000 43,000
ESA New Actual 41,290 57,880 53,900
ESA Ex-IB Forecast 44,000 67,000 68,000
ESA Ex-IB Actual 5,060 20,690 23,360
IB/IS Volunteers Forecast 16,300 19,300 8,600
IB/IS Volunteers Actual 1,820 790 210
All ESA/IB/IS Forecast 162,300 192,300 165,600
All ESA/IB/IS Actual 58,600 106,850 99,220
All ESA/IB/IS Actual compared to Forecast -103,700 -85,450 -66,380
Sources: Forecasts – Centre for Social and Economic Inclusion (2012) Referral – DWP Work Programme Tabulation Tool;
http://tabulation   tool.dwp.gov.uk/WorkProg/wp_mon_jo/tabtool_wp_mon_jo.html, Monthly figures.  Selections – Analysis: Referrals (Thousands) Row: 
Time Series. Column: Payment group. Subset: None.  Add together Jun 2011 – March 2012 for Year 1, April 2012 – March 2013 for Year 2, April 2013 – March 2014 for 
Year 3.
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Graph 8/4: Referrals to the Work Programme (cumulative) by Payment Group, Years 1 -3
Source: DWP Work Programme Tabulation Tool, http://tabulation-tool.dwp.gov.uk/WorkProg/wp_mon_jo/tabtool_wp_mon_jo.html, Monthly figures. 
Selections – Analysis: Referrals (Thousands) Row: Time Series. Column: Payment group. Subset: None. Add together Jun 2011 – March 2012 for Year 1, April 2012 – March 2013 
for Year 2, April 2013 – March 2014 for Year 3
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Graph 8/5: Referrals (quarterly) to the Work Programme by Payment Group, June 2011 – March 2014
Source: DWP Work Programme Tabulation Tool, http://tabulation-tool.dwp.gov.uk/WorkProg/wp_mon_jo/tabtool_wp_mon_jo.html , Monthly figures. Selections – 
Analysis: Referrals (Thousands) Row: Time Series. Column: Payment group. Subset: None
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The relatively low referral rates of ESA claimants to the Work Programme should be 
considered negatively when coming to a conclusion about institutionalisation of 
activation. With the consolidation of all other specialist disability programmes except 
Work Choice into the Work Programme, the low referral of ESA claimants to Work 
Choice and the limited support offered by the Jobcentre Plus Offer, there is precious 
little opportunity for claimants to access support.  This is particularly concerning for 
ESA-WRAG  claimants, who have to demonstrate they are making efforts to return to 
work. The Mencap mental health charity have expressed a similar concern: 
The low number of Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) referrals (just under 9%) to the 
Work Programme raises serious concerns about the support being offered to a group of 
disabled people who have been deemed to have “limited capability for work”, but for whom 
many will see conditions attached to receipt of their benefit (ie those in the work-related 
activity group (WRAG) of ESA). Of these referrals, 8.2% have actually attached to the 
Programme—a total of just 73,000 ESA claimants, out of 837,000 total attachments. These 
numbers should be considered in the context of the total ESA caseload. The latest Government
statistics show this figure to be 991,000 people, with 309,000 being found eligible for the 
WRAG of ESA — the group identified as needing additional help and support to move towards
and into employment. Whilst the figures cannot be compared like for like (eg the data 
collection spans different time periods), in the absence of any robust analysis of the entire 
“welfare to work” process for benefit claimants, the gap between the total number of ESA 
claimants (991,000) and total numbers accessing employment support through the two principal 
programmes (78,420) available to them, is significant and concerning, and merits detailed 
investigation and explanation.
Mencap Written Evidence to House of Commons DWP Committee Work Programme
User Groups Inquiry (EV w52), House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee 
(2013a), p.56, emphasis added.
The end of the period of interest did see a significant upswing in the number of ESA 
referrals to the WP. However, the increase in ESA referrals in Year 3 of the programme
came largely from the New ESA claimants, for whom DWP lowered the bar for 
participation to a 12 month work-ready prognosis.  Whilst this is positive from the 
point of view of increasing ESA claimant access to the programme, there are two 
caveats to add. Firstly, providers planned their approach on the basis that claimants 
would be ready for work within 3 and then 6 months, and so the type of ESA 
claimants most commonly now coming into the programme will be less ready for 
work than providers planned for, and these claimants are proving more difficult to 
help as a result:  
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At the time we said [to WP providers] ‘be careful what you wish for’, but providers lobbied 
hard for longer prognoses in order to up the numbers, then realised that they couldn’t afford 
to deliver the support that those groups needed, and in some cases things got worse because 
outcome rates fell and therefore also unit funding.
Former DWP Official, e-mail, July 2015
Secondly, the New ESA group is only one of several ESA payment groups and whilst 
their referral rate is increasing to catch up with the original projections, referrals of 
other ESA groups, especially volunteers who may have spent many years out of work 
and will have complex needs, are not.  This is especially important because the 
Support Group was growing rapidly at that time and was clearly becoming the largest 
group of ESA claimants (see Graph 8/6, below). If they are also not accessing Work 
Choice, as does not appear to be the case (see next section), there is a major service 
provision and engagement gap with the full range of claimants needing support:
The DWP’s response [to low referrals of ESA claimants], as you will know, has been to extend
the prognosis. That appears to be having an effect, in that the referrals for new ESA claimants 
are now more or less in line with what was in the invitation to tender. The really significant 
gaps are now in all the other groups of ESA claimants, particularly volunteers, people who 
voluntarily refer themselves to the Work Programme. Those are the ones, for the incapacity 
benefit claimants, where the largest outcome payments sit. The reasons for that are going to 
be totally different. It comes down to things such as awareness of the programme, how far the 
disability employment advisers in Jobcentre Plus are prepared to refer people to that rather 
than to, for example, Work Choice, which is a specialist programme for disabled people, and 
how effectively providers are marketing their services. My concern is that DWP’s response is 
to continue to try to get more and more of the new ESA claimants by extending prognoses, 
widening access and so on. Actually, it is that group of 2 million-plus people who are on 
incapacity benefit and ESA, the potential volunteers for the programme, who are the ones we 
should really be targeting. I think we need to be more innovative in how we do that.
Tony Wilson, CESI Representative, Evidence to House of Commons DWP Committee
Work Programme User Groups Inquiry (EV 4), House of Commons Work and 
Pensions Committee (2013b), p.72
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Graph 8/6 ESA caseloads by phase,  February 2009  – March 2014
Sources: DWP ESA Tabulation Tool, http://tabulation-tool.dwp.gov.uk/100pc/esa/tabtool_esa.html, Selections: Analysis – Caseload (thousands); Row – Time Series; Column 
– Phase of ESA claim; Susbet: None.
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Graph 8/7  Work Programme Compulsory, Voluntary and Total participation as a percentage of ESA-WRAG, ESA-Support and total ESA 
caseloads 
Sources: Work programme data – DWP Work Programme Tabulation Tool, http://tabulation-tool.dwp.gov.uk/WorkProg/wp_mon_jo/tabtool_wp_mon_jo.html, Monthly figures.    
Selections – Analysis: Attachments (Thousands) Row: Time Series. Column: Payment group. Subset: None.
ESA data – As for 8/6/ Selections – Analysis: Caseload (Thousands) Row: Time Series. Column: Phase of ESA claim. Subset: None 
Calculations. Compulsory – Add attachments for ESA-New and ESA Ex-IB for every four months, divide by relevant quarterly figure for ESA-WRAG, multiply by 100. Voluntary –
Add attachments for all other ESA/IS groups for every four months, divide by relevant quarterly figure for ESA-Support, multiply by 100.
Total – Add attachments for all ESA/IB/IS groups for every four months and divide by relevant summed quarterly figures for ESA-Support and ESA-WRAG, multiply by 100.
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One final point to make about referrals is around the apportionment of participants 
between Work Choice and the Work Programme. It is clearly a pressing problem that 
has been raised by a number of different stakeholders over the lifetime of the 
programmes so far.  A number of providers have said that the Work Programme has 
been receiving claimants – especially those with mental health conditions, who 
represent more than 50% of all ESA claimants referred to the programme to December 
2013, see Table 8/11, below – who cannot be supported adequately on the Work 
Programme and who should have been on Work Choice, and would be if there were 
more places:
We would also recommend that more people with mental health problems are referred to 
Work Choice, the Government’s specialist employment programme. Participation in Work 
Choice is voluntary, which we believe, and is reflected in the ERSA recent analysis of Work 
Programme statistics, is a basis through which to successfully work with people facing 
multiple barriers and ensure their sustain return to the workforce. Work Choice however, is 
limited to 115,000 placements over the lifetime of a five year contract and only 14% of all 
referrals to Work Choice so far have been ESA claimants.
Scottish Association for Mental Health Submission to House of Commons DWP 
Committee Work Programme User Groups Inquiry (EV 138), (House of Commons 
Work and Pensions Committee, 2013b, p.206)
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Table 8/11 Referrals to Work Programme of ESA/IB/IS claimants with a Mental health condition recorded as their Primary Health Condition, 
















(1) Total Referred 44,57
0
56,080 50,580 97,150 2,600 240,980
(2) Total Referred with Mental
and Behavioural Disorders 




20,080 23,160 47,940 860 127,920
(3) Percent referred with MBD 
as PHC as percentage of total 
referrals 
60.3% 35.8% 45.8% 49% 33% 53%
Source:  DWP Work Tabulation Tool, http://tabulation-tool.dwp.gov.uk/WorkProg/tabtool.html, Cumulative figures. Selections: Analysis – Referrals Thousands; Row – Time 
Series; Column – Primary Health Condition; 
Subset – Payment Group (Repeat all previous for each Payment Group). 
Calculations: (1) Add all of first column until December 2013. (2) Add all of third column until December 2013. (3) (2) divided by (1), multiplied by 100 
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 Related to this is the issue of 'inappropriate referrals', an issue that has arisen time and time 
again; on Pathways to Work; on Work Choice and on the Work Programme. This is usually used to 
mean referrals of claimants whose needs do not match the capacity of the programme to help them:
ESA has altered the PL Pathways client caseload and therefore clients are generally ‘harder to 
help’, often having complex barriers to work. Clients who are ineligible for ESA are those that 
would be easier to work with. Providers found it was difficult to meet the needs of the 
unexpectedly high proportion of clients with complex barriers to work. Problems with the 
new WCA intensified the challenges that providers faced in working with clients and meeting 
their needs. Respondents discussed inappropriate referrals in terms of clients not being 
referred to PL Pathways at the right time.
Hudson et al., (2010), p.63
Providers reported that not all of those referred to their Work Choice provision were suitable 
for the programme, although most providers reported that the suitability of referrals had 
improved over the period of the evaluation. The two main reasons why providers felt some 
participants were unsuitable were motivation and distance from the labour market, i.e. that 
participants did not wish to find work or that they were unlikely to be supported into work 
within the time-limits of the Work Choice pre-work module. Some provider staff highlighted 
what they felt was a tension between the target groups for the programme and the outcome 
targets expected of providers.
Department for Work and Pensions (2013a) p.59
One of the things we are seeing is huge numbers of inappropriate referrals coming 
through [to the Work Programme]: people who have been found fit for work who are a 
long, long way from work. The problem we have there is that people are coming through
the Work Capability Assessment, which is a test that effectively assesses medical 
functional capability, rather than assessing readiness for work. For instance, the idea that
if you can stand up in a shower for 15 minutes or something you are able to go into work
seems inappropriate as a way of measuring distance from work. Actually, in terms of 
your question about improving the scheme, one of the things we could do would be to 
look at the Work Capability Assessment and look at if there is a way of introducing a 
distance from work test which looks at readiness for work. 
Paul Trotter, Scope Representative, Evidence to House of Commons DWP 
Committee Work Programme User Groups Inquiry (EV 25), (House of Commons
Work and Pensions Committee, 2013b, p.92-93)
This points to an inconsistency between the claimants referred and the extent and
type of support the design of the programme (in the case of PES-led programmes)
or the payment systems (in the case of contracted programmes) mean is available.
These issues are the purview of sections 8.4.2.
8.4.1.3 WorkSTEP and Work Choice
Work Choice was intended to be a scheme for non-employed benefit claimants with 
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employment support needs related to disability that could not be accommodated by 
the mainstream support offered by Jobcentre Plus and contracted schemes.  However, 
there is considerable evidence to suggest that such claimants are not accessing the 
scheme in the way expected; that there is not as much of a distinction between the 
types of claimants accessing Work Choice and those accessing the Work Programme 
as was originally intended, and that there has been a noticeable shift in the types of 
claimants served in the transition between WorkSTEP and Work Choice.
Whilst ESA claimants can access either Work Programme (on a voluntary or 
compulsory basis) or Work Choice (voluntary only), a development that has come as 
somewhat of a surprise is the very limited inflow of ESA claimants into Work Choice, 
with JSA claimants accessing it in much greater numbers than was originally expected
(see Graph 8/8), below. Claimants of ESA and predecessor benefits accounted for just 
under 50% of referrals to WorkSTEP but represent only 16% of referrals to Work 
Choice97, with 58% of referrals being from JSA claimants and 40% being JSA claimants 
not claiming the additional costs benefit, DLA, indicating a lower level of need. As a 
result, the scale of access of non-employed sickness and disability benefit groups is 
similar despite Work Choice being a bigger scheme: an average of 3160 IB/SDA/ESA 
with/without DLA and IS claimants accessed WorkSTEP between 2006/7 and 2009/10, 
compared to 3612 for the Work Choice until 2013/14 (see Appendix A4 for the data 
these calculations used). 
There appear to be several explanations for this. Firstly, although the scheme is
designed to support participants with greater needs than other programmes, the 
requirements of the scheme – that the claimant should be capable of supported or 
unsupported employment within six months (later altered to six months with up to an
additional six month extension) – are nonetheless demanding given the target group.  
This has meant that Jobcentre Plus DEAs have been restrictive in their referral 
practice, even after the referral guidance was softened, apparently also driven by 
providers rejecting referred participants who they felt could not be helped 
successfully within six months (Department for Work and Pensions, 2013a). In its 
report of its experience of Work Choice, the Shaw Trust, the Prime Provider in 16 
CPAs, surveyed it staff and found that they;
97 Work Choice figures exclude referrals to Remploy.
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Felt six months was too short a time to receive pre-employment Support. Although staff 
and customers acknowledged some customers are able to quickly find and sustain 
employment, both sets of focus group participants felt that an increased length of pre-
employment support would ensure that more people with disabilities, health problems 
and impairments would be able to find and sustain work. 
The Shaw Trust (2013), p.34
At the same time, the Work Capability Assessment – which was designed to reduce 
access to ESA, with JSA being claimed alternatively in most instances – has resulted in
a large number of JSA claimants with disability and/or health-related employment 
barriers. This appears to have made it difficult for ESA claimants to access the scheme:
I still stand by the argument that Work Choice was a step forward in that it recognised that 
mainstream support wasn't going to work for everyone and the design of the programme and 
what is on offered is good: it is working very well, after all. But it clearly has been overtaken 
by events and changes in the benefits system that can't have been forseen at the time we put it
together. Because of WCA, there is alot of disabled people with high needs in the JSA group 
and so they are accessing Work Choice in very high numbers, whereas WorkSTEP was not for
JSA at all. That doesn't mean that they shouldn't be there as the referral guidelines are very 
clear, but because of the cap – I think it's about 20-odd thousand a year – there must be some 
crowding-out effect on the harder-to-help compared to WorkSTEP, but that hasn't been 
studied formally.  Obviously the answer to that is to raise the cap and certainly that message 
is coming from providers and the [disability] lobby. That might be forthcoming when we get 
to the end of the current contracts.
Interview, Former DWP adviser, September 2012
A DWP evaluation of Work Choice confirmed what this interviewee said about the 
impact of the referral cap in producing a crowding-out effect on claimants with more 
complex employment barriers, with providers reporting the same concerns:
My concern is that the Work Choice contract is not big enough to support the demand. I know
there are customers out there that DEAs have not referred across that should have been 
referred, because there’s not enough profile, and I think that is scandalous. If we end up 
putting those customers on Work Programme, those customers will suffer because Work 
Programme is not designed to meet their needs. The disability group is a very discreet [sic] 
group and needs specialist support.’
Work Choice provider, quoted in Department for Work and Pensions (2013a), p.185
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Graph 8/8: Referrals to Work Choice by Benefit, Years 2010/11 to 2013/14 
Source: Department for Work and Pensions (2014d)
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Graph 8/9: Referrals to WorkSTEP (2006/07 – 2009/10) and Work Choice (2010/11 – 
2013/14) as a percentage of total 
Source: DWP FOI Request, reproduced in Appendix A4, and Department for Work and Pensions (2014d)
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Comparing the primary qualifying conditions of participants of WorkSTEP and Work 
Choice shows the same trend. It is clear that Work Choice serves a different caseload 
than WorkSTEP did, with significantly fewer claimants with a learning disability and 
more than double the proportion of claimants with long-term medical conditions and 
mental health conditions:
Table 8/12 Referrals (as a % of total) to WorkSTEP (2008/09) and Work Choice Q3 
2010/11 – (Q4 2013/14) by Condition 
Condition WorkSTEP (2008-9) Work Choice
(Q3 2010/11 – Q4 2013/14)
Conditions Restricting Mobility / 
Dexterity 
17.7 14.8
Visual Impairment 6.7 3.3
Hearing or Speech Impairment 6 5
Long-term Medical Condition 4.3 10.7







9.4 N/A 20.7 1.2
Neurological Condition 7.6 5.1
Other health Condition 4.8 N/A
Multiple Conditions N/A 13.1
Sources: (Department for Work and Pensions, 2006, 2014d)
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DPO representatives interviewed confirmed this shift in focus between the two 
programmes:
We were really excited by Work Choice because it seemed like an improvement on WorkSTEP 
and the 4, 5, whatever number of schemes that went before and there would be some clarity. 
But now we're 18 months in it's pretty clear that it's serving a different kind of group to those 
programmes – it's disability in a much broader sense and taking in health conditions. If you 
have a learning disability especially or high cost needs around visual or mobility impairment, 
it's not really for you. It's great that people with moderate mental health conditions, for 
example, are getting support where they didn't before and we really support that, but when 
you bring those sorts of people in, you push others on the other side out, so you're going back 
to square one in terms of inclusivity. 
National DPO Chief Executive, Interview, September 2012
A particular element of this apparent crowding-out process has been the screening out
of harder-to-help claimants, as was the case with WPP.  The Work Choice evaluation 
reported that there was – particularly in the first year of the programme – 
disagreement between JCP DEAs and providers over the suitability of claimants, and 
providers could and did reject claimants who they felt they unable to support: “some 
DEAs reported that the providers in their area were rejecting referrals they felt were 
unsuitable immediately and sometimes for reasons the DEAs disagreed with.”  
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2013a), p.55. This was confirmed by a 
representative of a Supported Employment charity that had monitored Work Choice 
referrals:
One of the issues around Work Choice is that it's become quite selective about who gets on it. 
Providers have become much more careful about who comes onto the programme. There are 
some pre-programme chats with the person who's been referred and they have a quiet word 
and  gently suggest that it might not be right for them.
Supported Employment Charity Representative, interview August 2015
The difficulty ESA claimants have had in accessing a supposedly specialist 
disability employment programme should be considered negatively when 
assessing institutionalisation. In the absence of a scheme beyond Work Choice 
which recognises in its design and access criteria that some participants will need
long-term support in order to assist them into work – or that they may need 
sheltered employment  (support for the Remploy sheltered factory network was 
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ended in 2013), there appears to be little else on offer for claimants with serious 
and complex employment barriers.  
8.4.1.4 Accessing programmes: conclusions
This section has looked at easily and how widely claimants of sickness and disability 
benefits are able to access support offered by the various employment programmes 
that were on offer during the period of interest.  It has examined the number of places 
available relative to the number of claimants; referral rules and practices and, 
ultimately, how wide a group of claimants were able to access them.
By virtue of its size and the fact that attendance during the initial WFI stage 
was compulsory for most new claimants and selected existing ones, the access to 
Pathways services – 2.43m WFIs; 303,000 Choices98 – was always going to be large 
and, in the light of the relatively limited scope of previous programmes99, 
unprecedentedly significant. Notable also in the light of subsequent programmes is 
how well Pathways engaged claimants on a voluntary basis. Both quantitative and 
qualitative evidence suggests that many claimants continued to be involved with the 
programme over several years – well beyond the point at which their participation 
became voluntary – going on to take part in a Choices offer in large numbers – about 
50,000 a year.  During the same period, other types of support were available through 
WorkSTEP; Work Preparation, the Job Introduction Scheme, Remploy Factories and 
Residential Training Colleges.
Access to the successor schemes in the post 2010 period appears to have been 
more limited.  Although the Work Programe was meant to be a mainstream 
98 These figures represent Jobcentre Plus-led Pathways only. The total engagement with claimants of 
the entire Pathways programme was in reality larger than this, but detailed figures for Provider-led 
Pathways were not recorded.
99 Comparison with the only major previous Programme, New Deal for Disabled People, is difficult 
because NDDP became a Choice on Pathways when it began – and so figures for NDDP in half of 
the years it operated will be made up of referrals directly to NDDP and indirectly through 
Pathways, and these are impossible to separate out. Further, there is the additional matter of the 
unknown number of Choices participants on the Provider-led version of Pathways. However, given 
that starts on NDDP were on average 34,883 for the last 3 years (2002, 2003, 2004 (NDDP tabulation 
tool. [NDDP started towards the end of 2001, so that has not been counted, to avoid artificially 
understating the average]) before Pathways began to roll-out, I am confident in saying that 
Pathways was a bigger engagement, even if only Choices is counted, so that voluntary is compared 
with voluntary. Choices starts were on average 50,000 a year from 2005 to 2011, and even this is not
counting Provider-led Pathways. 
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programme with enough specialism to serve the diversity of claimants referred to it, 
access to it has been far below what was originally expected and, although a combined
figure is difficult to pin down, likely less than Choices access on the two Pathways 
programmes. The most notable difference, however, is not so much the scale of access 
but the difference in the extent of voluntary access to the two programmes. Choices 
was voluntary, but the vast majority of Work Programme referrals have been from 
mandatory groups – 23.6% of total referrals to March 2014 were voluntary claimants, 
76.4% mandatory – compared to an initial forecast of 40.7% voluntary, 59.2% 
mandatory100. This issue is thrown into relief by a consideration of the nature of the 
ESA caseload, which was becoming clearly apparent by 2012.  Contrary to 
expectations, the Support group was becoming bigger than WRAG, yet voluntary 
referrals have remained stubbornly low. If we take the Support group as a proxy for 
the hardest-to-help claimants, according to the framework, the support available 
clearly does not reach the full diversity of claimants. Added to the fact that until such 
time as DWP decides to extend WP access (or provide another programme) for 12 
month + prognosis ESA WRAG101 claimants there is little support for large proportion 
of WRAG claimants also, there is a significant and serious provision gap. 
This would not be such a problem had access to Work Choice been extensive, 
but it is has not. Although it is a much bigger scheme than its predecessor, access by 
ESA/IB/IS claimants has been broadly the same as access to WorkSTEP, and there 
appears to be an element of crowding out by other groups of claimants, likely 
exacerbated by the referral cap.
This highlights the risks entailed by merging specialist disability schemes into 
general ones, a possibility raised by (Mabbett, 2005). The competition for support that 
Mabbett predicted appears to be happening with Work Choices and, similarly, if 
claimants have difficulty accessing support in a mainstreamed system, as they do with 
Work Programme and Work Choice, the consequences are more severe than a system 
where there are several different programmes; as was the case with Pathways, which 
was accompanied by almost half a dozen other programmes. 
100 These figures are based on Table 8/10, above, arrived at by adding up referrals for the relevant 
groups (ESA Volunteer and IB/IS volunteers for voluntary and all others for non-voluntary) for the 
three years, dividing by the total and multiplying by 100 to get the percentage figure. 
101 Still being trialled as the time of writing (August 2015). 
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8.4.2 Steering activation: steering tools and their effectiveness 
8.4.2.1 Work Programme and Work Choice payment regimes 
The primary ways government can encourage providers to offer adequate specialist 
support are through outcome targets and associated payment regimes that incentivise 
providers to work towards those targets. The latter of those two with regard the Work 
Programme and Work Choice is the main focus here.
Work Programme providers are paid in three ways: an Attachment Fee when 
the participant joins the programme, declining in value over the life of the 
programme; an outcome fee if the participant gains employment for a specified period
time and a sustainment payment paid if they participant sustains the outcome for a 
given length of time. The emphasis is on the job sustainment, which counts for the 
majority of the maximum payment. The size of the payments and the length of these 
periods are different for each of the 9 Payment Groups (PGs) in order to reflect the 
greater challenges posed by certain groups, ESA groups in particular.  This is designed 
to create an incentive to help these groups and combat creaming and parking 
behaviour.
As Table 8/13, below, shows, it is a mixed picture in terms of there being a 
general incentive to help sick and disabled claimants. The ESA Ex-IB PG does indeed 
attract the highest potential return and ESA New claimants pays more than the other 
two groups (JSA 18-24 and JSA 25+) that make up the set of three that are the main 
focus of the programme, but ESA Volunteer and IB/IS volunteers attract much lower 
than many other groups, lower even that JSA 18-24 –  usually regarded as the easiest 
to help group.
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Table 8/13 Work Programme Payment Groups 
Payment 
Group













1 JSA 18-24 £400 £1200 £170 13 £3810
2 JSA 25+ £400 £1200 £215 13 £4395
3 JSA Early Access £400 £1200 £250 20 £6600
4 JSA Ex-IB £400 £1200 £250 20 £6600
5 ESA Volunteers £400 £1100 £115 20 £3800
6 New ESA claimants £600 £1200 £235 20 £6500
7 ESA Ex-IB £600 £3500 £370 26 £13720
8 IB/IS (England only) £400 £1000 £145 13 £3285
9 JSA Prison Leavers £400 £1200 £200 20 £5600
Source: Department for Work and Pensions (2013h), p.5
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Work Choice contracts operate differently, both in that there is only one payment 
regime and there is less of a focus on outcomes.  The same three payment types 
system operates, but with a service fee equating to 70% of a provider’s contract price. 
The outcome payment for achievement of 13 weeks of employment and sustained 
unsupported employment of 26 out of the 30 weeks after the move into unsupported 
employment is paid on a unit price basis – 15% of a provider’s contract price by the 
number of job outcomes and sustained job outcomes stated in the provider’s bid 
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2013a).
8.4.2.2 Incentivising specialist support provision and combating parking 
behaviour on Work Programme and Work Choice 
The question here is the extent to which there has been systematic underprovision of 
support to sick and disabled participants on the Work Programme. The answer 
appears to be that there has to a fairly significant extent. All but one of the 
interviewees – both DWP, DPO and provider representatives – asked about this issue 
said that this was the case.
So the differential pricing in the Work Programme contains a break against creaming a 
parking but the reality is there will still be creaming and parking within payment groups and 
often the differences between payment groups arguably are not large enough to drive provider 
behaviour, something the providers themselves say… I think that they understand that they 
haven’t got this right and there will be creaming and parking.  I think you’re looking at 10-
20% of participants that will effectively be written off.   Providers are looking to get about 40% 
of their caseload into work and to my mind they can’t afford to provide a bells and whistles 
service to everybody […] What worries us is that they will appear two years later with two 
years more of not being in the labour market, even more disadvantaged and you end up 
spending even more money.
Former DWP official, interview December 2012
This is corroborated by the DWP's own evaluation, though it goes somewhat 
further in describing the scale of the issue:
The available evidence to date suggests that providers are engaging in creaming and 
parking, despite the differential payment regime. Providers routinely classify participants
according to their assessed distance from work, and provide more intensive support (at 
least as measured by the frequency of contact with advisers, for example) to those who 
are the most ‘job-ready’. Those assessed as hardest-to-help are in many cases left with 
infrequent routine contact with advisers, and often with little or no likelihood of referral 
to specialist (and possibly costly) support, which might help address their specific 
barriers to work. Alongside this, it is worth noting that some providers at least, took the 
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view (perhaps surprisingly, given the design and remit of the Work Programme) that it 
was inappropriate for the hardest-to-help to be referred to their services at all. 
Department for Work and Pensions (2012c), p.24
A Work Programme sub-contracted provider goes the furthest in alleging parking
on the Work Programme of ESA groups:
From the outset, Primes were focusing on more job ready customers with service 
delivery strategies that involved parking hard to help customers. It is against this 
background that specialist providers confirm they are not receiving sufficient referrals 
for their subcontracts to be viable, which is leading to a consequential loss of expertise 
from the sector as services are withdrawn. Unsurprisingly, in the first 12 months, only 
330 people across all of the ESA payment groups secured employment, representing only
1% of the job outcomes delivered by the Work Programme, and our analysis shows that 
the probability of achieving a short job outcome is halved if a person has any type of 
disability. The Work Programme is effectively “locked in” to a culture of delivering an 
effective service only to work ready customers.
The Pluss Organisation Written Evidence to House of Commons DWP Committee 
Work Programme User Groups Inquiry (EV w141), (House of Commons Work and 
Pensions Committee, 2013b) p.209, emphasis added)
A way of pinning this down more precisely – and to corroborate these claims –  is to 
look at the scale of health and disability provision relative to the proportion of those 
claimants attached to the programme likely to require such support. If the former falls 
significantly short of the latter, underprovision is likely to have happened, and this 
does appear to be the case. Tables 8/14, 8/15 and 8/16 provide this information. 
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% of Providers offering
support type





Mean % of claimants
support type
Build personal effectiveness and 
confidence
93 63 77 57
With Jobsearch 90 74 79 72
Train to get a recognised 
qualification
79 23 73 30
Find work compatible with a 
health condition or disability
78 23 60 18
Other support (including health 
support)
38 21 33 33
Source: Department for Work and Pensions & Government Social Research (2014a), p.187 
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Table 8/15: % of attached Work Programme participants with a health condition or 
disability indicator, start of programme to Dec 2012, 2013
To Dec 2013 To Dec 2012
% of attached participants with a health condition 16 11
% of attached participants with a disability 
indicator 
35 30
Sources:  DWP Work Programme Tabulation Tool, 
http://tabulation   
tool.dwp.gov.uk/WorkProg/wp_mon_jo/tabtool_wp_mon_jo.html, Monthly figures.  
Selections – Analysis: Attachments; (Thousands) Row: Time Series. Column: Disability 
Indicator/Health condition. Subset: None
Calculations: Disability Indicator – Add all values for Yes and all for Total from June 2011 to 
Deember 2012/2013; divide former by the latter and multiply by 100. Health condition – add all 
values for all health conditions, and for Total from and to same dates; divide former by the latter 
and multiply by 100.






Health condition is barrier Health condition not a barrier Total
Not offered  70.5 85.7 75.4
Offered 29.4 14.2 24.6
[Base] 2969 655 3624
Source: Department for Work and Pensions & Government Social Research (2014b), p.80. 
Calculations: Data for participants with health condition of different lengths was aggregated using a 
weighted average.
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Although the structure of the contracts – with an emphasis on outcomes – was 
mentioned by almost all interviewees (and corroborated by other sources of data) as 
an important factor in influencing the extent of support received by sick and disabled 
claimants, the amount of money put into the contracts was also cited frequently as an 
issue. 
Forget for a moment all this about parking and just giving up on people because they 
won't get a job. There's just not enough money in the contracts for what our clients 
[people with moderate to severe mental health conditions and learning difficulties] need. 
Going off other programmes our members [voluntary sector health and disability 
organisations] been involved in, you're looking at well into the thousands, and more if 
they need long-term support in employment. Work Programme and to a lesser extent 
Work Choice just do not provide anything like that amount of resource. [Regarding 
Work Programme] You're looking at a £400 attachment fee and then some investment in 
anticipation of outcomes, which obvious varies with the individual, but on average that's 
another £500 to a grand. Realistically, that total of £900, £1000, £1110 is just enough to 
buy the kind of intensive support that is needed. You can design your contracts whatever
way you like – all outcomes or all service [fee] or whatever mix – if the money isn't in 
them, then the support won't be either.
Interview, DPO representative, January 2013
This is very much corroborated by a survey of providers done by DWP in its 
evaluation of the Work Programme (see Table 8/17, below) and by modelling of 
Work Programme spending performed by Centre for Social and Economic 
Inclusion (2014).  Around half of providers in both years the DWP survey was 
done said that the price they get for the 3 ESA groups did not cover costs, and 
well over half – 72% in 2013 and 67% in 2014 – said that the programme did not 
offer adequate resources to offer specialist services to sick and disabled claimants.
The CESI survey shows significant underspend on the ESA groups as a result of 
lower than expected referrals and outcomes, and these are likely to have been 
passed down to participants in the form of reduced services than providers had 
intended. The greater underspend for the Volunteer group is consistent with 
parking of and underprovision to participants with greater support needs.
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On average, does the price you receive for an outcome cover the cost of 
the support you provide for each customer group? % Answering no
JSA 18-25 34 21 116/81
JSA 25+ 34 21 116/81
ESA-Volunteer 51 47 116/79
ESA-New 56 62102 116/79
ESA-Ex IB 45 56 116/79
IB/IS Volunteers 42 41 113/75
Do your Work Programme contract(s) offer adequate resource to enable 
you to provide specialist services to customers with specific needs (e.g. 
Customers with disabilities/health conditions, ex-offenders, drug and 
alcohol support)?  % Answering no
72 67 195/147
Source: (Department for Work and Pensions & Government Social Research, 2014a)
102 This is consistent with the lowered participation bar (to ready for work within 12 months).
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Table 8/18: ESA groups Work Programme spending – expected, CESI modelled and % 
underspend
Expected Modelled Underspend
All ESA Groups £1169 £690 41%
ESA Volunteer £1376 £556 59.6%
ESA New £1111 £684 38.4%
ESA Ex-IB £1023 £863 15.6%
Source: Centre for Social and Economic Inclusion (2014), p.27 
Calculations: For underspend, subtract Modelled from Expected, divide product by Expected and 
multiply by 100 to get a percentage.
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While there is fairly broad consensus on the existence of parking of harder-to-
help sick and disabled participants of the Work Programme, this is less the case 
for Work Choice, and the evidence is certainly more mixed. The Work Choice 
funding model appears to be much more able to discourage parking, not least 
because caseloads on Work Choice were much lower:  
The differences in funding regimes did appear to ensure enhanced levels of resourcing on
the former [Work Choice] in terms of areas such as adviser case loads. [Unlike Work 
Choice] there were also some clear indications of parking on the WP […] where the 
differential pricing model appeared to have no impact in terms of addressing this issue as
intended.
Researcher involved in Work Choice evaluation. Interview, August 2015
Though the 70% service fee seemingly does discourage the widespread parking 
seen on Work Programme, consistent with the data on the nature of the intake, 
Work Choice does not seemingly deliver the level of specialist support as 
previous programmes, and several interviewees attributed this to the emphasis on
outcomes in Work Choice compared to other programmes: 
The 30% [of total payment tied to outcomes] thing is both good and bad. I think it makes 
the service providers work a lot harder and not just get someone into supported 
employment and then don't bother progressing them any further and the management of
the programme from both DWP and providers is a lot better [than WorkSTEP and WPP],
but on the other hand, it does make providers cut down on support for some of the more 
vulnerable claimants that they know aren't going to get those unsupported outcomes.
Interview, DPO representative, January 2014
In the publication of its programme user and staff consultation, The Shaw Trust – 
the largest Work Choice provider by quite some distance – says with perhaps 
surprising frankness that the current WC funding model that rewards only a job 
outcome and sustainment does not allow them to provide appropriate support to 
those furthest from the labour market
There has been an acknowledgement [sic] by staff directly delivering Work Choice 
services that if people with the most complex needs are to be supported into 
employment, an alternative contract funding structure is needed. In particular, many 
staff have conveyed a desire to move away from a funding structure that purely 
incentivises the achievement of job starts and sustained job outcomes. Instead, many 
would like to see the achievement of milestone outcomes such as participation in 
voluntary work rewarded in addition to job outcome payments, to ensure those furthest 
from the labour market will be genuinely engaged in programme delivery:
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Some staff were concerned that the progressions some customers with complex needs 
made towards achieving sustained work were not acknowledged by the current payment 
structure on Work Choice. This could lead to negative behaviours. For example, staff felt 
that by specifying that a job outcome could only be achieved by securing work for at 
least sixteen hours a week, employment opportunities of fewer hours were not always 
being considered 
The Shaw Trust (2013), p.21 and 34
As with the Work Programme, this is likely to been aggravated by the fact that 
there has been downward pressure on costs within the contracts. This was clear 
from the per-head spending figures for Work Choice and WorkSTEP in Table 
8/5103 and was a concern raised by a number interviewees:
It's pretty obvious that they [DWP] have been trying to reduce their costs in Work 
Choice compared to [Work]STEP. The 70% service fee is really helpful in providing 
support up front, but you've still got much less money coming down the line overall. 
That means pretty tough decisions in terms of what kind of support you can offer and 
who's going to get it. If you're looking at someone who needs a support worker or some 
really intensive CM [condition management], there's not enough [money] in Work 
Choice for that.
DPO representative, interview September 2014
103 To save the reader going back to that page, the figures were £11,717 for WorkSTEP and £3148 for 
Work Choice.
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8.5 The form and strength of the institutionalisation of activation 
for sick and disabled claimants in the UK
8.5.1 The Scope of Activation
The scope of active efforts for sick and disabled claimants has seemingly narrowed 
over the period of interest, both in the range of claimants targeted and – though this is
less certain given the difficulty in establishing the reach of some of the pre-2010 
programmes – the total number of claimants activated. The beginning of the period of 
interest came amidst an attempt through Pathways to Work to engage all new and 
some existing claimants of IB and then ESA in at least a course of work-focused 
interviews, with a range of support through the Condition Management Programme 
and other pre-exsting programmes like New Deal for Disabled People available on a 
voluntary basis thereafter. Though a precise number of claimants engaging with 
Pathways – and the duration of their engagement – is difficult to pin down by of the 
non-recording of anything other that start data for Jobcentre-Plus Pathways Choices 
and the very limited data for Provider-led Pathways – the throughput of claimants 
certainly dwarfed anything previously attempted and I am confident for the reasons 
outlined in section 8.3 that it likely to have been bigger than successor programmes. 
Pathways was notable in not being as strongly outcomes focused as later programmes 
were to become, and, accordingly, there were not any participation barriers such as a 
capability for work in a maximum period of time.  
With a focus on work trials and on supported employment, Work Preparation 
Programme and WorkSTEP also offered support that was not strongly focused on job 
outcomes in the standard labour market for claimants with higher support needs, 
though, paradoxically, there does appear to have been an element of screening-out of 
more distant claimants on WPP and the work-readiness requirement for WorkSTEP 
was more demanding than later supported employment programmes. For those 
requiring sheltered training or employment, around 3000 places were available in 
Residential Training Colleges or Remploy Supported Enterprises. Although the 
balance of places between these three main types of support is likely to have been out 
of proportion to those requiring the support – interviewees spoke of the insufficient 
number of supported and sheltered places – there was at least a range of support 
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offered to distinct groups of the sick and disability benefits population, and with many
entrance points.
The new programmes that came to replace these in 2010 and 2011 constitute a regime 
that is subtly but importantly different in scope. The Work Choice programme – now 
the only specialist support operated by DWP – takes a notably different set of 
participants than previously, more focused on more general health conditions like 
mild to moderate mental health conditions than, as with WorkSTEP, specific 
disabilities and learning difficulties. There also appears to have been a strong 
crowding-out effect on ESA/IB claimants since JSA claimants were allowed to access 
the scheme, again in contrast with WorkSTEP and consistent with existing theory 
(Mabbett 2003).  A number of interviewees said that Work Choice is not appropriate 
for the hardest-to-help claimants – particularly an issue given the ending of support 
to RTCs and the Remploy factories – and indeed, the per-head funding is far lower 
than WorkSTEP.
This problem is made more acute by the fact that access to the Work 
Programme has run far below what was originally forecast, seemingly in part due to 
the initially high participation requirements and a much larger proportion of ESA 
claimants not being as ready for work as was expected.  Whilst Pathways was 
seemingly very effective at engaging people on a voluntary basis, this is not the case 
for the Work Programme, which has had very limited voluntary participation.  This is 
relevant to the scope of activation because it means that if it is assumed that most 
voluntary participants are more distant from work – which should be the case under 
the ESA-WCA system – the hardest-to-help and most in need of support are not being
reached by either of the two current programmes. 
A characteristic shared by both the pre- and post-2010/11 systems is the 
seemingly fairly limited engagement of existing claimants. The stocks v flows – in the 
DWP terminology – issue has been a prominent one over the course of the period of 
interest.  Whilst all the programmes in the period of interest were and are open to 
new and existing claimants, the emphasis appears to have been quickly re-engaging 
recent claimants, rather than reaching back into the stock of exiting claimants. As 
several interviewees told me, there was interest in making significant inroads into 
existing IB stock around 2006/7, but this appeared to drop away due to cost 
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constraints.  Although it was not intended, participation of ESA groups on the WP has
largely been by new rather than existing ESA claimants.  
This is characteristic of a broader blindness to the long-term progression of 
claimants.  The UK system tends to see the claimant only in the context of their 
current benefit claim and/or programme participation, and there is very little evidence
of a strategy to progress claimants through the various types of support on offer, and 
eventually into work, even when – as is the case with ESA-WRAG – this is the policy 
intention. 
8.5.2 Political commitment 
The political commitment to the sick and disabled agenda appears to be relatively 
shallow – and becoming more so over time – on the measures that were offered by the
framework. 
Intensive research, evaluation and trialling is a reliable indicator of deep and 
substantive commitment and these do appear to decline over the period. Pathways in 
particular was extremely intensely evaluated and a whole range of additions and 
variations – the Job Retention and Rehabilitation Pilots especially – were tested. This 
has been noticeably less the case with recent schemes. Part of the explanation for this 
is likely to be the fact that these activities are now within the remit of providers rather
than government, though notably evaluation of current programmes – still part of the 
DWP's role – has been much reduced and condensed.  Similarly, the agenda appears to
have been relatively weakly anchored in government/quasi-governmental institutions,
with several being set-up and then quickly abolished over the period of interest.
Quite some effort was expended in pulling together expenditure data, 
something which does not appear to have been previously done for studies of this area
of policy in the UK.  The expenditure on employment support for the target groups 
shows no clear trend for most of the period and declines noticeably post-2010/11. This 
is entirely consistent with the account in the previous section of narrowing scope, 
both in absolute terms and towards easier-to-help claimants. If per head costs are 
compared for the pre-and post-2010/11 schemes, they are substantially lower on the 
latter than the former, and, according to interviewees, this was an explicit strategy. In 
particular, the referral cap on Work Choice is a very clear example of strong controls 
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on rising expenditure, despite seemingly universal agreement between DPOs and 
providers that it is oversubscribed and should be expanded.
Perhaps the best indicator of the nature of the political commitment is the 
development of policy post-Pathways. It was a very strong theme of people 
interviewed about Pathways that its perceived failure had a significant impact on the 
scale of the DWP's ambitions regarding the activation of sick and disabled claimants, 
and had been influential in the smaller scale and less generously funded schemes that 
succeeded it.
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8.5.3 The institutional promotion and protection of the right to activation
A key aspect of the institutionalisation of activation has to be the extent to which a 
claimant's access to activation is not a matter of discretion, but by right. An analysis of
what participants of the various UK programmes are entitled to – and on what 
grounds – shows that access to activation support is contingent on the fulfilling of 
various eligibility criteria – more often than not related to work readiness. A right to 
at least some basic support to return to employment has never really existed as a 
recognised principle. It was embodied to some extent in Jobcentre Plus Pathways 
Choices, but has been lost in the move over to the Work Programme and its Black Box 
principle. The WP's minimum standards are on the whole so vague as to be 
unenforceable, and whilst participants can draw on MSDSs in a complaint about the 
non-provision of support to the provider ICE and Parliamentary Ombudsman, 
complaints procedures are not promoted by the vast majority of WP providers, and 
very few cases are ever investigated by ICE. The situation appears to better on Work 
Choice – where there is a stated list of services that providers are encouraged to offer 
– but nonetheless, government cannot – and does not appear to want to – enforce 
these and there is no formal inspection of providers, as was the case on WorkSTEP.
The apportionment of support does to some significant extent relate to the 
categorisation of the claimant, rather than a personal assessment, particularly in later 
programmes. As was discussed in the earlier section on the scope of activation, 
Pathways support was available to anyone getting IB. On the Work Programme, 
however, whilst any ESA claimant can participate, DWP's has emphasis has been on 
channelling new rather than existing claimants to the programme. Once in the 
programme, the amount providers are paid depends on their benefit group, which has 
been roundly criticised as a poor indicator of a participant's level of need. Whilst some
ESA/IB groups do attract a higher payment, this is not the case for all of them. Further,
as the next section discusses, these incentives have proved largely ineffective in 
encouraging providers to focus on these groups and to offer appropriate services. 
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8.5.4 Security of the right to activation
A sign of a strongly institutionalised regime is one in which a large proportion of 
claimants of claimants are able to access support, and this does not appear to be the 
case for the UK. Without access to Pathways exit data for the pre-2010/11 system and 
data on Jobcentre Plus Offer services for post 2010/11, it is difficult to establish an 
activation rate with the precision it was possible to do for Denmark. However, judging
from the Work Programme – on which 15% of all ESA claimants were enrolled by the 
end of the period – it is unlikely to be significantly in excess of 20%.
Regarding the success of the steering tools to ensure claimants get the support 
they need, again it should be taken as a sign of weak institutionalisation that these do 
not appear to work well, especially on the Work Programme. There was wide 
agreement amongst both interviewees; provider, DPO and other representatives who 
have given evidence on the issue to public inquiries  and the data on the provision of 
specialist support relative to those needing it, that the differential payments system 
does not drive provider behaviour as intended, and this is linked significantly to the 
very high proportion of the overall payment that is attached to job outcomes. The 
majority service fee system operating on Work Choice does, however, appear to 
design this behaviour out to some significant extent, but this is likely to have been 
aided by the much lower proportion of harder-to-help ESA claimants accessing the 
programme.
Unlike Denmark, where rich sub-national data is available, it has not been 
possible to explore sub-national variation in the security of the right to activation. 
This would have required a  qualitative analysis of different providers in different 
areas which would have not been possible given the resources available to me.
8.5.5 Conclusions
The British case is a good illustration of the value of looking at activation regimes for 
sick and disabled claimants over a period of time, and not just as point-in-time 
snapshot.  Even over a relatively short space time – 8 years – it is possible to detect a 
number of changes that add up to a significant change in the character of the regime. 
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When the account starts in 2006/7, the UK government is in the middle of a large-scale
intervention in the form of Pathways to Work, offering support – albeit fairly limited 
in an internationally comparative context – to most IB and ESA claimants. After this is
seen to fail, the commitment becomes much narrower – increasingly towards the 
easier-to-help claimants. This change is reinforced firstly by changes in the delivery of
support, away from prescribed support by government and towards 'Black Box' 
provision by contracted providers, for the most part on an outcomes basis that seems 
to encourage parking of harder-to-help claimants. Secondly, an underestimating of the
nature of the caseload – much less ready for work than expected – means that the 
strategy to prioritise those ready for work within 12 months served a smaller and 
smaller proportion of the overall caseload. This demonstrates the value in looking at 
policy efforts relative to the nature of the benefits caseload and the range of claimants.
All this has been underpinned by very limited recognition of a claimant's non-
conditional right to a minimum level of support.
8.6 Epilogue: Policy learning from the Work Programme and ESA-
WRAG
Some policy developments in the past year (2014/15) give credence to some of the 
points that have been made in this chapter, and some of the weaknesses of the UK 
approach that have been identified here also appear to have been identified by 
government.
Regarding the existence of a rights framework and government monitoring of 
the type of support offered, these were issues that a Work Programme review 
committee examined, and the proposal to strengthen them have been taken up by 
DWP.  A working group of WP provider representatives have recommended that at 
the end of the current WP contracts, DWP replace MSDSs with Customer Service 
Standards (CSS), “to ensure the service is structured to meet the personal needs of all 
customers and not a minimum level of service.” (Department for Work and Pensions 
2014e, p.8). This would include what support the provider should offer at a number of 
defined points – Pre-programme engagement; Programme engagement; Pre-work 
Support; In- work Support; and Programme Exit. It was also recommended that the 
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quality of service offered by the provider's CSS should be formally monitored as part 
of the contract compliance process.  All these recommendations were broadly 
accepted by DWP and at the end of the period of interest were being tested in the new
contract with Intraining, which joined the Work Programme as a provider in CPA 18 
after Newcastle College Group's contract was terminated (ibid).
DWP also appear to be seeking to expand the scope of support provided to 
ESA-WRAG claimants not enrolled on the two live programmes, and to to take on a 
more interventionist role in terms of prescribing the nature of support. From 
November 2013 to August 2016, DWP is testing health interventions – the first 
government-initiated health support since CMP – for 18-24 month prognosis ESA-
WRAG claimants. Claimants will  have appointments with healthcare professionals 
provided by Ingeus as a condition of receiving their benefit, and these will be 




Chapter 9 Comparing institutionalisation
9.1 Central political commitment
The nature and basis of the political commitment to providing employment support to
sick and disabled non-employment benefit claimants is clearly different in the two 
countries. In the UK, it is an essentially strategic one, based on the perceived political 
and economic benefits of moving such claimants into work, and as such the strength 
of the commitment is a function of how those outcomes are valued and deemed 
possible. Commitment appears to have reduced in the face of prominent programme 
failures, and is reflected in diminished research and trialling of specialist support, as 
well as a post-Pathways aversion to launching new specialist programmes. This comes
in the context of employment support being a basically discretionary service for 
government.  In Denmark, on the contrary, the commitment to provide support to sick
and disabled claimants is rooted in a much broader and deeper commitment to 
activation as a right, and is anchored in a wide range of governmental and quasi-
governmental institutions set up to promote the agenda, trial new services and spread 
best practice. Despite this, Danish governments are clearly not isolated the effects of 
failing programmes, and the perceived failure of Flexjobs to reduce the size of 
Disability Pension caseload appears to have triggered a downwards revision of the 
level of commitment to such programmes, particularly budgetary commitment.
Considerable effort has been made to put together a set of expenditure figures for 
Denmark and the UK. Some justification of this is required as – given Denmark's 
longstanding position as a very high spender on ALMP (ranking consistently the 
highest spender in the EU and OECD) – an examination of expenditure was never 
likely to show anything other than a very wide gap in spending, and indeed this is the
case. Specialist sickness and disability spending relative to both benefits expenditure 
and overall ALMP expenditure is many times higher in Denmark than the UK and this
appears to pay for more frequent, intensive and extensive activation efforts in the 
latter than the former – as laid out in 9.1 and 9.3.
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However, although the overall levels of expenditure are as expected, looking at 
expenditure was valuable for some of the other details it has uncovered. Firstly, 
breaking down overall figures into individual schemes has enabled me to confirm the 
findings elsewhere in the study about the emphasis in spending in both countries on 
measures for claimants relatively close to the labour market and without multiple and 
complex barriers. Most new spending in Denmark has been on the Flexjobs scheme, 
whilst spending in the UK has increasingly been at the expense of schemes for 
claimants furthest from the labour market.  This is related to the second important 
finding that – whatever the two country's respective starting points in terms of 
spending – there appears to be a trend in both towards a political reluctance to spend 
on long term and open-ended schemes, with the time-limiting, shift towards lower 
hours jobs and other measures to lower the cost of Flexjobs; the general push in 
Denmark to have much shorter and therefore less expensive interventions – the chief 
victim of which has been Vocational Rehabilitation, and in the UK, significantly 
reduced unit costs in sheltered employment schemes and the end to funding of 
Remploy Sheltered Enterprises. Similarly, in both countries there has been a 
reluctance to fund interventions aimed at helping existing, long-term claimants at an 
adequate level. The examples here are the scrapping of plans in the UK to invest in 
getting 100,000 stock IB claimants into work and the Danish government's funding of 
the new scheme for Disability Pensioners – broadly equivalent to stock IB – at a far 
lower rate than comparable schemes and far lower than had been recommended.
As explained in Chapter 3, the level of expenditure is less directly relevant to 
the form or strength of institutionalisation than some of the other factors discussed in 
this research, but it is an important indicator of the nature of the political 
commitment, and is part of the broader context of the activation of sick and disabled 
claimants. It is also likely to to combine other factors to impact on the level of 
institutionalisation – falling per-head funding is likely to increase pressures for 
parking, for example.  
Perhaps the most important finding regarding expenditure is less the amount 
disbursed and trends, but how central government funds sickness and disability 
activation, which is notably different in the two countries. Notwithstanding some 
relatively small amounts of ad hoc spending through the Prevention and Development
Funds, Danish governments have relatively limited autonomy over the funding of 
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activation.  Municipalities decide on the size and the nature of the activation 
commitment they wish to make – for example,  whether to spend on more or less 
expensive programmes; whether to activate for longer or shorter periods and the 
types of instruments they use – and central government is bound to refund that to the
level stated by the refund rules existing at the time and cannot reduce funding at will. 
Governments can and do seek to change these rules – it changed Flexjobs refunds in 
2001, 2006 and 2013, for example – but this arrangement appears to offer activation 
spending a bulwark against central government budget cuts, at least in the short term.
Whilst the flipside of this is that funding is at the discretion of local government, 7.4 
showed that there are generally – but not universally, witness the steep decline in 
Vocational Rehabilitation spending –  effective incentives in place to guard against 
local governments cutting funding to sickness and disability activation measures. 
The system is quite the opposite in the UK. DWP and ultimately HM Treasury 
have the main say on the year-to-year funding of ALMP. Chapter 8 showed a number 
of examples – the scrapping of Building on the New Deal; abandoning of plans to 
invest in a 1000,000 reduction in IB stock and Treasury pressure against a replacement
for Pathways – where planned spending has not been taken forward at the behest of 
ministers. Similarly, unlike in Denmark, government can and does directly control the 
inflow of claimants in schemes, and has held down referrals to Work Choice.  As 
Chapter 8 showed throughout, if government decides to reduce the scope and level of 
expenditure, then there is relatively little protection against this.
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Graph 9/1: Total expenditure on Specialist ALMP as a percentage of total expenditure on ALMP and expenditure on incapacity-related benefits, 
UK and Denmark, 2007/08-2012-13
Sources: As for Graphs 7/2, 7/3, 8/1 and 8/2
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9.2 The scope and nature of the activation offer
The scope of activation is an idea that has been used throughout this study.  Scope is 
used in two ways – to refer to the range of barriers tackled and, arising from this, the 
range of claimants helped. Scope is relevant to institutionalisation because, if a narrow
range of barriers and the claims with them are the target, then this will poorly serve 
the claimant pool if it is diverse, as it is in both countries.  Measuring the security of 
activation is important, but it loses meaning and relevance if it does not sit alongside a
consideration of how broad a range of claimants are included.
One of the convictions about extant approaches to understanding the 
activation of sick and disabled claimants in contemporary welfare to work systems 
from which this thesis stems is that seeking to categorise approaches according to the 
work-first versus human capital development dichotomy is too limited. This is not to 
say that it is not a useful way to think about activation – indeed, the issue of outcome 
and process targets, for example, is useful in determining the scope of activation and 
has been argued to be an important factor in the institutionalisation of employment 
services for this group. Nor is critiquing this approach the same as saying that looking
at the content of policy is not important – indeed, a significant proportion of each 
chapter outlines the policy mix in the respective country. Rather, the thesis has tried 
to show the value in examining the extent to which the policies and programmes on 
offer reach the full range of claimants needing support – in the terms I have used, the 
scope of the activation offer – and to show that this does necessarily neatly map onto 
the work first versus human capital development conceptualisation. A work-first 
approach is very likely to exclude claimants further from the labour market, but the 
opposite is not necessarily also true: a programme may invest significant resources 
into developing a claimant's human development with a view to sustained, long-term 
(rather than rapid labour market entry), but at the same time be narrowly focused on 
a small proportion of the overall claimant population and/or have demanding entry 
requirements which preclude a significant proportion of the claimant pool.
There is a conceptual and a methodological point to make here that was made 
in earlier chapters, but is worth reiterating: that the nature of an activation regime 
cannot be derived only from the content of the ALMPs in place, but that we should 
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also consider how these policies are applied to the claimant pool – i.e. how widely – 
and the extent to which different sub-groups of the claimant pool are selected for 
support – and what factors influence their application. The first of these is examined 
in this section, the second in the next section, 9.3, and their combined impact on 
institutionalisation in the last section of this chapter.
At first sight, the overview of the Danish sickness and disability activation offer give 
in 7.2 does not show anything different than what might be expected of Danish ALMP
given its history a leading user of and spender on activation. The core activation offer 
goes beyond standard activation measures like jobsearch advice and activities and also
offers more resource intensive measures such as job subsidies; re-training, and 
opportunities to gain new qualifications.  These are part of a core offer available to all 
non-employed and comparing the service mix for sick and disabled groups with others
shows an appropriate difference, with more of an emphasis on training and 
qualification measures. These are available in low or quite high quantity and intensity 
and can be applied for long periods of time. These standard measures are often made 
available to sick and disabled claimants on different terms to UI or SA claimants, with 
higher subsidies offered for longer in the case of Flexjobs, and more retraining and 
education programmes in the form of Vocational Rehabilitation.  In comparison, the 
UK offer appears to be considerably more narrow, and narrowing: a core of work-
focused interviews and employability support supplemented by some limited 
supported and sheltered employment places that appear to have gradually fallen away
as governments have become less willing to sponsor defined schemes of specialist 
support.
However, when these are put in the context of what specific sickness and 
disability groups they are offered to; the overall size and nature of the claimant pool 
and the requirements for entry into the schemes, the picture changes somewhat. A 
very large proportion of Danish efforts are focused on relatively recent labour market 
leavers.  By the end of the period of interest, the two biggest – in terms of the 
numbers treated – activation efforts were for Sickness Benefit claimants and Flexjobs. 
By definition104, SB claimants will be, at most, one year out of the labour market. The 
104 Or rather, almost by definition. SB claimants can claim beyond 52 weeks, but this relatively rare 
given the disincentive for municipalities to keep paying SB beyond one year. I am also assuming 
here, I think fairly, that most claimants have come to SB from employment, rather than another 
benefit/scheme. 
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next most numerous scheme for most of the period, Rehabilitation, also took more 
participants from SB than from anywhere else. This means that there is not very much
else on offer for those who have passed through these measures and not been able to 
return to employment. Flexjobs – which was brought in to divert claimants away from
DP – was designed to plug this gap, but it does not appear to have been used for this 
purpose, and there has been some crowding-out of people with the greatest capacity 
reductions. Even if this had not been the case, Flexjobs only assumes a capacity 
reduction due to sickness or disability, not also the additional labour market barriers 
that we know arise when people become non-employed for those reasons. 
Putting so much effort into helping the recently non-employed for reasons of 
sickness or disability makes strategic sense as it is stopping short-term problems 
turning into long-term exclusion. However, this clearly does not work as intended as 
the total DP caseload only decreased by 6000 over the period of interest, despite the 
significant upswing in the activation efforts for SB claimants and ~25,000 more Flexjob
awards. As a result, for most of the period there was a gap in provision for claimants 
who were not helped by the SB regime and who could not get a Flexjob, as well as the 
existing ~250,000 DP claimants. That Denmark is now effectively replacing DP with an
activation scheme formally bringing together health (including mental health), 
education and social approaches gives credence to this claim that there has hitherto 
been a provision gap for claimants with multiple and complex barriers. 
Although the UK activation offer kicks in much later and does not target 
recent labour market leavers as in Denmark, there appears to be a similar focus on a 
relatively narrow part of the claimant pool.  Even supposedly specialist schemes have 
had, as in Denmark, relatively high participation requirements and have assumed a 
relatively high level of work capacity in order for claimants to be able to take 
advantage of them, and with Work Choice, as with Flexjobs, there appears to have 
been some crowding-out of claimants further from the labour market in the 
competition to get what specialist support is on offer. As was the case in Denmark 
until recently, there has not been a clear strategy for sick and disabled non-employed 
who are not able to successfully make use of the core activation offer and so, again 
similarly, there has emerged a group – the stock IB claimants and, latterly, ESA-
Support and ESA-WRAG claimants with longer prognoses – that are poorly served in 
terms of the wide availability of specialist support. With regard this latter point, a core
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difference, however,  is that the direction of travel is quite different – the UK already 
having tried; failed and largely given-up on integrated approaches to long-term stock 
claimants, whilst Denmark is just setting off on that policy journey.
The scope of policy as it emerges from a consideration of what is offered and to
whom is only first part of the policies stories being told, however. Although the stories
hitherto have been somewhat similar than might have been expected, what appears to
distinguish them is the extent to which government is able to embed the activation 
offer in the everyday practice of the sub-national units that deliver activation.
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9.3 The institutional promotion and protection of the right to 
activation
Whether someone subject to activation has rights to employment support as well as to
benefit is not one that has been much of a part of activation studies, but it surely must
merit consideration when investigating whether provision of activation support has 
become well-entrenched in the workings of activation regimes.  However broad the 
activation offer is and however well-backed by adequate expenditure, political intent 
and regulation, if the workless citizen cannot claim support by right, 
institutionalisation should be considered to be weak, as expenditure and political 
support can be reduced and wane, and regulation and steering of providers can fail to 
have the intended impact. 
Whether the concept of a right to activation exists as an idea; if it does, how 
this idea finds expression in a statement of rights; what legal basis this has and how it 
can be used to seek redress have all been examined in the two countries.  Whilst it is 
possible to successfully seek extra support in the event of poor or underprovision of 
support in both countries, the position of the claimant appears to be much stronger in 
Denmark than the UK. A benefit claimant's entitlement to support is clearly and 
quantitatively – i.e. the length and frequency of the support – stated in law, with a 
legally enshrined complaints process through the Social Appeals Board, which, along 
with municipal complaints procedures, appears to be fairly widely used.  Crucially, 
legislation recognises that sick and disabled cliamants may require additional support,
and they are generally entitled to longer minimum periods of support than 
unemployed claimants of Unemployment Insurance and Social Assistance benefits. In 
line with the findings on the scope of activation, however, what is guaranteed to 
claimants differs notably between claimant groups.  In several interviews Labour 
Market Authority and Ministry of Employment policymakers described part of central
government's role being the protection of individual claimants right to employment 
support, indirectly through incentive structures and directly through regulation. In 
contrast, the support available in the UK described is very clearly not provided by 
right. The UK PES and contracted providers do not have sufficiently specified or 
enforceable sets of service guarantees for any realistic right to support to exist, and 
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like so much else in the UK system, it is assumed that the maintenance of an 
acceptable basic standard of support will arise from providers pursuing profit under 
the contract and payment systems established, rather than because claimants have an 
entitlement to such support.
This extent to which a right to employment support exists is important in 
understanding institutionalisation not just in respect of the relationship between 
individual claimant and the ultimate provider of service – for the former to assert his 
or her right against the latter – but for the relationship between the provider and 
government – for government to manage providers, which is easier if there is a clear 
set of service standards against which they can be managed. This is the focus of the 
next part of this section
Although, as discussed earlier in this chapter and in Chapter 7, the Danish activation 
offer is selective in terms of the groups that are usefully able to access it, once 
someone is registered on a programme or benefit, there is a system of institutional 
controls that very strongly promotes provision of services to them, albeit a system 
which does not always work as well as intended.  Most important of these is that there
is a general principle underpinning the financing of activation that it should be 
cheaper for the municipalities to support someone whilst in active measures than not, 
and so active periods are more generously refunded than 'passive' ones. Alongside 
this, non-delivery of interventions which are guaranteed to the claimant attracts a 
penalty.  Also worth noting here is the Match system that was established to 
distinguish between different levels of need and to produce a targeting of support on 
claimants not close to the labour market. Match 2 claimants by right get more 
frequent interviews than Match 1 claimants, for example and the barrier is set low 
enough that around 85% of claimants/participants are classified as Match 2.  Thus, the 
Danish system appears to create a right to activation and, uses the categorisation of 
claimants and the financing system to very strongly protect and promote this right. 
The systems Denmark has in place in principle and design, even if not always in 
practice, establish the provision of employment support as a default for most 
claimants and, crucially, decouples the provision of support from an assessment of the 
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likelihood of the claimant's entry into employment.
The Danish Match system looks very much like the post-2008 system in the 
UK, where applicants for ESA are assessed into three different categories – work-
ready and therefore not eligible for the benefit; the ESA-Work Related Activity Group 
and the ESA Support Group, each with differing levels of conditionality and different 
access to the Work Programme. Both systems use a personal assessment to categorise 
the claimant into one of three groups, each offering differing levels of support. There 
are three crucial differences, however. Firstly, the UK lacks the very strong 
institutional-regulatory drivers Denmark has that promotes the provision of some 
kind of support as the default approach to non-employed people. For claimants who 
are not registered in a programme – which is the majority – there is no clear 
framework or accompanying set of incentives for the responsible body (DWP through
Jobcentre Plus) to progress the claimant towards programme participation. Two yearly
interventions are available through the Jobcentre Plus offer, but aside from this, most 
ESA-WRAG claimants get limited support until they can access a programme. Even 
when enrolled in a programme, DWP lacks the powers the Danish authorities have to 
ensure that interventions are delivered appropriately and on time, and only has some 
indirect control through payment-by-results contracts which, as has been shown and 
as will be discussed in 9.4, do not work well.  Secondly, whilst the Danish system 
priortises the majority of claimants for support by categorising most claimants as 
Match 1 and Match 2, the UK system is more narrowly focused: only ESA-WRAG 
claimants ready for work within 12 months (previously, the bar was set as high as 3 
months) and the ESA Ex-IB claimants are prioritised for Work Programme support. 
Almost in direct opposition to Denmark, there is a rationing of support related to the 
claimant's distance from the labour market.  Thirdly, whilst the Danish Match system 
has a clear trajectory for those furthest from the labour market – Match 3 – this does 
not seem to be the case for the equivalent UK group. Match 3 claimants cannot access 
activation programmes as defined by the AEEA, but they can access a range of 
statutory health, education and social work support with a view to helping them move
closer to the labour market. Although UK governments have toyed with various 
schemes to provide some similar regime for the ESA-Support Group and its 
antecedents – PEP and the Gregg Personalised Conditionality approach being 
examples – none of these have ever reached implementation, and so the UK's only 
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strategy for such claimants is to allow them to self-refer to Work Choice or Work 
Programme and hope that providers can offer appropriate support.
The caveat to this picture of distance between the two countries in terms of the
promotion and protection of the right to activation is that they do appear to be 
moving slowly in each other's direction.  In Denmark, this very strong push for 
activation has produced a volume and type – long, resource intensive courses – of 
activation that governments have become gradually less tolerant of, both politically 
and in terms of the cost.  This would explain why the centre right Rasmussen 
administrations (2001-2011)  have tried to steer municipalities towards shorter periods
of activation – with some success – and towards labour market-related measures like 
traineeships, rather than more expensive classroom training and education courses. 
Similarly, the UK is currently testing a stronger set of customer service standards to 
govern its contracted employment programmes and trialling measures for ESA-WRAG
18-24 prognosis claimants.
9.4 The security of activation
This section is the final stage in the analysis, looking at how successful the 
mechanisms described in the previous section have been in driving the provision of 
activation for sick and disabled benefit claimants in the two countries, examining 
what proportion of the claimant pool has been able to access support, particularly 
those further from the labour market, and the extent to which parking and similar 
gaming behaviour has been tackled. 
The quality and availability of the data that is recorded for Denmark provides a very 
precise picture of both the proportion of claimants in activation and how long they 
were activated for, very useful measures in trying to establish how secure access to 
activation is. In terms of the reach of activation, sick and disabled claimants are not 
significantly less likely to be activated than standard unemployed groups, and Share 
Activated is significantly higher for Rehabilitation participants. Additionally, Share 
Activated strengthens for all groups over the time period studied, and very 
significantly for Sickness Benefit claimants. This should be taken as a sign of strong 
institutionalisation – it appears that sick and disabled groups do not face significant 
additional barriers than other groups, and accessing support becomes more 
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widespread over time. If a weighted average is calculated of all sick and disabled 
groups Share Activated increases from 42% in 2007 to 59% in 2013, before dropping in 
the final year of interest, and none of these figures take into account an additional 
~60,000 Flexjob susbidies.  
The UK does not compare favourably to this. The high participation bars and 
the crowding-out of sickness and disability benefit claimants inevitably mean that 
there will a much lower proportion of claimants access support, even with a greater 
proportion of claimants subject to conditionality. Given the paucity of UK data, it is 
difficult to develop as rich or as extensive a set of figures to compare with Denmark, 
but the best available is the percentage of ESA claimants accessing the Work 
Programme that were presented in Graph 8/6, which is comparable with Share 
activated as it is similarly the participation in activation as a proportion of the overall 
benefit caseload. At its highpoint, this is 13% for ESA claimants105. Even accounting for
the fact that these figures do not include Work Choice, this is much lower than for 
Denmark.
Perhaps most impressive about Denmark is the consistency of activation over 
the whole range of claimants – close to; somewhat distant and far from the labour 
market.  Activation Share and Intensity does not significantly differ between Match 1 
and Match 2, which would suggest that measures to counteract parking work well. 
Even Match 3 claimants, who are not required to participate and who municipalities 
are not required to help, are not significantly far behind in terms of the reach and 
intensity of activation considering their distance from the labour market.  Again, the 
UK does not compare favourably. ESA support claimants have not accessed 
programmes in significant numbers, and their rate of access runs far below ESA-
WRAG claimants. Though this is expected given the different terms of access, it is 
worth noting that the forecasts were far higher and previous programmes have been 
105 Whether to compare Share Activated with WP access data for ESA-WRAG (27%) or with all ESA 
claimants (13% in the final year) was a knotty methodological decision that is worth making a small
commentary on, being as it is a very good example of the difficulties in comparing activation in two
very different benefits systems. The problem is that the ESA group contains many claimants who in
Denmark would be in Disability Pension and therefore are out of the active system entirely. 
Comparing the entire ESA group, then, would not be comparing like with like. Solving this by 
including DP claimants at 0% Share Activated would, however, have seriously skewed the Danish 
data. At the same time, however,  comparing only ESA-WRAG with a mix of conditional and 
voluntary claimants is also not comparing like with like. In truth, there is no easy or neat decision, 
and such is the reality of comparative research. In the end, it was decided to use the combined ESA 
and Support figure on the grounds that the Work Programme failure to adequately engage Support 
claimants compared to previous programmes was a key aspect of developments in the UK.
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able to engage such claimants in greater numbers.
Again worth pointing out here are some flaws in the Danish approach and 
some ways in which it shows some a small element of convergence with the UK.  
Although activation generally reaches a large proportion of claimants, there are some 
gaps which claimants can fall through. Despite being classed as ready for work with 
some assistance, Flex Benefit claimants have gotten very limited support, and this is 
decreasing over time.  This is entirely consistent with the interview data, with several 
interviewees and other sources showing that the model Denmark has established 
breaks down for claimants further from the labour market, due to the very high 
investment costs relative to the low likelihood of labour market return. This also 
appears to be the case for Resource Scheme participants – supposedly a new priority 
for the Danish government – but given that it only started in 2013, it will take a few 
more years to see a trend develop. This does, however, fit with the low investment in 
the scheme relative to the recommended amount and to other similar schemes like 
Vocational Rehabilitation.  There is also considerable geographical variance, and 
activation is clearly higher on the local agenda in some areas than others.
Additionally, there is some element of gaming around benefit categories that 
Share Activated and Activation Intensity cannot pick up on easily: interviewees 
reported that claimants are transferred Match 3, where there are no obligations to 
provide activation, or to other benefits like Social Assistance, where it is reported by 
disability groups claimants get very limited specialist support because of their benefit 
categorisation. This strongly reminiscent of the transfer of IB claimants to JSA. 
The comparison now moves on to how what extent of support claimants receive in the
two countries, and how this is influenced by the systems that are in place.  Regarding 
Denmark, it is clear from the two measures of activation length that very large 
amounts of support can be provided. The average Rehabilitation claimant spends 
around 85% of their claim period in activation, to the tune of around 30 hours a week. 
Whilst this is not typical, it does show the lengths to which the Danish system can go.
More typical would be an SB claimant, spending 25% of their claim period in 
activation, around 4 hours each week.  Given the non-availability of similar data in the
UK, the comparison is inevitably imprecise, but it is clear from the interviews and 
from other qualitative data that such levels of support are not available – 4 hours a 
week – is not the norm on UK programmes.  On the contrary, there is evidence of 
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extensive parking of claimants on the Work Programme, and on Work Choice to a 
lesser extent. Unlike the Danish steering tools, the differential payments system on the
Work Programme does not drive providers to invest in support for participants they 
perceive as harder-to-help.
Again, however, it is possible to detect some small element of convergence of 
the two. There has been considerable system-wide political pressure in Denmark for 
shorter activation periods, and indeed Activation Intensity drops for all groups apart 
from Rehabilitation and Pre-Rehabilitation. Similarly, the Flexjob rules have been 
changed to move subsidies over to lower-hours jobs.
9.5 The form and strength of institutionalisation of activation in 
Denmark and the UK
Given the emphasis I have placed throughout this presentation of the research upon 
the importance of understanding the detail and nuances of how the activation regimes
operate in the two countries, I am somewhat reluctant to come to a conclusion about 
the strength of institutionalisation of activation in the sense of labelling each country. 
A description of Denmark and the UK as 'strongly' or 'weakly' institutionalised will 
inevitably gloss over these nuances, as well as ossifying what I have argued to be an 
essentially dynamic processes.  Further, the purpose of the model presented was to 
provide through the concept of institutionalisation a different and better way of 
understanding the nature of activation regimes for sick and disabled claimants, rather 
than to allow the user to arrive at a definitive conclusion for each country.  The way I 
square this circle is to invoke the comparativist's privilege: whilst I am reluctant to 
label one or the other as strongly or weakly institutionalised, the strength of 
institutionalsiation in the two countries can be stated in comparison to one another – 
i.e. whether the provision of activation support is more strongly or less strongly 
institutionalised in Denmark than the UK.
In most of the aspects that the framework argues to be important, employment 
support is clearly more strongly institutionalised in Denmark than the UK. It is 
underpinned by a longstanding political commitment to providing employment 
support not in a discretionary manner to serve government strategy – to increase the 
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effective labour supply and lower dependency ratios, for example – but because it is a 
recognised part of a non-employed citizen's social rights. This and the particular 
method of funding of most social policies mean that government is locked into very 
generous expenditure that pays for a fairly wide range of services, a commitment that 
cannot quickly or easily be reduced.  Also arising naturally from this is a strong 
system of direct regulation and indirect steering by financial incentives that, albeit 
unevenly and with blindspots, particularly regarding claimants with complex barriers 
to employment, appears to do a largely effective job of protecting this right. Crucially 
also, although the likelihood of job outcomes does clearly have an impact on the 
provision of support, this sits alongside a mostly respected recognition that citizens 
have a right in law to access some minimum support that cannot be abrogated by the 
municipality's assessment that such support may not result in the citizen getting 
employment.
The experience in the UK, particularly by the end of the period of interest, 
appears to be quite the opposite. Political commitment to offering some basic package 
of support to most claimants was relatively strong in the UK context at the start of the
period, but diminished rapidly after the perceived failure of Pathways. Consequently, 
funding of successor support has been much more cautious, the budgetary freedom of 
UK central government meaning that funding can be directed away relatively easily.  
Employment support is fundamentally a discretionary government service, and there 
is no legal codification of what support the claimant is entitled to. As such, UK 
government does not have an established role in ensuring support is provided beyond 
an extremely weak set of minimum standards associated with the current major 
employment programme, which are anyway so nebulous as to be unenforceable. The 
funding systems underpinning the major programmes are the only protection for 
claimants from parking, and these appear largely ineffective, although the majority 
service fee system for supported employment programmes does appear to offer some 
better guarantee of some meaningful support over the medium term.
However, there are two further points to make that problematise this hitherto fairly 
neat distinction.  Firstly, both systems have a series of mechanisms which, in the term 
used in this thesis, 'sort and select' within the sickness and disability benefit claimant 
pool, providing more intensive support to certain groups – almost always those closer 
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to the labour market – and less (or even sometimes effectively no) support to those 
identified as further. This happens at several distinct levels in different ways.  Firstly, 
at the highest level, most notably in Denmark with regard Disability Pension 
claimants – a large group of around 260,000 people – until very recently, a certain 
benefit group or sub-group may be formally outside the active system. Secondly, even 
if harder-to-help claimants are within the scope of activation, they may fall foul of 
high programme access criteria used to ration support, or, unintentionally, suffer from
crowding-out from more labour-market ready claimants as appears to have been the 
case with Flexjobs and Work Choice, the third mechanism. Again this is process that 
may be worsened by of rationing of support and is also more likely to happen if the 
breadth of support on offer is inconsistent with the needs of the sick and disabled 
claimants looking for support. There were several examples in both countries of this 
being the justification for parking of claimants.
The second caveat is that this is clearly some convergence between the two, 
driven mainly, it seems by Denmark moving away from its extant approach. The 
drivers of this appear to be reduced political willingness to fund resource-intensive 




Chapter 10 Conclusion 
10.1 Summary of the research and the contribution it makes
Throughout these 10 chapters, an attempt has been made to draw on the very rich 
heritage the last 20 years of ALMP studies bequeaths to a researcher in order to bring 
a new perspective to an academic debate that sometimes appears to revisit the same 
issues time and time again.  The project's approach to studying the activation of sick 
and disabled claimants is characterised by a desire to establish how well the practice 
of activating this group – previously a peripheral one – has become embedded in the 
everyday operation of the activation regimes of the two countries.  This is a desire 
driven by a suspicion – based on a review of existing activation literature – that this 
embededness may be less the case than either the proponents or the critics of welfare 
to work for sick and disabled claimants assume.  Taken to its natural conclusion, the 
concept of institutionalisation as constructed here suggests that policy change in 
welfare to work for this group is driven at least as much by the internal dynamics of 
target setting; central management of service providers to align their practice with 
political objectives, and the consistency of policy tools with policy targets as by 
specific policy decisions to choose one type of programme or intervention over 
another.
Institutionalisation as a concept has been able to usefully distinguish the UK from 
Denmark, yet at the same time pick up on some important but otherwise easily missed
similarities. Governments in welfare states as different as these two that seek to 
integrate claimants of these benefits into employment face many of the same problems
in providing appropriate back-to-work support.  Perhaps most distinctively, the study 
has shown how two very different activation regimes 'sort and select' sick and 
disabled claimants for activation in very similar ways, with certain sub-sets of the 
overall claimant pool – almost always those nearer to the labour market – being 
prioritised for support. This points to the need for more attention to be paid to how 
governments respond to the diversity of sick and disabled benefit claimants and of 
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their needs.
The study has strengthened my belief that when analysing the activation of 
sick and disabled benefit claimants – and indeed perhaps any social policy – the devil 
is very much in the detail, and that broad overviews will often trade large-n 
comparability with accuracy. I choose my words carefully and deliberately here. This 
is not just a matter of broad overviews offering less rich or nuanced pictures of 
welfare regimes – although this is also the case. Rather, detecting and appreciating the
importance of those nuances is crucial to an accurate overall understanding.  The 
framework has offered a way to identify what detail is important and what relevance 
it has. Flexjobs is a good example here. Etherington and Ingold (2012) are right in a 
broad sense to call it an inclusive labour market strategy as that is what it was 
designed to do – broaden access to the labour market. It is a large, generously-funded 
scheme that claimants can access by right providing they meet the qualifying 
conditions. However, when one judges it against the framework offered, for example, 
looking at who gets access to it – people already in employment and those already 
close to the labour market and how political commitment to it has changed – sharply 
declining in recent years – it shows up in a different light, and should be seen as less 
inclusive than they argue. The same applies to Work Choice in the UK – apparently a 
step away from the usual poorly-resourced, work-first model given that it is a 
significant expansion on previous supported employment schemes, but it looks less so 
when one considers how it serves a different, closer to the labour market population 
than previous schemes, with a significantly reduced per-head budget.
10.2 Next steps
The concept of institutionalisation is not one that has been used in ALMP analysis and
thus the concept here has been developed iteratively and in a grounded way from 
existing ALMP literature. It has been operationalised into a great many measures, and 
inevitably there will be some scope for refinement and concision. If a concept is to be 
useful, then clearly a potential user needs to be able to unpack and use it in a rather 
more compact way than the ~85,000 words it has taken here.  Part of that process 
might involve seeking to adapt the concept for studying the activation of groups other
than than sick and disabled benefit claimants. Certainly, many of the factors that have 
334
been argued to be important – designing out creaming and parking behaviour and 
matching up a diverse set of claimants with a diverse set of services – are issues that 
have been discussed by others in relation to immigrants and lone parents. 
An important unforseen issue that emerged in the comparison between the two 
countries is the quite different legal and regulatory basis of activation. It has been 
shown that Denmark has something that approaches a de jure right to activation, with
clearly specified amounts and types of support being laid out in legislation. The UK, 
meanwhile, appears to guarantee very little to claimants, with a weak basis for 
programme participants to seek redress in response to poor services.  Given recent 
interest in the legal underpinnings of activation (Aerschot, 2013); what Benish (2014) 
calls 'administrative justice' in activation, and increasing amounts of activation being 
provided through non-state institutions, a project looking at the legal and regulatory 
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A7 Parliamentary and Health Ombudsman complaints
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Appendix B Danish  Information Requests
B.1 Resource Scheme effectiveness projections 
The relevant figures here are in the second half of the slide. The forecasts are that RS 
will succeed in diverting 30% from DP, but most of the movement will be to Social 
Assistance (the 25% figure) rather than into employment or a Flexjob (the 5% figure)
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B.2 Resource Scheme expenditure and caseload projections 
First slide: The relevant figure here is the projected activation expenditure under 
Ressourceforlob, indsats. The second slide shows projected caseloads. The first divided 
by the second gives the per head spending figures quoted.
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